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1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH TOPIC 
Researchers have long been interested in understanding how firms are able adapt to ongoing 
internal and external change (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984). In our pursuit 
of contributing to this phenomenon, in this dissertation we build upon three core topics: 
‘Business Models’, ‘Dynamic Capabilities’ and ‘High-Growth Firms’. With the increased 
environmental dynamism (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007), these three related research topics 
have gained momentum in recent years (Demir, Wennberg, & McKelvie, 2017; Massa, Tucci, 
& Afuah, 2017; Schilke, Hu, & Helfat, 2018). In what follows, we elucidate how these three 
research topics are interlinked and how we address them throughout this doctoral dissertation. 
The high environmental dynamism of today’s business environment is driven by technological 
and digital disruptions and the disruptive growth of innovative business models (Cozzolino, 
Verona, & Rothaermel, 2018; Teece, 2018a). Firms that bring about business model innovation 
are able to grow rapidly and put a lot of pressure on incumbent firms (Kim & Min, 2015). A 
well-known example is Netflix, that changed its DVD delivery business model into an online 
streaming platform and by doing so changed the state of art in the movie rental industry (Snihur 
& Zott, 2019). The biggest player in the industry at the time, Blockbuster, which was operating 
with physical movie rental stores did not manage to adjust its business model to the changing 
circumstances and only a few years after the introduction of Netflix’ disruptive business model 
filed for bankruptcy (Ahuja & Novelli, 2016). Polaroid (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) and Nokia 
(Vuori & Huy, 2016) faced the same challenges, the two top performers in their industries lost 
the battle because of their inability to adapt to the change they faced. These cases exemplify 
two important trends in today’s business environment. On the one hand, firms that are able to 
design innovative business models that allow them to achieve and sustain high growth are able 
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to quickly capture an important share of the market in which they operate (Markides, 2008). 
On the other hand, incumbent firms face the challenge of adjusting their business models in 
order to protect their competitive position in the constantly changing business environment 
(Saebi, Lien, & Foss, 2017).  
Why some firms are able to continuously adjust to changing circumstances while others are not 
is a question that scholars have sought to answer for years. Over the last twenty years, the 
dynamic capabilities perspective has been embraced by scholars in their search to answer this 
question. Dynamic capabilities represent the important ability of organizations to achieve 
evolutionary fitness by purposefully extending and modifying their resource and capability base 
(Barreto, 2010; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Helfat & Peteraf, 2009; Helfat 
& Winter, 2011; Schilke et al., 2018; Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997). 
In early studies, the focus of dynamic capabilities has been particularly on organizational 
processes that allow firms to alter the way they make a living (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; 
Teece et al., 1997). However, since managers are the key agents of adaptation and change, and 
organizational processes reflect top managers’ beliefs and ideas (Zahra, Sapienza, & 
Davidsson, 2006), there has been increasingly argued that capabilities must be utilized properly 
by top management in order to be effective (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). As the role of top 
managers in the guidance of dynamic capabilities has been increasingly stressed by scholars, it 
has developed into a subfield of dynamic managerial capabilities (DMC) (Helfat & Martin, 
2015; Teece, 2018b). Dynamic managerial capabilities are the capabilities with which managers 
create, extend, and modify organizational resources and competencies (Adner & Helfat, 2003: 
1012; Helfat & Martin, 2015).  
Teece (2018b) argues that the ability of designing and implementing business model innovation 
is an important feature of DMC. In today’s fast changing environment, he argues, it might be 
even the most important feature. Studies have shown that firms that innovate their business 
model i.e., firms that make designed, novel and nontrivial changes to the way they create and 
capture value, tend to outperform their competitors in almost every industry (Zott & Amit, 
2007). Nevertheless, business model innovation (BMI) is a highly complex managerial task 
(Snihur & Zott, 2019) and although some managers have designed successful BMI in response 
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to the changing environmental circumstances, many others have experienced strong difficulties 
and failed to go through the process of BMI successfully (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; 
Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). The increased number of studies on the relation between DMC and 
BMI indicates that top management team’s DMC are of crucial importance for the successful 
innovation of the firm’s business model (Foss & Saebi, 2017; Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019; 
Helfat & Martin, 2015; Martins, Rindova, & Greenbaum, 2015; Schneider & Spieth, 2013). 
The current state in the dynamic capabilities literature also indicates that the development of 
dynamic capabilities has primarily been studied in either new ventures or more mature firms 
(Autio, George, & Alexy, 2011). However, it also provides an important theoretical backdrop 
to study how High-Growth Firms (HGFs) manage to continually adapt to the changing 
circumstances. HFGs, often referred to as scale-ups, are defined as organizations with at least 
20% of annual growth rate in terms of revenue and/or employees over a three-year period, and 
with at least 10 employees in the base year (OECD, 2007). While rapidly scaling in size, the 
internal environments of scale-ups ‘suffer’ from dramatic changes in managerial scope, and 
continuous and fast change, which often results in the inappropriateness of practices and 
structures in place (Nicholls-Nixon, 2005). Moreover, rapid growth results in important 
challenges for (managerial) skills, organizational practices and structures, and (human) 
resource needs (Hambrick & Crozier, 1985; Lee, 2014). Although some studies have provided 
valuable insights into the challenges of HGFs, there is a sparsity of studies addressing how these 
firms manage to overcome these managerial challenges. This means that our current 
understanding about the foundations of and processes underlying sustained high growth has 
remained rather limited (Demir et al., 2017; Wright & Stigliani, 2013). 
As only a small proportion of around three percent of all firms is able to overcome the 
challenges of high growth and thus sustains high growth over prolonged periods of time 
(Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 2000; Feindt, Jeffcoate, & Chappell, 2002; Lopez-Garcia & Puente, 
2012), scholars have started to show interest in the strategic characteristics of such 
organizations (Demir et al., 2017; Jansen et al., 2020). Scalability, which broadly refers to the 
ability to obtain and sustain profitable growth (Picken, 2017), has been argued to be a specific 
characteristic of HGFs that set them apart from other growing organizations (DeSantola & 
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Gulati, 2017). Firms that are able to design and implement scalable business models might be 
able to sustain high growth over time (Zhang, Lichtenstein, & Gander, 2015). However, studies 
on what scalable business models are and how firms configure their business models to make 
them scalable are lacking (Jansen et al., 2020). 
Taken collectively, studies have shown that in today’s fast changing business environment 
firms either achieve high growth or their competitive position is challenged by competitors that 
do. On the one hand, firms that achieve high growth face the managerial challenge of designing 
scalable business models and adjusting their organizational practices to the constantly changing 
circumstances. On the other hand, firms that are challenged by fast growing competitors face 
the challenge of innovating their business model in order to protect their competitive position. 
Either way, firms rely on their dynamic capabilities, guided by the top management team, to 
address those challenges. Despite important insights, there remain significant gaps in our 
understanding of how firms do this.  
First, we know that incumbent firms rely on the dynamic managerial capabilities of their top 
management team in the process of business model innovation (Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019; 
Teece, 2018b). However, there remains an important gap in our understanding of how the DMC 
of individual top managers are brought together within a team in this business model innovation 
process (Brettel, Flatten, Bendig, da Costa, & Strese, 2018; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). This is 
an important blind spot because understanding how firms sense and seize opportunities requires 
the examination of the interpersonal mechanisms that allow top management teams to combine 
the individual DMC within the team (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018).   
Second, research has shown that, even though only a small proportion of firms manages to do 
it, achieving and sustaining high growth is possible. Yet, current literature tells us little about 
how HGFs deal with the challenges of constant adaptation to the changing circumstances that 
come with fast growth (Demir et al., 2017; Wright & Stigliani, 2013). This is a crucial omission 
because a thorough understanding of HGFs requires the examination of the dynamic patterns 
by which rapid growth evolves and the specific capabilities required to adapt to internal and 
external contingencies over time (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Simsek, 2009). 
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Third, scholars have argued that designing scalable business models is what sets high-growth 
firms apart from other organizations (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017; Zhang et al., 2015). However, 
existing literature fails to explain how HGFs design their value creating and capturing activities 
to facilitate and manage high growth over time (Mom, 2019; Simsek, Heavey, & Fox, 2017). 
This is an important gap in our understanding because a thorough understanding of both 
business model scalability and HGFs requires an in-depth understanding of the key 
characteristics of scalable business models (Jansen et al., 2020). As such, there is a clear need 
for insights about how HGFs configure their business model elements in order to ensure long 
term scalability. Figure 1.1 visualizes the relation between the three topics of this dissertation.  
Figure 1.1 Visualization of relation between research topics of the dissertation 
 
In sum, whereas current literature has provided important insights into the phenomena, this 
dissertation builds on the notion that there is still much left to learn about how organizations 
deal with both internal and external changes when growing fast and how organizations protect 
themselves from their fast-growing competitors.  
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In order the strengthen and develop our understanding of how organizations deal with these 
challenges, in this dissertation we set out to conduct three empirical studies (chapters 3, 4 and 
5). Each study addresses one of the of blind spots identified in the literature. Based on the 
identified opportunities for further research, three research questions have been developed that 
together attempt to improve our understanding of the phenomena under study: 
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1) How do top management’s dynamic managerial capabilities combine in the process of 
business model innovation? 
2) What are the managerial and organizational capabilities that enable sustained high growth 
and how are they created and enacted over time? 
3) How do high-growth firms design scalable business models that enable them to create and 
capture value over prolonged periods of high growth? 
Each question aims to solve a different part of the puzzle we try to contribute to throughout this 
dissertation and therefore each study has different objectives. The objective of the first study is 
twofold. First and most importantly, we aim to extend prior research on dynamic managerial 
capabilities by unraveling the interpersonal mechanisms that allow top managers to combine 
the dynamic managerial capabilities of individual top managers within the top management 
team (Brettel et al., 2018; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). A second objective of the first study is to 
bridge the gap between dynamic managerial sensing and seizing capabilities, an important link 
for the successful deployment of dynamic capabilities on which prior research has remained 
silent (Roberts & Grover, 2012; Schilke et al., 2018). 
The main objective of the second study is to move beyond the rather static insights about 
initiation and achievement of high growth (Barbero, Casillas, & Feldman, 2011; Chan, 
Bhargava, & Street, 2006; Stam & Wennberg, 2009) and illustrate how high-growth firms 
dynamically sustain their scaling over prolonged periods of time. To accomplish this, two 
concrete objectives have been formulated. First, we aim to identify the dynamic capabilities 
that allow HGFs to sustain fast growth over time and to illustrate how these capabilities 
contribute to overcoming the challenges of fast growth. The second objective is to illuminate 
how HGFs enhance and develop their dynamic capabilities over time (Ford & Friesl, 2019; 
Montealegre, 2002). 
The third study has a similar main purpose as study two: providing a more dynamic perspective 
on high growth through the lens of Business Models. To do this, we aim to identify the key 
characteristics of scalable business model designs. By zooming in to the core elements of 
HGFs’ business models, our aim is to provide a more dynamic perspective on and deeper 
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understanding of how specific characteristics of the business model elements facilitate 
scalability over time (Zhang et al., 2015; Zott & Amit, 2010).  
All in all, the general objective of this dissertation is to extend our understanding of how, on 
the one hand, firms are able to deal with the challenges of sustaining high growth, and on the 
other hand, can protect themselves from their fast-growing competitors.  
1.3 RESEARCH METHODS 
Given the limited theory and evidence about the phenomena under study, we utilize a qualitative 
research approach in our attempt to answer the research questions. More specifically, we use 
theory-building case study research designs in the three empirical studies (Corley & Gioia, 
2004; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012; Yin, 
1984). Case studies are particularly suited to answer the ‘how’ research questions that we set 
out to study in this dissertation (Lee, 1999; Yin, 2014). Moreover, case studies are useful to 
develop theory on how complex organizational processes unfold over time (Langley, 1999).  
1.3.1 Research Methods Study 1 
To answer the question of how the dynamic managerial capabilities of individual top managers 
combine within the team, in the first study we adopted an inductive theory-building single case 
study design that allowed us to capture the longitudinal, processual nature of this process 
(Langley, 1999; Yin, 2014). We conducted our study in the biggest independent fashion retailer 
in the Netherlands, which we refer to as Clothing, as we believe it to be a revelatory and 
exemplary context that enables us to gain insights that might not be possible in more typical 
cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Sigglekow, 2007). We specifically focused the analysis 
on the process in which Clothing innovated its business model by adding an online business 
model to its physical offline business model. 
Our main source of data came from private interviews with the top management team members 
of Clothing which were conducted in three formal round of data collection. In total we 
conducted nine interviews with the top management team members of Clothing and 
triangulated our findings by analyzing 246 documents of archival data. Following the ‘Gioia 
method’ (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Langley & Abdallah, 2011), we first open-coded the interviews 
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to develop first order codes. Then, by relying on the constant comparison method (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998), we grouped first order codes into second-order themes to bring the data to a 
more conceptual level. After that, we grouped the second-order themes into aggregate 
dimensions and created a data structure (Gioia et al., 2012). Finally, we developed an 
empirically grounded process model of how dynamic managerial capabilities combine in the 
process of business model innovation. 
1.3.2 Research Methods Study 2 
To answer the second research question: what are the managerial and organizational capabilities 
that enable sustained high growth and how are they created and enacted over time?, we also 
adopted a single case study approach (Gehman et al., 2018). The selected case in this study was 
Takeaway, one of the biggest food order and delivery platforms worldwide and the fastest 
growing organization in the Netherlands. We have specifically chosen to focus on Takeaway 
as a single case for our study as it represents a prototypical exemplar of a highly successful 
scale-up company (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Sigglekow, 2007). 
Data was collected over a 30-month period from 2017 to 2019. In total we conducted 30 
interviews with the founder/CEO, board members and senior managers1. We triangulated our 
findings by analyzing 1,822 pages of archival documents. Similar to the approach in study 1, 
we built upon the ‘Gioia method’ to analyze our data. We followed good practice of qualitative 
data analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 2014; Miles & Huberman, 1994) and developed a data 
structure by grouping first-order codes into second-order themes and combining them in 
aggregate dimension. Finally, we developed a grounded process model that illustrates how 
Takeaway was able to achieve and sustain high growth over an extended period of time. 
1.3.3 Research Methods Study 3 
While the first two studies of this doctoral dissertation build upon a single case study approach, 
the third and final paper draws upon a multiple-case study research design (Eisenhardt & 
 
1 The data that has been used in empirical studies two and three, which are presented in chapters four and five 
respectively, has been collected in collaboration with a group of researchers from the Department of Strategic 
Management and Entrepreneurship of Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), Erasmus University.  
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Graebner, 2007). To answer the question how high-growth firms design their business models 
to ensure business model scalability over time, we opted for a multiple-case method because it 
allowed us to follow the replication logic and test emerging insights within each additional case 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). We selected three of the most successful high-growth firms in 
the Netherlands with a proven record of scaling-up as we believed these firms would provide 
valuable insights into the characteristics of scalable business model designs. 
The main data source were in-depth interviews with founders, CEOs, board members, and 
senior managers. A total of 33 interviews were conducted and 1,574 pages of archival material 
were analyzed to triangulate findings. We went through an iterative process of data analysis 
and recursively cycled among the case data, emerging theory and extant literature to refine our 
theoretical insights (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1994). By reflecting 
emerging insights to the existing business model literature, we were able to group the empirical 
codes into theory-based themes related to the key elements of the business model (Mantere & 
Ketokivi, 2013). 
1.4 DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
The structure of this dissertation can be divided into three parts. First, chapters 1 and 2 provide 
a general theoretical overview. The introduction of chapter 1 contains the motivation of the 
research topic, the major research questions and objectives, and an outline of the theories that 
are used throughout the dissertation. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical introduction of the 
concepts that will be studied in the three empirical studies. The key theoretical lenses that will 
be addressed are ‘Dynamic Capabilities’ and ‘Business Models’. These concepts provide the 
theoretical basis for the three empirical studies. The phenomenon ‘High-Growth Firms’ shall 
also be introduced in chapter 2 as it plays an important role in studies two and three. Rather 
than providing a comprehensive literature review, we provide an introduction of the state-of-
art of the literature on HGFs and position the empirical studies in this literature. 
The second part consists of the three empirical studies conducted with the aim to answer the 
research questions we set out to study in this dissertation. Every chapter will have its own 
introduction, theoretical framework, results, and discussion and will hence represent an 
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independent research paper. Chapter 3 presents the first study, which is called “Without friction, 
no shine: How top management’s Dynamic Managerial Capabilities combine in the process of 
Business Model Innovation”. Study two, called “Reinforcing complementarities for Sustained 
High Growth” is presented in chapter 4. The final chapter of the second part, chapter 5, presents 
the last empirical study which is called “Designing Scalable Business Models: Lessons from 
Netherlands’ most successful Scale-ups”. Figure 1.2 visualizes the outline of the doctoral 
dissertation and shows how the three core concepts are brought together in the three empirical 
studies. 
Figure 1.2 Outline of the doctoral dissertation 
 
In the final part of the dissertation, chapter 6, we present the general conclusions and 
contributions of the three empirical studies. In this part, the contributions to the three core 
streams of literature of this dissertation and the managerial implications are summarized. 
 







Chapter 2:  
General Theoretical Framework 
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This doctoral dissertation builds upon three core subjects, the theoretical perspectives ‘Business 
Models’ and ‘Dynamic Capabilities’, and the phenomenon ‘High-Growth Firms’. The aim of 
this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive literature review of everything that has been 
studied in the field. Rather, it is to provide a theoretical introduction of the three core subjects 
that will be addressed throughout the three empirical studies of this doctoral dissertation. 
2.2 BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION 
The Business Model (BM) literature traces its origin back to 1954 where Peter Drucker 
introduced the concept in his book, The Practice of Management (Drucker, 1954). According 
to Drucker (1954) a good business model answers two main questions: ‘Who is the customer 
and what does the customer value?’. In 1960, the first academic article using ‘business model’ 
in its title was published (Jones, 1960). However, The BM concept became the focus of a 
substantial number of studies since the mid-1990s. Scholars surmise that the emergence of the 
business model concept may has been driven by the advent of the internet (Zott, Amit, & Massa, 
2011). The first studies on BMs were mostly practitioner-oriented and have been published in 
non-academic journals. Therefore, research published in academic journals long lagged behind 
practice (Zott et al., 2011). Nevertheless, since 2005 the number of publications in academic 
journals is increasing significantly. Foss and Saebi (2017) indicate that BM research is 
attracting very significant attention, not just in practitioner-oriented studies, but also 
increasingly from various research communities. 
Despite these developments, the business model concept is still being referred to in many 
different ways and scholars still debate about what the business model actually “is” (Massa et 
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al., 2017). Wirtz, Pistoia, Ullrich, and Göttel (2016: 37) argue that “there is still no complete 
clarity in the literature, in particular about the purpose or the right of the business model 
approach to exist, or even the contrast to established concepts”. The lack of agreement makes 
the business model a slippery construct to study (Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013). However, 
such a strong increase of research on a topic is likely to happen when the phenomenon is broadly 
seen as highly important, ill-understood, but the problem of understanding is not so badly 
defined or ill-structured that inquiry seems near hopeless (Foss & Saebi, 2017). Hence, the 
business model is an important phenomenon that is still in need of cumulative research to 
overcome this lack of clarity and conceptual agreement (e.g. Foss & Saebi, 2017b; Massa et al., 
2017; Zott et al., 2011). 
2.2.1 Business model perspectives 
Terminology has not kept pace with the ways business models are described, allowing the 
business model literature to branch into different research streams (Massa et al., 2017) and to 
develop various perspectives (Ritter & Lettl, 2017). Massa and colleagues (2017) divide the 
interpretations of the business model into three major streams: (1) Business models as attributes 
of real firms i.e., how firms do business, (2) business models as cognitive/linguistic schema i.e., 
how the way firms do business is interpreted by organizational members, and (3) business 
models as formal conceptual representations/descriptions of how on organization functions i.e., 
how streams (1) and (2) could be represented in a formal conceptualization (e.g. symbolic, 
mathematical, or graphical). 
2.2.1.1 The business model activity perspective  
The research stream business models as attributes of real firms describes how a firm does 
business by explaining the value creation and capture logic (Magretta, 2002; Ritter & Lettl, 
2017; Zott & Amit, 2010). Archetypes such as the ‘razor-and-blade’ (Casadesus-Masanell & 
Zhu, 2013; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) and the ‘freemium’ (Cosenz & Noto, 2018; Rietveld, 
2018) business model have been used to describe the generic logic of how firms do business. 
Archetypes describe the business model in the most general sense but do not address the 
underlying logic of how a firm creates and captures value. The underlying logic of value 
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creation and capture is explained by the activity perspective of the business model (Ritter & 
Lettl, 2017). Zott and Amit (2010: 217) referred to the business model as “a set of 
interdependent organizational activities centered on a focal firm, including those conducted by 
the focal firm, its partners, vendors or customers, etc.”. In later work, Snihur and Zott (2019: 
5), defined the business model as “a boundary-spanning activity system that centers on a focal 
firm, yet may encompass activities performed by its partners, suppliers, and customers in the 
pursuit of value creation and capture”.  
Following this perspective, the business model consists of three core elements: content, 
governance and structure (Amit & Zott, 2001; Saebi & Foss, 2015; Zott & Amit, 2010). Content 
refers to the selection of value creating and capturing activities that are performed within the 
boundary-spanning system. Governance refers to who performs the activities and addresses 
issues of control, and who is in charge of the activities (Snihur & Zott, 2019). Structure refers 
to how the activities are linked and sequenced. Teece (2010) refers to structure as the business 
model architecture. The architectural perspective points out that the business model is not a 
mere list of activities for creating and capturing value. Rather, the architecture specifies the 
interdependencies and relations among the various activities and mechanisms in the system 
(Foss & Saebi, 2017). The content, governance and structure of the activity perspective together 
explain how a firm creates and captures value. 
Four design themes, which have been theoretically proposed and empirically tested, explain the 
sources of value creation within the activity perspective (Amit & Zott, 2001; Hock, Clauss, & 
Schulz, 2016; Zott & Amit, 2010). Summarized in the NICE framework, Zott and Amit (2010) 
proposed Novelty, Lock-In, Complementarities and Efficiency as business model design 
themes, representing sources of value creation. Novelty refers to the adoption of new activities 
(content), changes in the governances by (re)appointing who is in charge of the activities 
(governance), and/or (re)designing novel linkages between the activities (structure). Novelty 
can be introduced by the firm into one or more elements of the business model separately or 
combined in a coordinated way. Lock-In is the degree to which customers are motivated to 
repeat transactions and can be increased by, for instance, increasing switching costs and loyalty 
programs (Amit & Zott, 2001). Complementarities are present when a combination of goods, 
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services, or activities provides more value than the total value of having them separately (Amit 
& Zott, 2001). In the business model, complementarities are present whenever bundling 
activities provide more value than running activities separately (Zott & Amit, 2010), and 
explain the uniqueness and rigidity of the business model (Foss & Saebi, 2018). Efficiency 
refers to reducing transaction costs (Williamson, 1979). This can be realized by, for instance, 
reducing information asymmetries between stakeholders such as buyers and sellers, reducing 
search costs, and reducing the possibility of opportunistic behavior by one of the stakeholders 
(Amit & Zott, 2001). Table 2.1 presents the main dimensions and themes according to activity 
system design framework. 
Table 2.1 Business model as an activity system design framework 
Design Elements  
Content What activities are performed? 
Structure How should the activities be linked and sequenced? 
Governance Who performs the activities and where are they performed? 
  
Design Themes  
Novelty Adopt innovative content, structure and/or governance 
Lock-In Build in elements to retain business model stakeholders, e.g. customers 
Complementarities Bundle actitivities to generate more value  
Efficiency Reorganise activities to reduce transaction costs 
Source: Zott & Amit (2010: 222) 
2.2.1.2 Business Models as cognitive schemes  
The second stream of research describes how organizational members interpret the way firms 
do business. Authors following this approach argue that managers do not hold real systems in 
mind while making decisions. Rather, their decisions are influenced by their own cognitive 
schemes (Massa et al., 2017). In this line, Teece (2010: 191) argues that “a business model 
reflects management’s hypothesis about what customers want, how they want it and what they 
will pay, and how an enterprise can organize to best meet customer needs, and get paid well for 
doing so”. This stream of research (business models as cognitive/linguistic schema) emphasizes 
the role of the top management team and more specifically top managers’ managerial cognition 
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(e.g. Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Johnson & Hoopes, 2003). Hence, it describes why the business 
model is designed in a certain way. 
Prior studies have addressed the impact of cognition on business models (Frankenberger & 
Sauer, 2019; George & Bock, 2011; Martins et al., 2015; Osiyevskyy & Dewald, 2015). Morris, 
Schindehutte and Allen (2005) in their study find that business model choices are directly 
influenced by the cognitive capabilities and skills of management team members to interpret 
the needs for their organizations. Osiyevskyy and Dewald (2015) show that management’s 
perceptions directly influence the choice for exploitative or explorative business model 
innovation. In a similar vein, Frankenberger and Sauer (2019) find that TMT’s attention 
patterns explain their BM design choices. The aforementioned studies all prove empirically that 
managerial cognition affects business model design choices.  
As Täuscher and Abdelkafi (2017) put it, the business model is like a painting. Paintings are an 
objective reality that represent the painter’s ideas and is interpreted by the viewer. In this view, 
managers use their knowledge and cognitive skills to make business model design choices. 
Their cognitive base is projected on the business model design and therefore, the business 
model reflects management’s cognition. However, although the business model (just like a 
painting) can be interpreted in various ways, the combination of activities is objectively 
presentable in the business model (just like the colors and size of a painting). Hence, in line 
with what prior studies have shown, we argue that management’s cognitive schemes are 
reflected in business model designs. However, the business model design itself is also 
objectively observable. We agree with Foss and Saebi (2017) and Spieth and colleagues (2014) 
that the link between managerial cognition and the business model is an interesting avenue for 
future research in which much work is still to be done. 
2.2.1.3 Business models as formal conceptual representations  
The third stream of research refers to the business model in a simplified and explicit, written 
down in pictorial, mathematical, or symbolic form (Massa et al., 2017). This stream of research, 
by Ritter and Lettl (2017) referred to as the business model elements perspective, proposes 
structuring business models on the basis of essential elements in order to capture the important 
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parts of a business (Ritter & Lettl, 2017). The use of such a conceptual representation of the 
business model is useful for managers and scholars in trying to make sense of the complexity 
of the concept (Massa et al., 2017). This stream of research thus focuses on what the most 
important elements (or components) of the business models are. Hence, the ‘what’ question 
does not focus on the microfoundations of the business model, but it is a simplified 
representation that allows managers to make sense out of the complex phenomenon. Since 
authors in the activity perspective and authors following the perspective of business models as 
formal conceptual representations use the term “elements” to refer to different things, we will 
henceforward use the term “components” in this stream of research to ensure terminological 
clarity. 
Studies adopting this perspective have suggested a variety of components that should be 
included to form a complete understanding of the business model. Johnson, Christensen, and 
Kagermann (2008) propose four key components of the business model: value proposition, 
profit formula, key resources, and key processes. Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) in their 
famous business model canvas, use nine components. Despite the variety of suggestions, the 
majority of studies seems to converge on the similar core components of the business model 
which are; value creation, value delivery, value capture, and the value proposition (Saebi & 
Foss, 2015; Teece, 2010; Wirtz et al., 2016; Zott et al., 2011). Some studies use other 
terminology and add components such as market segment, profit formula, and value chain 
structure as main components of the business model (Johnson, Christensen, & Kagermann, 
2008; Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010; Saebi, Lien, & Foss, 2017). We agree that those 
components are very important and parts of the business model. However, we believe them to 
be part of the inclusive key components stated above (see also Rayna & Striukova, 2016; Teece 
& Linden, 2017). Following the stream of research ‘business models as formal conceptual 
representations’, value creation derives from organizing activities in such a way that customers 
perceive higher value related to their needs and are willing to pay for the services or products. 
Value creation in the BM derives from core competencies, key resources, governance, 
complementary assets, and so on (Rayna & Striukova, 2016). Value delivery describes how the 
created value is delivered to customers and target market segments through different 
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distribution channels (Osterwalder, Pigneur, & Tucci, 2005; Rayna & Striukova, 2016). The 
created value has to be monetized by the focal firm. Value capture refers to the value exchange 
or appropriation. In other words, the objective of the BM is to benefit from the value created 
by generating a profit for the focal firm and its partners (Zott & Amit, 2010). The revenue 
capture mechanisms such as the revenue model to generate cash flow and the cost structure as 
well as the profit formula are part of the value capture component (Guo, Zhao, & Tang, 2013). 
Finally, value proposition refers to the reason why customers turn to one firm over another. A 
good value proposition creates value for customers and partners through a bundle of products 
and/or services that benefits customers and partners (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010). Thus, value 
has to be created, with the help of the value proposition, and captured with the help of the value 
delivering mechanisms. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the relations between the research 
streams and perspectives of the business model. 
Table 2.2 Relation between research streams and perspectives of the BM 
Research stream Business model perspective Key components Studies adopting the research streams and perspectives 
Business model as 
attributes of real firms  
– “How it is being done” 
Business model archetypes  Rietveld (2018); Amit & Zott (2012); 
Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart (2010); 
Business model activities  Amit & Zott (2001); Zott & Amit 
(2010); DaSilva & Trkman (2014); 
Business model 
alignment/architecture 
 Teece (2010); Zott & Amit (2010); 
Foss & Saebi (2017); Teece (2017); 
 Business model logics  Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart (2011); 
Snihur & Tarzijan (2018) 
Business models as 
conceptual 
representations  
– “What is being done” 
Business model elements 
(or components) 
- Value creation 
- Value capture 
- Value delivery 
- Value proposition 
Saebi & Foss (2015); Johnson et al 
(2008); Wirtz et al (2016); 
Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010); Zott et 
al (2011); Cosenz & Noto (2017); 
Source: Own elaboration based on Massa et al (2017) and Ritter & Lettl (2017) 
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2.2.1.4 Converging the business model streams and perspectives  
Dating back to when Peter Drucker (1954) first used the term in his book, the main purpose of 
the business model is to describe how a firm does business (Massa et al., 2017; Zott et al., 
2011). The underlying logic to do so are the firm’s activities, stressed in the activity perspective. 
The business model elements perspective offers a conceptual representation by grouping the 
underlying activities of the business model into certain components and helps scholars and 
managers to make sense of the complex phenomenon. The analogy we used about paintings 
describes why managerial cognition plays an important role in business model design decisions. 
Yet, we believe this stream of research fails to explain the underlying logic of the firm’s 
business model. Hence, we argue the research stream ‘business models as attributes of real 
firms’, reflected in the business model activity perspective to be the most promising future 
research line as it addresses the underlying logic of how a firm does business. Combining it 
with the ‘business models as formal conceptual representations’ stream of research can be a 
valuable way for researchers and practitioners alike to create more clarity within the complex 
phenomenon (see Table 2.3 for a visual representation). 
Table 2.3 Combining the Business Model research streams and perspectives 
What? Value proposition 
The bundle of products and/or services that benefits customers and partners 
Value creation 
Organizing activities in such a 
way that customers perceive 
higher value related to their 
needs and are willing to pay 
for the services or products. 
Value delivery 
How the created value is 
delivered to customers and 
target market segments 
through different distribution 
channels. 
Value capture 
How the created value is 
monetized by the focal firm in 
order to appropriate value for 
the focal firm and its partners. 
How? Organizing the content, 
structure and governance of 
value creating activities within 
the boundary spanning activity 
system 
Organizing the content, 
structure and governance of 
value delivery activities within 
the boundary spanning activity 
system 
Organizing the content, 
structure and governance of 
value capturing activities 
within the boundary spanning 
activity system 
Source: Own elaboration 
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2.2.2 Business model innovation 
While the business model has attracted significant attention of academics since the mid-1990’s, 
practitioner and scholarly interest in Business Model Innovation (BMI) has only started recently 
(Foss & Saebi, 2017). Prior research argued that the business model was the means through 
which organizations could commercialize innovative ideas and technologies (Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Zott et al., 2011). Those studies emphasized the role of the BM in realizing 
the full potential of product and process innovations (Björkdahl, 2009). In this vein, business 
model innovation is the means to an end, namely, leveraging the full potential of other types of 
innovation such as product or service innovation. Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) in their 
study show that Xerox Corporation’s technology spin-offs became successful through evolving 
the business model and changing it significantly from that of Xerox. The business model had 
to be adapted in order to leverage the full potential of early stage technology (Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom, 2002). More recently, the business model itself has become the subject of 
innovation (Schneider & Spieth, 2013). Although the notion that the business model itself can 
be innovated dates back to at least Mitchell and Coles (2003), only recently have scholars 
started to emphasize this (Foss & Saebi, 2017; Schneider & Spieth, 2013; Zott et al., 2011).   
Due to the relatively recent emphasis on the business model as a subject of innovation, it 
exhibits the characteristics of an emerging research stream, lacking conceptual clarity 
(Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013). Mitchell and Coles (2004: 17) provided one of the first 
definitions of BMI: “By business model innovation, we mean business model replacements that 
provide product or service offerings to customers and end users that were not previously 
available. We also refer to the process of developing these novel replacements as business 
model innovation”. More recently, authors have defined business model innovation as 
redefining content, structure, and governance of the activity system (Amit & Zott, 2012), and 
“the search for new logics of the firm and new ways to create and capture value for its 
stakeholders” (Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013: 464). Since there are different 
conceptualizations for the business model construct, it is no surprise that BMI has been defined 
in various ways. Nevertheless, Foss and Saebi (2017b: 216) in their literature review on 
business model innovation combine these insights and define business model innovation as 
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“designed, novel, and nontrivial changes to the key elements of a firm’s BM and/or the 
architecture linking these elements”.  
Disentangling the definition, BMI consists of two important parts. First, it entails designed, 
novel and nontrivial changes. ‘Designed changes’ indicates that BMI requires top management 
attention in order to mindfully design business model reconfigurations (Foss & Saebi, 2017). 
‘Novel changes’ refers to the adoption of new activities into the key elements of the business 
model (Zott & Amit, 2010). These activities can either be new to the focal firm, or new to the 
industry (see following part for further elaboration of novelty in BMI). The requirement of 
nontriviality excludes minor changes in, for instance, supplier relations or product portfolios 
from business model innovation (Foss & Saebi, 2017). Second, BMI refers to changes to the 
“key elements and/or the architecture linking the elements”. From a business model as elements 
perspective, this refers to changes to one or more of the business model components (the value 
proposition, creation, delivery and capture components) or the architecture linking the 
components. From an activity system perspective, this refers to changes into the content and 
governance (elements) and/or changes in the structure (architecture) of the boundary spanning 
activity system (Amit & Zott, 2012; Snihur & Zott, 2019). As the activity perspective 
constitutes the microfoundations of the business model, we argue business model innovation to 
be “designed, novel, and nontrivial changes to the content, governance and/or structure of the 
boundary-spanning activity system to create and capture value” 
Prior studies have not yet reached conceptual agreement on how much the business model needs 
to change to classify as business model innovation (Spieth & Schneider, 2016). Authors do not 
agree on the number of elements (scope) and the degree of newness (novelty) of change is 
needed to qualify as BMI (Foss & Saebi, 2017). Related to scope, some authors argue that the 
change of one single component of the BM is enough to qualify as business model innovation 
(e.g. Amit & Zott, 2012; Santos, Spector, & Van Der Heyden, 2009). Others argue that more 
than one component has to be changed to qualify as BMI, and still others suggest that an entirely 
new combination of the BM components and the architecture linking them is needed (e.g. 
Velamuri, Bansemir, Neyer, & Möslein, 2013). Regarding novelty, some authors suggest that 
the change of the business model has to be new to the industry to qualify as business model 
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innovation (e.g. Santos et al., 2009). Others argue that it can be defined as business model 
innovation when the innovation is new to the organization changing its business model, but not 
necessarily to the industry (e.g. Osterwalder et al., 2005). Foss and Saebi (2017) make a 
valuable contribution in providing conceptual clarity of the business model by dividing business 
model innovation into four business model typologies (see Table 2.4).  







 Modular Architectural 
New to firm Evolutionary BMI Adaptive BMI 
New to industry Focused BMI Complex BMI 
Source: Foss & Saebi (2017b: 217) 
Evolutionary BMI refers to the innovation of one or more elements of the business model 
without changing the architecture linking them, which is new to the firm. These changes often 
occur naturally over time and constitute the fine-tuning of the BM with voluntary and emergent 
changes (Demil & Lecocq, 2010). This can occur when the complementarities among different 
activities are not considered strong (Foss & Saebi, 2017). Adaptive BMI involves architectural 
changes in the BM that are new to the focal firm. This often occurs when firms proactively 
respond to changes in the external environment (Teece, 2010). Focused BMI and Complex BMI 
are ‘new to industry’ changes. Both can be defined as processes by which management actively 
engages in changes in the BMI to disrupt market conditions. Focused BMI occurs when the 
firm innovates within one component of the BM, such as targeting a new market segment. 
Complex BMI can be seen as the most complex and disruptive type of BMI in which the firm 
introduces a novel architecture of activities that is new to the industry. 
Linking the BMI typologies to the activity perspective, the four BMI typologies can be seen as 
follows: Evolutionary BMI (changes to the content and/or governance, new to the firm), 
Focused BMI (changes to the content and/or governance, new to the industry), Adaptive BMI 
(changes to the structure, new to the firm) and Complex BMI (changes to the structure, new to 
the industry) (see Table 2.5).  
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 Modular Architectural 
New to firm Evolutionary BMI 
Changes to the content and/or 
governance of activities that are 
new to the firm 
Adaptive BMI 
Changes to the structure of 
activities that are new to the 
firm 
New to industry Focused BMI 
Changes to the content and/or 
governance of activities that are 
new to the industry 
Complex BMI 
Changes to the structure of 
activities that are new to the 
industry 
Source: Own elaboration based on Foss & Saebi (2017b: 217) 
2.3 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES 
Dynamic capabilities represent the important ability of organizations to achieve evolutionary 
fitness by purposefully extending and modifying their resource and capability base (Barreto, 
2010; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Helfat & Peteraf, 2009; Helfat & Winter, 
2011; Schilke et al., 2018; Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997). Teece et al. (1997: 516) defined 
dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and 
external competences to address rapidly changing environments”. The term ‘dynamic’ thus 
refers to the capacity of firms to adapt the firm’s capabilities base to the changing business 
environment. The term ‘capabilities’ emphasizes the key role of strategic management in 
adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring organizational capabilities to match the requirements 
of the changing environment (Helfat et al., 2007).  
In the original work, Teece and colleagues (1997) argue that the essence of a firm’s dynamic 
capabilities lies in the firm’s processes that are shaped by the firm’s positions and its 
evolutionary paths. Firms specific assets such as specialized plants, reputational assets and 
knowledge assets determine the firm’s position and hence the firm’s options for future choices 
(Danneels, 2002). This position on its turn, is a function of the path the organization has traveled 
and also determines the paths ahead. This means that the firm is path dependent (Danneels, 
2002). Therefore, what a firm can do and where it can go depends on what the firm has done 
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and where it has been (Teece et al., 1997). Thus, according to Teece (1997), the dynamic 
capabilities of organizations rest fundamentally on the organizational processes that are shaped 
by their positions and paths. 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1107) define dynamic capabilities, in line with Teece et al. (1997) 
as “the firm’s processes that use resources – specifically the processes to integrate, reconfigure, 
gain and release resources – to match and even create market change. Dynamic capabilities thus 
are the organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource 
configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die”.  
Despite the similarities in the definition, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) take a different stand, 
one between the traditional Resource Based View (RBV) (Barney, 1991) and Teece’s dynamic 
capabilities approach and explicitly call dynamic capabilities an extension of the RBV 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). According to Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) the strategic value of 
dynamic capabilities lies in their ability to manipulate resources, not in the capabilities 
themselves. With the effective use of dynamic capabilities, resources can be manipulated into 
new value-creating strategies. Dynamic capabilities thus are necessary, but not sufficient for 
long-term competitive advantage. 
Prior to this seminal paper, dynamic capabilities have been described in a vague tautological 
way. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) however, argue that dynamic capabilities consist of 
identifiable and specific routines such as product development routines and strategic decision-
making. In order to be a source of competitive advantage, dynamic capabilities, just like the 
RBV suggests, have to be valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN). Besides, 
the effectiveness with which the dynamic capabilities are executed determine their value. As 
with all organizational processes, there are more or less effective ways of executing dynamic 
capabilities, also called ‘best practice’. For instance, product development capability is an 
important dynamic capability that more firms within a certain industry may possess. The 
effectiveness with which firms execute this dynamic capability and how they are capable of 
configuring their resource base with their use, determines the strategic value of the dynamic 
capability for the firm (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).   
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Since the two important seminal papers, there have been formulated a number of definitions by 
well-known authors that build on a combination of both perspectives. Despite the difference in 
definitions, consensus lies in the following principles; dynamic capabilities are organizational 
processes in the most general sense and their role is to change the firm’s resource base, dynamic 
capabilities are built rather than bought, they are path dependent and embedded in the 
organization (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). While dynamic capabilities are embedded in 
organizational processes, they reflect top managers’ ideas as top managers are the key agents 
of change (Zahra et al., 2006). This means that organization’s principal decision-makers have 
a strong effect on firm’s dynamic capabilities. 
2.3.1 Procedural levels of dynamic capabilities 
Teece (2007) makes an important contribution to the dynamic capabilities literature by 
disaggregating them into three, in his terms, classes of sensing, seizing, and transforming. 
According to this typology, dynamic capabilities are reflected in the capacity to sense and shape 
opportunities and threats, seize opportunities, and maintain competitiveness through enhancing, 
combining, protecting, and, when necessary, reconfiguring the enterprise’s intangible and 
tangible assets (Schilke et al., 2018; Teece, 2007). The three classes represent a procedural 
distinction between the organizational processes that are aimed at understanding the 
environment (sensing), making strategic choices to address environmental opportunities and 
threats (seizing), and reconfiguring the firm’s structure, resources and capabilities accordingly 
(Schilke et al., 2018). The continuous alignment of organizational process within and between 
the three levels is of critical importance (Roberts & Grover, 2012). Sensing, seizing, and 
transforming are not dynamic capabilities itself but rather an overarching level that helps to link 
organizational processes to their strategic goals. Future research is needed to make these 
processes concrete and to enhance our understanding of them (Harris, Collins, & Hevner, 2009; 
Schilke et al., 2018). While Teece (2007) originally referred to sensing, seizing and 
transforming as classes, we argue that they are different stages in a process. For instance, in 
order for a firm to address opportunities (seize), a firm first needs to identify (sense) these 
opportunities. Because of this procedural distinction, we will henceforward refer to sensing, 
seizing and transforming as the three procedural levels of dynamic capabilities. 
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Sensing capabilities refer to capacity to identify and shape opportunities for the organization 
(Teece, 2007). Firms can sense opportunities by interpreting environmental stimuli and 
opportunities can be created through internal processes (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et 
al., 2007). For instance, firms’ strong product development processes can lead to ideas of new 
product innovations. Organizational processes to identify target market segments, processes to 
direct R&D, organizational agility, processes to tap developments in exogenous technology, 
and so on, are of strong support for the organization in analyzing and identifying opportunities 
(e.g. Roberts & Grover, 2012). Therefore, organizational processes are considered important 
microfoundations of organizational sensing capabilities (Teece, 2007). Nevertheless, individual 
and team level cognitive and creative capacities are also important underpinnings of dynamic 
sensing capabilities. Managers have to accumulate and then filter information from a variety of 
sources in order to create a hypothesis about what the opportunity consist of. Hence, mental 
activities and information processing are very important in recognizing opportunities at the 
management level (Adner & Helfat, 2003). Individual and team level capacities to sense, filter 
and shape opportunities are thus important sensing capabilities as well (Helfat & Martin, 2015; 
Teece et al., 1997). 
Following the procedural levels, the ability to address the identified opportunities relies in the 
dynamic seizing capabilities of organizations (Teece, 2007). Seizing capabilities entail strategic 
choices about when, where, and how much to invest (Helfat & Peteraf, 2009). A way of seizing 
the identified and shaped opportunities is designing the business model in such a way that it 
allows the firm to capitalize on the identified opportunities (Teece, 2018b). While further 
research should identify more concrete dynamic seizing capabilities, business model redesign 
is frequently mentioned and extensively discussed in Teece’s (2007) original work and in 
subsequent studies as an important seizing capability (Helfat et al., 2007; Schilke et al., 2018; 
Teece, 2018b). 
The successful combination of sensing and seizing leads to new positions and paths which lead 
to growth and profitability (Helfat & Peteraf, 2009). With this growth comes the augmentation 
of enterprise-level resources (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Key to sustain this growth is the 
ability to recombine and reconfigure resources and organizational structures, referred to as 
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dynamic transforming capabilities (Teece, 2007). When the strategic choices that are made to 
seize identified opportunities ask for it, the accumulated asset base of the organization should 
be reconfigured in order to adapt to the changing circumstances (Helfat & Peteraf, 2009), 
dynamic transforming capabilities allow the firm to do this successfully. Moreover, in times of 
change, there is a continuous need to modify organizational resources and capabilities to make 
the organization fit with its environment (Helfat & Winter, 2011). How these organizational 
processes work in detail remains an important omission in dynamic capabilities research (Harris 
et al., 2009; Schilke et al., 2018).  
2.3.2 Hierarchical levels of dynamic capabilities 
There have been discussions about the differences between operational and dynamic 
capabilities and the levels of dynamic capabilities that exist (Helfat & Winter, 2011; Zahra et 
al., 2006). While some authors argue there to be an infinite number of hierarchical levels of 
dynamic capabilities (Collis, 1994; Winter, 2003), despite typological differences, there can be 
identified four layers of capabilities in the literature: one layer of ordinary capabilities and three 
layers of dynamic capabilities (see Table 2.6), which are: first-order, second-order and high-
order dynamic capabilities (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Collis, 1994; Danneels, 2002; Teece, 
2018b; Winter, 2003).  
At the base level of the organization, there are ordinary capabilities. Ordinary capabilities 
consist of the routines and operational activities such as administration, and so on. The 
stationary processes of ordinary capabilities allow the organization to operate in a more or less 
efficient way (Teece, 2007) and to “earn a living now” (Winter, 2003: 992). Without ordinary 
capabilities the firm would not be able to make revenues. Ordinary capabilities are rather static 
of nature. 
First-order dynamic capabilities are the firm’s capabilities of changing the product, the 
production process, scale, or markets (Winter, 2003). First-order dynamic capabilities consist 
of specific strategic and organizational processes that create value for firms within dynamic 
markets (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Different from ordinary capabilities, first-order 
capabilities are dynamic and enable the firm to create new value-creating strategies by altering 
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the resource-base (Grant, 1996). First-order dynamic capabilities are no vague unidentifiable 
processes. Rather, they are routinized responses to environmental changes (Schilke, 2014a; 
Winter, 2003). Examples are new product development processes, strategic decision making, 
and alliancing (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). Due to the routinized nature of the 
dynamic capabilities at this level, they allow firms to respond to familiar types of change 
(Schilke, 2014b).  
Second-order dynamic capabilities refer to the ability to identify, evaluate, and incorporate new 
competences into the firm (Danneels, 2002; Schilke, 2014a). Second-order dynamic 
capabilities are used to acquire first-order and ordinary capabilities and involve the adjustment 
and recombination of those capabilities (Danneels, 2008; Teece, 2018b). Different from the 
lower level capabilities, second-order dynamic capabilities sit on a higher level and are not 
specific to a certain domain of knowledge and skills. Rather, they refer to the ability to learn 
new domains (Danneels, 2002). ‘Learning to learn’ is a capability that can supersede lower 
level capabilities in fast changing environments (Collis, 1994; Schilke, 2014a). Deliberate 
investments in organizational learning facilitates the creation of second-order capabilities that 
allow for the modification of lower level capabilities (Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
The possession of these capabilities allows the firm to overcome position and path dependencies 
(Schreyögg, Sydow, & Holtmann, 2011; Teece et al., 1997).  
Thus, first-order dynamic capabilities are identifiable processes that enable firms to alter how 
they currently make a living. They are mainly useful to address familiar types of change. 
Therefore, first-order dynamic capabilities are especially useful in environments with a 
moderate level of change. Second-order dynamic capabilities, on the other hand, operate on a 
higher level. They are not a combination of identifiable processes in a certain domain. Rather, 
they refer to the ability of firms to learn about new ways of altering the way they make a living. 
Second-order dynamic capabilities are especially useful in the environments that are known for 
rapid and disruptive change (Schilke, 2014b, 2014a; Schilke et al., 2018). 
Guiding the first and second-order dynamic capabilities are the high-order dynamic capabilities. 
High-order dynamic capabilities are the highest layer of dynamic capabilities and are the 
capabilities by which management senses and shapes opportunities and threats, seizes 
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opportunities, and maintains competitiveness through enhancing, combining, protecting, and, 
when necessary, reconfiguring the enterprise’s intangible and tangible assets (Teece, 2007). 
The layer of high-order dynamic capabilities has developed into a sub-field of dynamic 
managerial capabilities (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat & Martin, 2015). Dynamic managerial 
capabilities guide second and first-order dynamic capabilities through managerial action 
(Teece, 2018b). Different from first-order dynamic capabilities, high-order dynamic 
capabilities are unlikely to be fully routinized as they depend mainly on managerial 
competences (Helfat & Martin, 2015; Teece, 2007). The concept of dynamic managerial 
capabilities, introduced by Adner and Helfat (2003), emphasizes the role of the top management 
team in the dynamic capabilities’ literature. The concept helps to explain the heterogeneity in 
managerial decisions while coping with environmental changes (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat 
& Martin, 2015). With the introduction of the dynamic managerial capabilities perspective, the 
literature moved from an organizational towards a managerial level of analysis where the role 
of the top management team in organizational adaptation is emphasized. Table 2.6 provides an 
overview of the four layers of (dynamic) capabilities. 
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Table 2.6 The four layers of (dynamic) capabilities 




Managerial Represent the capabilities of 
management to sense, seize, and 
transform competencies that adjust and 
direct ordinary capabilities and first 
and second-order dynamic capabilities 
in order to obtain and maintain 
competitive advantage (Teece, 2007) 
Less routinized than lower level 
capabilities and depend mainly on 
managerial competences (Teece, 
2018b). 
Management’s ability to guide all 
levels of product development 
routines by sensing and seizing 
opportunities and threats in the 
business environment, and 
reconfiguring tangible and 





Organizational Ability to identify, evaluate, and 
incorporate new competences into the 
firm (Danneels, 2002) 
Learning capabilities that can 
supersede lower level capabilities in 
fast changing environments (Collis, 
1994; Schilke, 2014a) 
Routines to reform new product 





Organizational  Enable the firm to create new value 
creating-strategies by altering the 
resource-base (Grant, 1996) 
Capabilities of changing the product, 
the production process, scale, or 
markets (Winter, 2003) 
New product development 




Organizational Stationary processes that allow the firm 
to ‘earn a living now’ (Winter, 2003) 
Organizational routine activities to 
operate in a more or less efficient way 
(Teece, 2007) 
Production routines of existing 
products (Winter, 2003) 
Source: Own elaboration 
2.3.3 Dynamic Managerial Capabilities 
Dynamic managerial capabilities are “the capabilities with which managers build, integrate, 
and reconfigure organizational resources and competences” (Adner & Helfat, 2003: 1012) in 
order to achieve congruence between the firm’s competencies and the changing environmental 
conditions (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Kor & Mesko, 2013) and are the microfoundations of 
dynamic capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Teece, 2007). In line with Teece’s (2007) 
typology, dynamic managerial capabilities are reflected in management’s capacity to (1) sense 
and shape opportunities and threats, (2) seize opportunities, and maintain competitiveness 
through (3) enhancing, combining, protecting, and, when necessary, reconfiguring the 
enterprise’s intangible and tangible assets (Schilke et al., 2018; Teece, 2007). The three classes 
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represent a procedural distinction between management’s capacity to understand the 
environment (sensing), to make strategic choices to address environmental opportunities and 
threats (seizing), and when necessary, reconfigure the firm’s structure, resources and 
capabilities accordingly (Helfat & Martin, 2015; Schilke et al., 2018). 
Managers draw on a set of underlying managerial resources that allows them to sense, seize 
and transform being; managerial human capital, managerial social capital, and managerial 
cognition (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat & Martin, 2015). These underlying managerial 
resources, separately or in combination “provide the basis for patterned aspects of managerial 
intentionality, deliberation, decision making, and action” (Helfat & Martin, 2015: 1285). In 
combination they help to explain the heterogeneity in managerial decisions, hereby 
emphasizing managerial impact on strategic change (Kor & Mesko, 2013).  
Managerial human capital refers to the learned skills and knowledge repertoire of managers 
that has been shaped by investment in education, training, and learning in a more general way 
(Becker, 1964; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009). Managers develop themselves and their expertise while 
acquiring knowledge and perfecting their abilities through prior work experience (Hitt, 
Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001; Lepak & Snell, 1999). Besides, not only professional 
experience, but also personal experience shapes managers’ human capital (Kor & Mesko, 
2013). Experience in a specific industry or organization shapes the skills and knowledge base 
of managers, making their human capital more suited to that specific situation (Davidsson & 
Honig, 2003). For instance, managers with experience in high-technology industries are able to 
develop specialized skills and acquire specialized knowledge about technology which they 
might be able to use in other situations. 
Managerial social capital (Coleman, 1988) refers to the ability of managers to access resources 
through the structure and content of their social relations (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Kor & Mesko, 
2013). Both formal (e.g. professional networks) and informal (e.g. friendships) social relations 
are transferrable to work settings and help managers to acquire essential resources and provide 
them with critical information for decision making (Adner & Helfat, 2003). Those social 
relations can be divided into internal and external social capital. Internal social capital refers to 
the social ties and networks within the organization and facilitates the sharing of knowledge 
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within different levels of the firm (Sirmon et al., 2007). External managerial social capital refers 
to the social ties of managers outside the organization. External ties can provide access to 
external sources such as finance, and also provide managers with information about practices 
in different organizations (Adner & Helfat, 2003). Social capital can thus take various forms. 
Although forms differ, they share two common characteristics: (1) they constitute some aspect 
of the social structure, and (2) they facilitate the actions of individuals within the structure 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Since social capital emphasizes the social structure, an important 
difference between social capital and other forms of capital, is that social capital is owned 
jointly by the actors involved and no one party has exclusive ownership rights (Burt, 1992). For 
instance, friendships cannot be easily traded from one person to another. Thus, although social 
capital is valuable in use, it is intangible and relies in the social structure and not in one actor 
alone (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). The second characteristics highlights that social capital 
allows for the achievement of ends that would be impossible without social capital or could 
only be achieved at extra cost (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). For instance, strong external 
managerial ties help managers to get in contact and embrace desirable business partners and to 
collect a great deal of customer, supplier, and competitor information (Guo et al., 2013; 
Timmers, 1998). 
Managerial cognition is the third underpinning of dynamic managerial capabilities and refers 
to the beliefs and mental models of managers that are used for decision making (Kor & Mesko, 
2013; Walsh, 1995). The cognitive base of managers consists of knowledge about future events, 
knowledge about alternatives, and knowledge about the consequences of alternatives (Adner & 
Helfat, 2003). Eggers and Kaplan (2013) in their study emphasize that managerial cognition is 
central in the process of capability development and deployment though three central processes: 
the construction of routines, the assembly of routines into capabilities, and matching of 
(perceived) capability application to (perceived) opportunities (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). The 
central role of cognition in dynamic managerial capabilities also indicates that the cognitive 
base of managers forms the basis for the interpretation of information, strategic decision-
making and sequentially, firm performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
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All three underpinnings of dynamic managerial capabilities are strongly interrelated (Adner & 
Helfat, 2003). First of all, managerial human capital, managerial social capital and managerial 
cognition develop through experience. The same experience may contribute to the three 
underpinnings simultaneously (Beck & Wiersema, 2013). Secondly, the information and 
knowledge that can be obtained through formal and informal relationships of managers 
(managerial social capital) can be crucial in building and renewing the skills and knowledge 
repertoire of managers (managerial human capital) (Kor & Mesko, 2013). Thirdly, by 
influencing the search for, and the interpretation of, information, cognition influences 
managers’ human capital (Helfat & Martin, 2015). Finally, cognition and social capital both 
affect each other. The information that managers obtain via social ties might influence 
manager’s image about the external environment. On the contrary, managerial beliefs affect the 
social relations managers opt for (Adner & Helfat, 2003). Figure 2.1 provides an overview of 
the relations between the constructs in the dynamic capabilities framework. 










Source: Own elaboration 
 
  
Dynamic Capabilities Dynamic Managerial Capabilities 
High-order dynamic capabilities 
Second-order dynamic capabilities 
First-order dynamic capabilities 
Ordinary capabilities 
Managerial cognition 
Managerial human capital 
Managerial social capital 
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2.4 HIGH-GROWTH FIRMS 
High-growth firms (HGFs), often referred to as scale-ups, are defined as organizations with at 
least 20% of annual growth rate in terms of revenue and/or employees over a three-year period, 
and with at least 10 employees in the base year (OECD, 2007). Different from the other building 
blocks of this doctoral dissertation, high-growth firms are not a theoretical construct. Rather, 
HGFs represent an important phenomenon that recently attracted significant research attention 
in the academic management literature (Demir et al., 2017). The aim of this chapter is not to 
provide a comprehensive literature review. Rather, it is to provide an introduction of the 
phenomenon and to highlight what has been studied in the literature in order to identify fertile 
ground for further research on which the empirical studies in this dissertation will elaborate. 
2.4.1 The economic importance of high-growth firms  
Studies have shown that although only a very small proportion of about three percent of all 
start-ups is able to survive and scale-up successfully (Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 2000; Feindt et 
al., 2002), they are important for economic growth and prosperity of entire countries or regions 
(Henrekson & Johansson, 2010; Lopez-Garcia & Puente, 2012; Nightingale & Coad, 2014; 
Shane, 2009). Studies that examined the economic importance of HGFs show that they are the 
main driver of wealth and job-creation (Davidsson & Henrekson, 2002; Du & Temouri, 2015). 
These studies also indicate that by their rapid growth, HGFs strongly affect employment rates 
and therefore have an important impact on the wider economy (Huber, Oberhofer, & 
Pfaffermayr, 2014; Nightingale & Coad, 2014). What is more, studies on the economic 
importance of scale-ups highlight that HGFs also generate positive externalities in terms of 
enhanced productivity and innovativeness that leads to industry growth within regions and 
countries (Bos & Stam, 2014). By establishing new business models and leveraging new 
technologies, high-growth firms bring about change and innovation in regional and national 
ecosystems (Jansen, 2019). Taken together, these studies show that scale-ups are considered 
important contributors to economic growth and prosperity.  
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2.4.2 High-growth firms in the field of management 
Besides interest in the economic importance of HGFs, the phenomenon has received ample 
attention within a variety of other research domains such as entrepreneurship, strategic 
management and public policy (Daunfeldt, Elert, & Johansson, 2016; Krasniqi & Desai, 2016; 
Rindova, Yeow, Martins, & Faraj, 2012; Stam, 2015). The dominant research method applied 
in the high-growth context is quantitative and most studies relied on either secondary or survey 
data (Barbero et al., 2011; Gundry & Welsch, 2001; Mohr, Garnsey, & Theyel, 2014). The main 
insights of these studies have been on the antecedents and consequences high-growth (Dobbs 
& Hamilton, 2007; Henrekson & Johansson, 2010).  
Studies in the management literature have started to investigate the strategic characteristics of 
high-growth firms (Demir et al., 2017) and have found a number of organizational level 
practices related to rapid growth. At the organizational level, different characteristics such as 
organizational structure and resource allocation decisions have been identified that might be 
relevant for high growth (Feeser & Willard, 1990; Moreno & Casillas, 2007; Siegel, Siegel, & 
Macmillan, 1993). For instance, these studies have shown that the number of alliances, the 
degree of internationalization (Mohr et al., 2014) and organizational networks, customer 
knowledge, and training and development-oriented HR practices (Barringer, Jones, & 
Neubaum, 2005) are all related to high growth. Additionally, authors have examined firm level 
outcomes of high growth by, for instance, linking it to profitability (Markman & Gartner, 2002).  
Closely linked to the dynamic capability perspective, authors examined potential organizational 
capabilities that are related to high growth (Barbero et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2006; Stam & 
Wennberg, 2009). The findings of these studies suggest that different functional capabilities, 
such as marketing, financial and innovation capabilities seem to be correlated with high growth. 
For instance, Stam and Wennberg (2009) found that strong R&D capabilities are a predictor of 
fast growth in organizations. Barbero and colleagues (2011) focused on the relation between 
different types of dynamic capabilities and high growth. They found that firms should possess 
strong marketing and financial capabilities in order to develop growth enhancing market 
expansion and innovation strategies as the means for achieving high growth.  
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Another closely related body of research focused on the relation between individual level 
characteristics of founders and top managers on high growth (Barringer et al., 2005; Florin, 
Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2003; Gundry & Welsch, 2001; Willard, Krueger, & Feeser, 1992). 
Studies show that founders’ human capital (Barringer et al., 2005; Feeser & Willard, 1990) and 
social capital (Florin et al., 2003), two managerial resources underpinning top managers’ 
dynamic managerial capabilities, are important for high growth. Additionally, Gundry and 
Welsch (2001) found that ‘high-growth’ entrepreneurs differ from ‘low-growth’ entrepreneurs 
by their, among other factors, stronger entrepreneurial intensity and leadership skills. 
In related work, Shuman, Shaw, and Sussman (1985) identified a number the strategic planning 
practices of top management teams related to high growth rates in scale-ups. Lastly, studies 
investigated the ongoing debate between the performance of founder-managed versus 
“professionally” managed high-growth firms and so far have not found significant differences 
(Willard et al., 1992).  
Taken together, the growing body of literature on HGFs in the management field provides 
valuable insights into the managerial and organizational antecedents and outcomes of high 
growth. However, mainly due to the quantitative approaches that have been used in these 
studies, the main focus of the management literature on HGFs has been on the questions of 
‘how many’ rather than questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ firms achieve steep growth paths over 
time (Dobbs & Hamilton, 2007; Henrekson & Johansson, 2010). 
Only a limited number of studies has addressed the specific managerial and organizational 
challenges that rapid growth creates (Hambrick & Crozier, 1985; Lee, 2014; Nicholls-Nixon, 
2005). Lee (2014) provided a general overview of frequent challenges within high-growth 
firms, being lack of management skills, and recruitment and financial issues. In a similar vein, 
Hambrick and Crozier (1985) highlight that high growth creates problems of disaffection, 
inadequate skills, and inadequate systems and extraordinary resource needs. Lastly, Nicholls-
Nixon (2005) also found that when companies rapidly scale in size, their internal environments 
‘suffer’ from dramatic changes in managerial scope, and continuous and fast change, which 
often result in the inappropriateness of practices and structures in place. Altogether, studies 
have shown that rapid growth results in challenges for (managerial) skills, organizational 
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practices and structures, and (human) resource needs. While these studies provide valuable 
insights into the challenges of high growth, they do not explain how firms manage to overcome 
them.  
The sparsity of studies addressing ‘how’ firms achieve and sustain high growth rates means that 
our current understanding about the foundations of and processes underlying high growth has 
remained rather limited (Demir et al., 2017; Wright & Stigliani, 2013). This is an important gap 
in the literature because thorough understanding of HGFs requires not only the identification 
of its determinants and outcomes (Demir et al., 2017; Jansen & Roelofsen, 2018), but also the 
way in which firms manage to alleviate the challenges they face. Chapters 4 and 5 of this 
dissertation aim at addressing this omission by providing a more dynamic perspective on how 
high-growth firms manage to achieve and sustain high growth rates over prolonged periods of 
time. 
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“A gem cannot be polished without friction, nor a man perfected without trials.” - 
Lucius Annaeus Seneca 
Top managers of established firms have to bring about business model innovation (BMI) in 
order to protect their competitive position in the constantly changing business environment 
(Saebi et al., 2017). Studies have shown that firms that innovate their business model i.e., firms 
that make designed, novel and nontrivial changes to the way they create and capture value, 
outperform their competitors in almost every industry (Zott & Amit, 2007). Yet, business model 
innovation is a highly complex managerial task (Snihur & Zott, 2019). Although some 
managers have designed successful BMI in response to the changing environmental 
circumstances, many others have experienced strong difficulties and failed to go through the 
process of BMI successfully (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). As 
BMI requires top managerial attention, the ability to innovate the business model has been 
argued to strongly rely on the dynamic managerial capabilities, “the capabilities with which 
managers build, integrate, and reconfigure organizational resources and competences” (Adner 
& Helfat, 2003: 1012), of the firm’s top management (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Teece, 2018b). 
Prior studies have contributed to our understanding of the role of dynamic capabilities in the 
process of business model innovation (Achtenhagen, Melin, & Naldi, 2013; Schneider & 
Spieth, 2013). For instance, scholars have shown that dynamic capabilities are an important 
internal antecedent of business model innovation (Foss & Saebi, 2017) and that strong dynamic 
capabilities are vital for the creation and implementation of effective business models (Teece, 
2018b). More precisely, studies have shown that differences in dynamic capabilities of the top 
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management team explain the heterogeneity of business model innovation decisions 
(Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019; Martins et al., 2015). Collectively, these studies indicate that 
top management team’s DMC are leading in the business model innovation process (Helfat & 
Martin, 2015). 
Dynamic sensing and seizing capabilities are especially relevant for achieving superior business 
model innovation (Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019; Teece, 2007). Dynamic managerial sensing 
capabilities refer to management’s ability to recognize and interpret opportunities and threats 
in the external environment such as changing customer needs, technological opportunities, and 
competitive developments, among others. Seizing capabilities refer to the actions where 
managers take hold of the identified opportunities and threats by reconfiguring organizational 
resources and capabilities in order to meet those new challenges (Harreld, O’Reilly Ill, & 
Tushman, 2007). Moreover, seizing capabilities are higher-order capabilities, which include 
“actions that constitute astute managerial decision making under uncertainty” (Teece, 2018: 
41). Dynamic managerial sensing and seizing capabilities thus explain how managers gather 
and process information to make sense of the business environment and make decisions 
accordingly (Helfat & Martin, 2015; Martin, 2011). 
Taken collectively, research has shown that firms rely on the dynamic managerial capabilities 
of their top management teams in the process of business model innovation (Frankenberger & 
Sauer, 2019; Teece, 2018b). Yet, these studies tell us little about how top management’s DMC 
combine in the process of BMI. Most studies have either focused on CEO’s individual dynamic 
capabilities (e.g. Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Gröschl, Gabaldón, & Hahn, 2019), or on top 
management team’s DMC collectively i.e., the average of the top management team members’ 
DMC (e.g. Sirmon & Hitt, 2009). Despite the important insights, there remains an important 
gap in our understanding of how the DMC of individual top managers combine within a team 
by the means of interpersonal interaction (Brettel et al., 2018; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). This 
is a crucial omission because understanding what enables top managers to act collectively 
requires the examination of the mechanisms that bring together top managers individual DMC 
at the team-level (Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). To address this blind spot, we develop an 
empirically grounded model of dynamic managerial capabilities in which we unravel the 
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mechanisms that allow the top management team to conjoin individual-level DMC in the 
process of BMI. By doing this, we make at least two contributions to the literature. 
First, rather than taking the top management team as one unit of analysis, we disentangle this 
collective and investigate how the DMC of individuals are brought together in the team. Moving 
beyond earlier research that analyzed DMC as either the CEO’s individual or the TMT’s 
collective capabilities, our findings suggest that there is an important interplay between 
individual and team capabilities. We find that the initial sensing capabilities reside in the 
individual top managers. However, we identify purposeful friction as the mechanism that 
allows the TMT to enhance individual level sensing capabilities at the team level. Furthermore, 
our findings suggest that collaborative value driven decision making allows the top 
management team to improve the decision-making process by bringing together individual level 
seizing capabilities and we also highlight that experimental implementation strengthens the 
seizing process. By investigating DMC as a result of the interpersonal interaction of individuals, 
we address the call for further research on the microfoundations of dynamic managerial 
capabilities (Brettel et al., 2018), move beyond recent one dimensional insights, and illustrate 
how top managers’ DMC combine in the process of BMI. 
Second, although studies converge on sensing and seizing as the procedural levels of dynamic 
capabilities (Schilke et al., 2018; Teece, 2007), our understanding about how identifying 
opportunities and threats in the business environment (sensing) leads to action where managers 
design new business models to address those opportunities (seizing) is limited (Schilke et al., 
2018). This is an important omission because both capabilities are recognized as fundamental, 
interrelated and necessary for successful adaptation (Helfat et al., 2007). Moreover, research 
has shown that even firms with superior sensing capabilities do not achieve competitive 
advantage if they fail to capitalize on the identified opportunities (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 
2002). Our study addresses this research gap and suggests how managerial sensing and seizing 
capabilities are linked within the process of business model innovation. What is more, in our 
process model we highlight how individual level sensing capabilities combinedly lead to 
collective team level seizing. By revealing the mechanisms, we provide a systematic 
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understanding of how the procedural levels of dynamic managerial capabilities are linked and 
sequenced. 
Given the limited theoretical insights and empirical evidence about the team-level dynamic 
managerial capabilities we carried out an inductive theory building approach (Gehman et al., 
2018; Gioia et al., 2012) and conducted an in-depth case study of the business model innovation 
process of the biggest independent fashion retailer in the Netherlands. This case is particularly 
suited for this study because for a traditional physical retailer to introduce an online business 
model indicates a designed, novel and nontrivial change to the business model (Kim & Min, 
2015). We were able to follow the BMI process in real time as well as retrospectively what 
provided a rich context for a longitudinal examination of how DMC combine in the process of 
BMI. The fact that we have been able to be closely in contact with all TMT members made it 
an extremely suitable case to answer our research questions. 
3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
3.2.1 Business model innovation 
The business model in the most basic sense describes how a firm does business (Magretta, 
2002). As research on the business model has attracted significant attention, various business 
model perspectives have been developed (Massa et al., 2017). We follow the activity 
perspective (Zott & Amit, 2010) and define the business model as an “activity system that 
centers on a focal firm, yet may encompass activities performed by its partners, suppliers, and 
customers in the pursuit of value creation and capture” (Chesbrough, 2010; Snihur & Zott, 
2019: 5). Following this perspective, the business model contains three core elements: content, 
structure, and governance (Zott & Amit, 2010). Content refers to the activities within the system 
that are performed with the goal to create and capture value; structure refers to how these 
activities are linked and sequenced and can be seen as the architecture of the business model 
(Teece, 2010); and governance refers to who is in charge of the activity (Amit & Zott, 2001, 
2015).  
Architecting the three core elements of the business model is a concrete managerial task of the 
focal firm’s top management (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010) and in order to assure 
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sustainable value creation and capture, managers have to actively adapt and innovate their 
firm’s business model (Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013). Managers can innovate their firm’s 
business model by making changes to one or more elements of the business model separately 
or in a coordinated way (Foss & Saebi, 2017). Thus, BMI occurs when the firm adds or adapts 
its value creating and/or capturing activities (content); reorganizes the linkages between 
activities (structure); and/or changes the responsibility of activities, for instance by bringing in 
partners or outsourcing activities (governance). Studies have shown that BMI has a positive 
effect on the financial performance of organizations (Kim & Min, 2015; Zott & Amit, 2007). 
Scholars have identified exogeneous change as important driver of BMI. For instance, scholars 
have identified technological change (Teece, 2018a), economic crises (Sosna, Trevinyo-
Rodríguez, & Velamuri, 2010), and competitive pressure (Johnson et al., 2008) as important 
external antecedents of BMI. Another stream of research has investigated the internal drivers 
of BMI. For instance, Osiyeveskyy and Dewald (2015) shed light on how top managers’ 
perceptions of the environment affect their BMI choices. In a similar vein, Saebi, Lien and Foss 
(2017) show that when managers perceive the environmental stimuli as a threat, they are more 
inclined to innovate their firm’s business model, while opportunity perceptions tend to have the 
reversed effect. These studies have in common that they point at the importance of 
management’s perception of the external developments as antecedents of BMI. While these 
studies have made a valuable contribution by opening this stream of research, there is still a 
significant gap in our understanding of the role of managers in the process of BMI (Snihur & 
Zott, 2019). Moreover, we still know little about the micro level mechanisms through which 
business model innovation occurs (Foss & Saebi, 2017). A valuable literature that can help us 
to understand how managers bring about business model innovation is the dynamic managerial 
capabilities literature (Foss & Saebi, 2017; Teece, 2018b). 
3.2.2 Dynamic Managerial Capabilities 
Dynamic managerial capabilities are “the capabilities with which managers build, integrate, 
and reconfigure organizational resources and competences” (Adner & Helfat, 2003: 1012). 
Dynamic managerial capabilities are reflected in management’s ability to sense, seize and 
reconfigure (Schilke et al., 2018; Teece, 2007). The three classes represent a procedural 
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distinction between management’s capacity to understand the environment (sensing), to make 
strategic choices to address environmental opportunities and threats (seizing), and when 
necessary, reconfigure the firm’s structure, resources and capabilities accordingly (Helfat & 
Martin, 2015; Schilke et al., 2018). 
Creativity and innovation in organizations depend mainly on top management’s sensing and 
seizing capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). Also, management’s sensing and seizing 
capabilities are vital for the successful innovation of the firm’s business model (Frankenberger 
& Sauer, 2019; Teece, 2018b). As noted by Demil, Lecocq, Ricart, and Zott (2015: 3) “a firm’s 
decision to change its business model in order to exploit a new business opportunity and to 
create and/or capture more value does not necessarily involve a resource move, as the new 
model could be enabled by the same resources as the old one.”. Moreover, management’s 
sensing and seizing capabilities are strongly underpinned by managers’ cognitive capabilities 
and refer to managerial sensemaking and decision-making. Reconfiguring capabilities, on the 
other hand, refer to manager’s capacity to communicate the proposed changes into the 
organization (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015).  
In this paper we focus on the first two procedural levels of dynamic capabilities for two reasons. 
First, sensing and seizing capabilities refer mainly to the managerial level of analysis whereas 
reconfiguring capabilities involve the organizational level of analysis, therefore the specific 
contribution of managers is more clearly identifiable in the first two procedural levels. Second, 
both sensing and seizing capabilities have been particularly proven to be important in the BMI 
process but are also more blurred and tacit than the more specific reconfiguration changes, so 
there is an important need for unraveling the mechanisms underlying these two capabilities. 
Dynamic managerial capabilities draw on a set of underlying managerial resources: managerial 
human capital, managerial social capital and managerial cognition (Adner & Helfat, 2003). 
These underlying managerial resources, separately or in combination “provide the basis for 
patterned aspects of managerial intentionality, deliberation, decision making, and action” 
(Helfat & Martin, 2015: 1285). Hence, they explain how managers sense and seize the business 
environment in times of change (Helfat & Martin, 2015; Martin, 2011). 
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Despite the development of the theory and its empirically proven importance for organizational 
performance, our understanding is limited about how the interaction of dynamic managerial 
capabilities of individuals in the TMT affects team decision making, particularly with regard to 
strategic change (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). Scholars have mainly focused on either the CEO 
(e.g. Eggers & Kaplan, 2009), or the team as a collective (e.g. Beck & Wiersema, 2013). 
Focusing on individual top managers raises questions about team-based capabilities. Namely, 
in reality it is seldom the case that a single manager leads an entire company. More often, this 
role is assigned to the top management team (Martin, 2011). On the other hand, analyzing team 
capabilities by looking at the top management team as one collective does not capture how 
individual level capabilities combine in the top management team (Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). 
As Helfat and Peteraf (2015: 846) note: “We also know relatively little about how the 
interaction of cognitive capabilities of individuals in the top management team affects team 
decision making, (…) Future research could investigate whether diversity of managerial 
cognitive capabilities within a team helps or hinders strategic change”. 
Only recently have authors started to acknowledge and investigate the microfoundations of the 
dynamic managerial capabilities perspective (Brettel et al., 2018; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). 
Brettel and colleagues (2018) in their study find that CEO’s personality traits affect 
organizational level human and social capital. These two types of organizational level 
knowledge-based capital are the microfoundations that facilitate the development of 
organizational level dynamic capabilities. While it is an important first step in the understanding 
of the microfoundations of DMC, it does not capture the interaction at the top management 
team level. Salvato and Vassolo (2018) in their conceptual study, to the best of our knowledge, 
were the first to look into how individual level capabilities combine in the team of top managers. 
In their study they develop a multi-level framework that explains dynamic capabilities as a 
construct that emerges from top managers’ individual managerial resources through 
interpersonal interaction in the top management team. 
All in all, existing research points at the dynamic managerial capabilities’ perspective as a 
fruitful ground to study how top management teams bring about business model innovation. 
Yet, it does not reveal the mechanisms that explain how top managers individual level DMC 
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combine in the top management team, making it a fruitful avenue for further research (Foss & 
Saebi, 2017; Helfat & Martin, 2015; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). Hence, we ask: How do top 
management’s dynamic managerial capabilities combine in the process of business model 
innovation? 
3.3 RESEARCH METHODS 
Given the limited theory and evidence about the team-level interaction of dynamic managerial 
capabilities we draw on an inductive theory-building case study design as it gave us the 
opportunity to gain deep insight into this rather under researched phenomenon (Gehman et al., 
2018; Gioia et al., 2012). We adopt an in-depth single case study design as it allows us to 
capture the longitudinal, processual nature of the BMI process (Langley, 1999). We opt for an 
embedded design with multiple levels of analysis (business model innovation process, the top 
management team and individual top management team members) to strengthen the richness 
and accuracy of our theorizing (Snihur & Zott, 2019; Yin, 2014). 
3.3.1 Research context 
Inspired by Kim and Min (2015) we conduct our study in the retail industry. Online retailing, 
considered a new business model archetype in retailing (Zott et al., 2011), has developed into 
an important, disruptive business model in the industry, putting a lot of pressure on incumbent 
firms (Hagberg, Jonsson, & Egels-Zandén, 2017; Kim & Min, 2015).  
We have specifically chosen CLOTHING2 as single organization for our study because we 
believe it to be a revelatory and exemplary context that enables us to gain insights that might 
not be possible in more typical cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Sigglekow, 2007). 
CLOTHING became the biggest independent fashion store in the Netherlands by putting 
emphasis on its physical store. By constantly improving their clients shopping experience by 
strongly valuing service, quality and personal attention they grew out to a well-respected store 
in the Netherlands. This did not remain unnoticed and their store was awarded multiple times, 
including the award for “Best independent store in the Netherlands” in 2010. Yet, in that same 
 
2 CLOTHING is a pseudonym we use to ensure the anonymity of the organization that we studied 
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year they introduced an online business model, seemingly incompatible to the service they 
offered in their physical store. Nevertheless, since the introduction of their online business 
model, CLOTHING grew significantly in profits (61%) as well as FTE (54%), suggesting a 
successful BMI. The decision of CLOTHING to not only adjust the extant business model, but 
to introduce a completely new business model indicates an important managerial decision 
(Teece, 2018b). Hence, the case allows us to delve deeper into the top managerial decision-
making progress of business model innovation and to answer our research question of how top 
management’s dynamic managerial capabilities combine in this process. Moreover, as the 
business model innovation process started relatively recently, and the process is still not 
finished, we could capture both real time and retrospective data. Table 3.1 provides a 
description of the business model and the most important financial features of CLOTHING 
throughout the Business Model Innovation process. 
Table 3.1 Business Model description and financial profile throughout the BMI process  
 Start BMI process 
Start Phase 1 –2010 
End Phase 1 – 
Start Phase 2 –2016 
Integrated BM 
Phase 2 –2018 
Business Model 
Description 
One physical store with 
10,000 square meters 
shopping space 
One physical store with 




model at separate 
location with separate 
warehouse 
One physical store with 




business model at same 
location. Order picking 
from physical store’s stock 
 
FTE 198 267 305 
FTE growth in phase n.a. 69 (35%) 38 (14%) 
FTE growth in process n.a. 69 (35%) 141 (54%) 
Operating Revenue  unknown unknown 51.4 million euros 
Profit 1.9 million euros 1.6 million euros 3.0 million euros 
Profit growth in phase n.a. -0.3 milloen euros (13%) 1.4 million euros (84%) 
Profit growth in process n.a. -0.3 milloen euros (13%) 1.1 million euros (61%) 
NOTE: The FTE numbers are the numbers of January 1st of each year. The key financial numbers are the numbers over the 
year prior to the start of each phase in the business model innovation process. This way, we can most accurately track the 
effect that the business model innovation process has on the financial profile of the organization. 
Source: Primary data and Orbis database by Bureau van Dijk  
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An important characteristic of CLOTHING is the fact that it is a family firm. All top 
management team members are relatives, the CEO is the oldest member and the CCO and COO 
are his sons. The ownership is equally distributed among the top management team members. 
We believe this context to be suited to answer our research questions for several theoretical and 
empirical reasons. First, with over 14 million family businesses in Europe which together 
provide over 60 million jobs in the private sector, family firms are the backbone of the European 
economy (KPMG, 2015). In Europe, family businesses represent from 55% to 90% of all 
companies, depending on the country, and they are present in businesses of all sizes and 
operating in all sectors (KPMG, 2015). In the Netherlands, the geographic context of our study, 
71% of all firms are family firms (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2017). Our research 
context thus covers an important share of the European economy. Moreover, given the high 
percentage of family firms in our geographic context, a broad number of managers might 
benefit from our insights as the results may be transferrable to their firms.  
Second, the family firm context could be an exemplary context for many nonfamily firms with 
regards to interpersonal interaction. Namely, family members have to find an equilibrium 
between the intersection of their work and family lives, making them more inclined to overcome 
interpersonal conflicts (Greenhaus & Powell, 2006).   
Third, family firms tend to be more long-term oriented, making the managers more inclined to 
make decisions that ensure the long-term viability of their firms (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, 
Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). This is important as it might help us to 
capture sustainable, rather than quick one-off, interpersonal mechanisms that bring together the 
individual top managers within the team over time. Hence, we believe that this is a suitable 
setting for a first empirical contribution and that it allows us to gather important theoretical 
insights into the interpersonal interactions of individual DMC within the team.  
3.3.2 Data collection 
Our main source of data came from private interviews conducted with the top management 
team members of CLOTHING. All interviews were recorded whenever possible and 
transcribed immediately after. Interviews lasted typically between 45 and 100 minutes. 
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Additionally, archival data was collected using firm’s website, blogs and press coverage, 
including a number of press video interviews with the CEO that were available. Moreover, we 
have been able to enrich our data with TMT’s notes made during important meetings. Finally, 
firm documents such as HR documents and presentations for government officials, that were 
often highly confidential, were consulted. The variety of data allowed us to triangulate and 
cross-check retrospective perceptions of the interviewees to limit the retrospective bias (Jick, 
1979).  
We went through three phases of data collection. As suggested by Gioia and colleagues (2012), 
we went through an iterative process of data collection and analysis and allowed for 
modifications as data collection progressed. First, we collected initial data. An exploratory 
interview and as much as possible archival and secondary data was collected in order to guide 
and structure the further data collection process. In this phase of data collection, managers and 
decision makers with key positions in the BMI process were identified. The first phase helped 
us to enhance our understanding of the BMI process of our case firm and the role of each 
individual TMT member in this process. After the initial data collection, we developed 
interview guidelines. In the second phase we conducted semi-structured interviews with the key 
actors in the BMI process with an emphasis on the TMT members involved in the process. In 
order to mitigate the risk of potential retrospective bias, we used specific interview techniques 
such as courtroom questioning and event tracking (Eisenhardt, 1989). Furthermore, we focused 
on critical events and decisions in the BMI process and asked open-ended questions that 
allowed respondents to provide further information. Open-ended questions also result in higher 
accuracy in retrospective studies (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 
1997). Within this phase we could interview all members of the top management team 
extensively. The information gathered in the second phase allowed us to construct the first draft 
of the BMI process and the corresponding role of the top management team in the process. In 
the third phase we focused on additional data gathering via secondary sources and compared 
semi-structured interviews of various managers to triangulate the data. During this combination 
of data collection and data analysis, a more comprehensive insight was formed that allowed us 
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to identify possible gaps in our data. Finally, we conducted follow-up interviews to clarify 
certain concepts. Table 3.2 provides an overview of all data gathered. 
Table 3.2 Data Overview 
Data collection period First Second Third Minutes/pages Total 
 
Interviews 




Chief Executive Officer (TMT) 2 1 1 187 (48 pages) 4 
Chief Commercial Officer (TMT)  2 1 95 (37 pages) 3 
Chief Operating Officer (TMT)  1  41 (22 pages) 1 
E-commerce Manager (Middle M.)   1  46 (24 pages) 1 
      
Archival documents    603 pages 246 documents 
Firm’s blog and website    62 34 
Internal documents    51 10 
Meeting notes    3 3 
Presentations for local government    81 2 
Press coverage    384 pages 191 
Press video interviews     22 pages 
(30 minutes) 
6 
NOTES: Out of 9 interviews, 6 were recorded and transcribed. The labels in brackets indicate the hierarchical level of the 
interviewee: TMT refers to Top Management Team level; Middle M. refers to Middle Management level. 
 
3.3.3 Data analysis 
In order to initiate a leap in the data, we used well-known and widely used techniques of 
inductive qualitative data analysis such as content analysis and constant comparison (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994), to move from raw data to theoretical insights.  
In our first stage of analysis we read all our data and wrote a thickly descriptive case narrative 
and a detailed timeline of the business model innovation process, documenting the key events 
and the role of the top management team (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). The factual timeline 
of events combined with theoretical logic and the descriptions of our informants allowed us to 
make sense of the temporal dynamics of the process model (Vuori & Huy, 2016). This allowed 
us to track how various events and decisions influenced subsequent decisions over time. We 
noted two different phases in the business model innovation process in the data. From 2010 to 
2016 CLOTHING focused on introducing and developing the new business model. Within this 
phase the decision to innovate the business model was made by the top management team, the 
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business model design was refined, and the firm focused on the growth of the business model. 
From 2016 onwards, the business model was integrated back into the focal firm and the top 
management team focused on merging the online and offline business models in order to 
stimulate complementarities. During this time period, the focus was on aligning the two 
business models and leveraging the complementarities between them.  
Building on these insights, in our second stage of analysis, we used the temporal bracketing 
technique to be able to decompose our data into two phases (Langley, 1999). Guided by the 
method described by Gioia and colleagues (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Gioia et al., 2012), we 
returned to the raw data and used open coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). We read all interview 
transcripts again and coded them using in-vivo codes to stay close to the data. If in-vivo codes 
were not available, we used a simple phrase to describe the content of the interviews. The initial 
codes included various topics such as “TMT members offer resistance against ideas” and we 
also included cognitive related themes such as “perceiving environmental changes as a threat 
to the extant business model”. By comparing the first order codes within and across the 
identified phases, we were able to identify common empirical themes in the data (Eisenhardt, 
1989). For a detailed overview of our first-order codes and supporting interview data, please 
see Table 3.3 in the appendix. Next, we engaged in axial coding during which we looked for 
relations among and between the created first order codes (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This 
allowed us to move the data to a more abstract theoretical level in which we grouped our first 
order codes into second order themes (Gioia et al., 2012). When relevant, we iterated between 
data and theoretical construct to label our second order themes. This was not a linear process. 
Rather, we went through an recursive process of data analysis that continued until we had a 
clear grasp of the relationships between the constructs (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Eisenhardt, 
1989). We developed a data structure (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013) as a device that 
facilitated our comparison and the contrast of our codes as our understanding of the company’s 
processes over time evolved (for an overview, see Figure 3.1).  
Based on the advanced insights, we noticed that our emerging themes were related to the 
procedural levels of the dynamic capabilities literature (Teece, 2007). Building on this 
literature, we further explored the relation between managers sensing and seizing capabilities. 
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The procedural levels sensing and seizing helped us to better capture the processual nature of 
top management’s role in the business model innovation process. In the last stage we examined 
our emerging themes reflecting them against the literature. This helped us to build our 
theoretical process model as we were better able to understand the process of how dynamic 
managerial capabilities combine in the process of business model innovation. 
Figure 3.1 Data Structure 
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Throughout our data collection and analysis process we took several steps to ensure the validity 
of our findings. We applied the event tracking interview technique and asked for specific events 
to mitigate the risk of potential retrospective bias (Eisenhardt, 1989). Combining retrospective 
and real-time data allowed us to gather more robust insights into the entire business model 
innovation process and helped us to further reduce potential retrospective data (Leonard-
Barton, 1990; Smith & Besharov, 2019). The data analysis was done by the authors themselves. 
First, the authors conducted the analysis independently and the results were later discussed and 
revised together. After that, the authors recoded the raw data using the emerged coding scheme. 
During the selective coding stage (Corbin & Strauss, 2014), the authors achieved a 92% inter-
coder reliability. To further increase the trustworthiness of our data, we followed Shah & Corley 
(2006). We used various data sources to triangulate our findings, including press releases, 
internal documents, presentations, and meeting notes, among others. Moreover, we interviewed 
all TMT members and the middle manager individually in order to triangulate their perspectives 
and form a more-robust insight into the process (Vuori & Huy, 2016). We tested the validity of 
our findings using a member-check (Shah & Corley, 2006). We presented a summary of our 
findings to our informants and asked for feedback. The informants confirmed our theoretical 
model. As the CEO said: “Yes that's right, you’ve seen that right”. 
3.4 THE HISTORY OF CLOTHING 
The story of CLOTHING dates back to 1950 when Mr. and Mrs. CLOTHING opened a small 
tailor shop in a small village in the Netherlands. Over the years, CLOTHING grew out to 
become the biggest independent fashion retailer in the Netherlands in terms of square meters 
shopping space. The firm has gradually grown to over 15,000 square meters shopping space 
and €51.5 million revenues in 2017. Still not saturated, new ongoing renovations in the physical 
store will lead to 17,000 square meters shopping space in 2020. The physical store provides 
over 200.000 available items of more than 800 different brands. Service, quality and personal 
attention are at the core of the organization. Those values are translated in their completely 
renovated physical store with its unique tailor department to do free alterations, free coffee for 
their guests, the in-store restaurant, their bakery and their specialized sales staff. With this 
unique concept, CLOHTING provides the ultimate fashion experience.  
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As son of the founding fathers, Bryan, the current CEO of CLOTHING is ingrained with the 
DNA of the organization. The same goes for the other top management team members. Bryan’s 
sons, John and Roger, joined the organization ten years ago and became part of the board soon 
after. Together with Bryan (CEO), John (CCO) and Roger (COO)3 form the top management 
triangle of CLOTHING. The top management team structure could be described as rather flat. 
All TMT members have a strong operational focus and make decisions in consultation with 
each other. None of the TMT members has “the primacy to simply push through” (Bryan – 
CEO), limiting the hierarchical difference between the TMT members. 
3.5 FINDINGS  
3.5.1 Phase 1 – Building the Online Business Model (2010-2016) 
In 2010, CLOTHING took the decision to introduce a web shop in addition to their physical 
store. The website was developed by an external party and the decision was made to further 
craft and develop the business model at a separate location, away from their physical store. 
With the focal firm governing the online business model, the process of online sales was crafted 
and reshaped throughout the years at the separate location. In 2016, they decided to integrate 
the created online business model back into the focal firm. Both the physical presence of the 
online team and the business model processes were integrated and brought back to the physical 
store of CLOTHING.  
3.5.1.1 Triggers of different perceptions.  
‘Triggers of different perceptions’ refers to differences of individual top managers that result 
in prioritizing different aspects and different perceptions of the environmental stimuli. 
Individual differences. The CCO was the youngest member of the top management team. After 
working for different companies in the retail industry, he joined CLOTHING in 2009. 
Throughout his experience in the industry, he had been working on projects related to the future 
impact of e-commerce in the retail industry in the Netherlands. This experience taught him what 
online sales entailed and led him to realize the possible impact it could have for CLOTHING. 
 
3 Bryan (CEO), John (CCO) and Roger (COO) are aliases to ensure the anonymity of the respondents 
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Hence, in 2010, he came to the conviction that it was time for CLOTHING to introduce an 
online business model. 
“I have always been thinking about that theme [e-commerce] …. I thought the time 
was right to make the step online for CLOTHING” (John – CCO)  
The COO, stemming from the same generation, had the same perception. Because the 
millennials were brought up with fast technological change, they were used to and hence stood 
open for those developments. The CEO, who almost differed 30 years in age, perceived the 
online developments differently. Because of the generational difference, only later in his life 
started the technological change to take off, leading him to be less familiar with such 
environmental turbulence. Moreover, the cognitive framework he developed throughout his 
years of functional experience within the physical, highly service oriented, store of CLOTHING 
did not fit with the concept of online shopping. For these reasons, the CEO perceived the online 
developments differently and was against the initiative to introduce an online business model. 
“The feeling of the established order was that clothes are an emotional product 
that you have to see, that you have to feel, that you have to fit, that it was not going 
to be sold online. Yes, and so [the CEO’s] generation also had that conviction” 
(John – CCO) 
Prioritization differences. Stemming from the individual differences, the top managers 
prioritized different aspects. For the younger managers this meant focusing on new business 
while for the older manager this meant strengthening the existing business model. The CCO 
and COO were triggered by the online developments in the industry because they only recently 
joined the organization, making them less bounded to the established processes of the physical 
store. The CEO, on the other hand, was long tenured in the organization. Because the 
organization became successful by emphasizing personal service in their extant business model, 
the CEO prioritized strengthening the physical store rather than investing in a new business 
model, especially because in his opinion e-commerce was incompatible with the power of their 
physical store. 
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“Because of course it is contradictory to the power of physical shopping, isn’t it? 
You can of course provide personal attention and service to the customer, face-to-
face, in your physical store, that is completely different in the field of e-commerce” 
(Bryan – CEO) 
Prioritizing different aspects influenced the perceptions of each individual. Namely, CEO’s 
prioritization of the physical store led him to reflect the new stimulus to that frame of reference. 
This consequently resulted in the perception that e-commerce was incompatible with their 
physical store’s success factors. This perception led him to argue against the introduction of an 
online business model. 
3.5.1.2 Purposeful friction 
Purposeful friction refers to the process of discussing conflicting perceptions of individual top 
managers in the team with the aim to shape and enhance the perceptions of individuals towards 
the company wide goals. By addressing a strategic idea from various perspectives and 
frequently discussing it in the top management team, purposeful friction enables the 
improvement of initial ideas. Hence, purposeful friction is an interpersonal mechanism that 
enables the reinforcement of individual’s capabilities within the team. 
Frequent informal interaction. When, in 2010, the CCO came to the conviction that it was 
time for CLOTHING to introduce an online business model, he proposed this idea in the top 
management team. During this interactive moment, each top manager perceived the idea 
individually based on their own cognitive framework (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). The opposing 
perceptions of the individual top managers, stemming from their individual and prioritization 
differences, were triggers of friction in the top management team. Namely, by frequently 
interacting the top managers were able to put forward their conflicting perspectives. 
The firm operated following an “everything under one roof formula” (Presentation). This 
meant that all operations as well as the offices were located at the same location. Being 
physically present at the same location facilitated frequent interaction between the top 
management team members. This resulted in almost daily interactions in which the idea was 
discussed. Not only was the idea discussed during meetings and at the office. Rather, the 
interactive moments often times took place in an informal setting such as during lunch. As the 
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CCO notes: “And yes, then we talked very much about it. That is in meetings but that is also 
during lunch”. These frequent informal interactive moments created an environment in which 
the barriers to share conflicting perspectives were mitigated. Namely, the managers reported a 
feeling of trust in which they felt supported to bring their perspective to the table. 
“We certainly do not have a formal meeting culture, but you have to put your heads 
together. But that’s also possible a little ad hoc in the corridors.” (Bryan – CEO) 
Top managerial discussion. The interaction between the top management team members 
created a setting in which the perspectives of individuals could be discussed. As the 
perspectives were opposing, this created friction. The CEO, who perceived e-commerce as 
contradictory to the power of their physical store and therefore not supported the initiative, 
offered much resistance. This resistance presented itself in the form of counterarguments in 
which he formulated why sticking to the core competencies of their business, which had led to 
success over the years, would be better. The CEO believed this would allow the firm to further 
leverage their key competencies namely, service, quality and personal attention. Online, he 
argued, this would be almost impossible. Moreover, the CEO offered resistance because he was 
being reserved for the resources that would have to be invested in developing the online 
business model.   
“When the idea came up, first of all, I offered benevolent resistance. Maybe also 
from a kind of fear of the new. But also, being reserved for the work that it entails. 
And yes, we've all seen that it doesn't bring any golden mountains, at least not 
directly. I think it was also a justified resistance” (Bryan – CEO) 
The CCO, on the other hand, was so convinced about the importance of introducing an online 
business model for CLOTHING that he persistently formulated why it was important to make 
the step online. He believed it to be the future of retail and that therefore CLOTHING had to 
make the step online in order to adapt to the changing circumstances. The persistence of both 
the CCO and COO were important to move the discussion forward. As the CEO notes: “The 
younger generation had to be quite persistent and tenacious in order to finally get through”. 
While the managers reported persistence to be an important means to move the discussion 
forward, they also reported it to be important that this was done on the basis of arguments. 
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Whereas resistance on the one hand and persistence on the other were sources of friction, 
supporting the perspectives with substantiated arguments helped the managers to move beyond 
the cognitive friction. Namely, the arguments helped the top managers to better understand the 
perspectives of their team members. 
“It is only important that it is done on the basis of arguments and that we 
thoroughly evaluate it before a decision is made” (Bryan – CEO) 
Embracing friction. The friction that originates from the conflicting perspectives of individual 
top managers, was embraced by the top management team. Namely, each top manager reported 
that discussing the opposing perceptions of individuals helped them to critically view the online 
initiative from various perspectives, eventually leading to an improvement of the original idea. 
The perception of friction as healthy was important for the group dynamics as it helped the 
managers to embrace discussion rather than being offended by it. Moreover, by embracing 
friction, a situation is created in which each top manager is able to freely share his perspective. 
Being heard before the decision was made eventually led to a stronger support of the subsequent 
decision. 
“Between the directors, a healthy field of tension may arise. From which I think 
only better things can be born”. (Bryan – CEO) 
Because all team members perceived frictions as healthy, the process of informal interaction 
within the top management team in which various perspectives were brought to the fore, 
allowed for better sensemaking at the team level. As a result of the frequent interactions, the 
CEO’s perception started to change. Namely, being confronted frequently with the perspectives 
of his fellow TMT members helped him to understand different points of view. By frequently 
reflecting on the idea to introduce an online business model during these discussions, the CEO 
started to realize that e-commerce was an important trend in the retail industry. This perceptual 
change led to an alteration of the CEO’s opinion and he became convinced that introducing an 
online business model would be a good step for clothing.  
“Well, I think it is very important that you do not throw away the child with the 
bath water, that you also have a little respect for what has been achieved. And that 
you say a little bit ‘research everything and keep the good’. And yes, we also had 
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that development with e-commerce. That is a very good example of that. Of 
something that throws things in a completely different direction and where you 
finally made a 180-degree turn because in the end it was the best choice” (Bryan – 
CEO) 
This process indicates that individual perceptions were altered by having team level interaction 
in which different perspectives were discussed. It also shows that team level capabilities 
enhanced the individual level capabilities, and by having these mechanisms in place, the team 
moved beyond the cognitive boundaries of individuals. 
3.5.1.3 Collaborative value-driven decision making 
Top managerial collaboration. During the initial sensing phase, the opposing perceptions of 
the individual top managers have been brought together. As a result of purposeful friction these 
perceptions have been altered, allowing the team to move beyond the cognitive boundaries of 
individual managers. However, the individual perceptions were not yet completely aligned. 
Although the CEO acknowledged the importance of e-commerce, he still prioritized the extant 
offline business model. The CCO on the other hand, so strongly believed that e-commerce 
would be the upcoming trend in the industry that he prioritized the new business model. The 
COO took a more neutral position. While he believed the online business model to be a good 
step for CLOTHING, he also acknowledged the importance of their physical store. In order to 
move forward and seize the identified opportunity, the top managers compromised in their 
decision. This means that there was made a decision which was not completely in line with the 
thoughts of one individual. Rather, the decision constituted of a combination of perspectives. 
Namely, the decision was made to introduce the online business model as an extension of their 
physical store. This way the firm could build further on the strengths of the offline business 
model, in line with the CEO’s perspective, while capitalizing on the new trend in the industry, 
in line with the CCO’s perspective. The neutral position of the COO led also him to support 
this decision. 
The frequent discussions enabled the team members to freely share their perspective on the 
idea. Not only was this process important to enhance the sensing capabilities of the team by 
combining and shaping the perspectives of individuals, it also helped to create a feeling of being 
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heard. This was important as this feeling resulted in a stronger support of subsequent decisions. 
Moreover, the flat hierarchy in the team allowed for collaborative decision making because not 
did one manager had the primacy to push his perspective through without consulting his team 
members. 
“But it is always giving and taking a little, in every relationship, that also applies 
within a company, that applies within different departments. You still have to do it 
all together … In the field of e-commerce, I had to compromise, I had to make 
concessions” (Bryan – CEO) 
Value driven decision making. Five years prior to the business model innovation decision, the 
company’s core values were explicitly codified. By collaborating with a third party specialized 
in defining a company’s DNA, the firm extensively thought about what defined them as an 
organization. During this process they came up with five core values which are: “customer 
focus, professionality, collaboration, results-oriented, and passion” (Presentation). The 
codification of the core values was important as it guided the top management team in further 
decision making. Namely, all decisions that are made have to be in line with the core values of 
the organization. 
“Those values and what we stand for. Yes, they are so well anchored that you 
automatically put those things along the rod of the [CLOTHING] values. And that 
is why I think it will not go wrong so fast”. (John – CCO) 
These core values formed a red thread through the decision-making process which was crucial 
for the alignment of the opposing perspectives. Collectively, the team considered whether the 
online business model would contribute to strengthening the core values. This helped them to 
further refine their ideas and agree that the online business model should be introduced as an 
extension of their physical store as it would allow them to further stimulate the customer focus. 
The online channel would facilitate their existing customers because they could now order from 
home without coming to the physical store. 
“The combination [of online and offline], that is the original idea has been just like 
alright, e-commerce is "new business", is a new reality, you can't ignore that, you 
have to play that game if you respect yourself as a company. And it is actually an 
extension of the service that we offer in the store to the customer, that hasn't 
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changed. Since [we] started here in 1950, personal attention and unique service 
have always been paramount. Those have still been the most important elements 
for success. And you should actually see e-commerce as follows; you also want to 
give your own customers the opportunity to be able to shop 24/7 with an ipad on 
their lap, you want to give them that possibility.” (Bryan – CEO) 
3.5.1.4 Experimental implementation 
Experimental decision making. The decision making was a two-stage process in which the 
firm first decided to introduce an online business model as an extension of the service they 
offered in store, and then started experimenting. Experimentation was used to test the first 
decision. When the firm started experimenting, they learned what the online business model 
entailed and the way in which they were able to translate their core values into the online 
business model. Besides, they gained a better understanding of the resource investments needed 
to develop the online business model. Based on the advanced insights, a second decision was 
made to continue or not with the online business model. During this process the TMT 
recognized the potential of the online business model and made the decision to invest in its 
further development. 
“When you start, you don't know how it will turn out. And when you see that it has 
a promising future, then you continue to invest in it, then you expand it, then you 
make it bigger” (Bryan – CEO). 
Furthermore, the experimentation process was used to further convince the CEO of the 
importance of e-commerce. Even though his perception of the phenomenon changed strongly 
as a result of the top managerial interaction, he was not yet completely convinced. Therefore, 
the CCO and COO used the experiment to prove its potential to the CEO.  
“At some point it was also being decisive. So, even though not everyone believes it 
completely, just do it … The decision was then already a kind of decision that at 
least experimentation will take place. But that experiment is to support, or not, the 
idea”. (John – CCO) 
In order to successfully capture the insights during the experimentation process, the top 
management team was closely involved. The CCO, who initiated the online business model, 
was personally involved and responsible for the experimentation. By conducting all operational 
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tasks himself, he gained a good understanding of what the online business model entailed. 
Understanding the dynamics of the new business model in great detail helped him to further 
craft the business model in line with the core values of the organization.  
“It is about yes, first do it yourself. [The CCO] initially picked the orders himself, 
folded boxes. Yes, just try first. You have to prove it yourself and yes, like a start-
up starts, you have to try and experiment, you have to mix the cocktail yourself, so 
to speak” (Roger – COO) 
Moreover, having close top managerial involvement was important as it minimized the 
information flows. During the frequent interactions between the top managers the developments 
could easily be discussed. This helped them to quickly make adjustments to the business model. 
Another important advantage of having close top managerial involvement was the fact that the 
CCO had in-depth knowledge of the extant business model. This was important because, first, 
understanding the dynamics of both business models helped him to align them more easily and 
second, it helped him to identify complementarities between the two business models. Namely, 
as the orders started to grow, they learned that it was difficult to predict which products were 
going to sell best online. Because they could not estimate this correctly, they experienced stock 
problems because they purchased too much or too little of certain items. Given the close 
involvement, the top management team was able to immediately act upon this insight and 
adjusted the model. Since the physical store had over 200,000 available items, they came to the 
conviction that it would be better to use the stock of the physical store online. This would solve 
the stock issues of the online store and allow them to leverage the size of their physical store 
online. Hence, the decision was made to integrate the online business model into the focal firm. 
This way, they were able to leverage complementarities and consequently, strengthen both 
business models. 
“We soon discovered that purchase decisions for a customer that you actually don't 
know online, that comes from everywhere, that it is actually very difficult. So, then 
you quickly get stuck with that stock. So, we immediately adapted that model, that 
is test and learn” (Roger – COO) 
Conservative resource allocation. In order to be able to divide the decision process into a two-
stage process which includes experimentation, they started with limited resources. As the CEO 
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notes: “we carefully embedded it, we did not immediately start with large budgets”. This was 
important as it allowed the firm to stop with the initiative in case it turned out not to be as 
promising as they hoped without being forced to continue because there were big investments 
at stake. Starting with limited resource investments further enables experimentation for the 
same reasons. Making limited investments simplified the decision to adjust the model as there 
was no big financial burden making them path dependent. 
3.5.2 Phase 2 – Leveraging Complementarities (2016-2019) 
The identification of complementarities between the offline and online business models led to 
the decision to integrate the online business model into the focal firm. In this phase, the business 
model has been further developed and new value creating activities have been introduced to 
further strengthen the complementarities. For instance, the personal shopping concept, which 
includes shopping-by-appointment and the tailor-made fashion box, is a new value creating 
concept that aims at strengthening the complementarities of online and offline by combining 
the two channels. 
3.5.2.1 Triggers of different perceptions 
Individual differences. The CCO who started e-commerce himself is still responsible for the 
online department. In order to establish a good competitive position, in the online department 
they are constantly looking for innovative ways to distinguish themselves from their 
competitors. Still being closely involved in this department helped the CCO to identify the 
personal shopping concept as a new value creating activity. The COO, who was responsible for 
the physical store, did not directly see the added value for his functional department. This 
indicates that because of the functional division of tasks, each individual top manager perceived 
this concept differently. Moreover, generational differences kept influencing the perceptions of 
the individuals in further projects. Namely, the CEO was still reserved for the implementation 
of new innovative initiatives as he perceived them as rather disruptive for the physical store. 
The combination of functional and generational differences led to friction in the TMT members 
perspectives regarding the novel proposed initiatives. 
Managing High Growth and Innovation 
 68 
“But those are areas of friction. In that sense, there will also be others, certainly 
from the older generation and also people who have more affinity with the daily 
happenings of the physical store, they are more likely to say yes, but that is so 
difficult to implement, and they just weaken that a little” (Bryan – CEO) 
Prioritization differences. Given the prioritization differences described earlier, the novel 
personal shopping initiatives were perceived differently. Namely, the COO and CEO, who 
strongly focused on the customer of the physical store kept prioritizing the offline business 
model and therefore believed that the personal shopping concept, which brought together online 
and offline, would not strengthen the customer focus in the physical store.  
“Yes .. so as management of such a hybrid construction in such a company, you 
just have to make sure that you set your own priorities. It cannot be that you are 
only busy with digital or e-commerce because then the focus is not entirely on where 
it should be” (Bryan – CEO) 
The CCO on the other hand, laid more emphasis on the improvements of operational processes 
and believed the personal shopping concept to be contributing to the complementarity 
advantages of combining both business models. As the COO reported “The CCO always 
focuses on innovation”. These differences of prioritization again led to different perspectives 
in this stage of the business model development. By prioritizing different aspects of the 
business, each individual top manager developed his own perspective on the personal shopping 
initiative.   
3.5.2.2 Purposeful friction 
Frequent informal interaction. To further leverage the complementarities, various ideas came 
up, mainly via the online department for which the CCO was responsible. To keep the pace in 
decision making, not all ideas were discussed in the management team. Rather, only the 
strategic and tactical decisions are discussed by the TMT. Smaller operational choices and 
adjustments are made by the TMT members individually in their departments.  
“Yes, those limits that are ... yes, they are certainly there, but they are not explicitly 
defined either. But it is more if you feel that they are just strategic choices than you 
always put it in the MT. And maybe tactical too. Operational not.” (John – CCO) 
Chapter 3: Without friction, no shine 
 69 
The personal shopping concept, which was a strategic initiative to strengthen the 
complementarities between the online and offline business model, was proposed in the TMT. 
Rather than planning formal meetings to discuss the topic, managers discussed the concept 
informally. The topic was brought up during lunches, and ad hoc when managers had questions 
or doubts. When specifically asked for the way in which they discussed the personal shopping 
initiative, the CCO said: 
“Yes, not only formally. We work here anyway in a not so formal environment, so 
that usually goes a bit informally in the corridors. And yes then we talked very much 
about it and yes, that is in meetings but that is also at the kitchen table” (John – 
CCO) 
Top managerial discussion. The perceptions of the TMT members were more aligned during 
this stage as all managers supported the initiative to integrate the online business model into 
the focal firm in order to leverage complementarities. As the dispersion of perceptions was less 
diverse than during the initial BMI stage, less resistance was offered against the proposed 
initiatives. Nevertheless, the culture within the team makes that all initiatives are challenged in 
order to critically illuminate it from various perspectives. When the CCO proposed the personal 
shopping concept, the CEO was reserved and advocated against it. This resistance stemmed 
from the CEO’s perception that the new initiative might affect the physical store. 
“Sometimes there is a difference of opinion about, for example, the impact that 
personal shopping has on the entire business. (…), then I would rather say, well, 
we slowdown that a bit and he says that it should be given free rein, that we need 
to develop and profile that even more” (Bryan – CEO) 
In order to move the discussion forward, again, the CCO had to substantiate why he believed 
that it was a good decision. By calculating the impact, eventually the CEO’s perception changed 
what led him to support the personal shopping initiative. 
“And there is also then, yes that [concept of personal shopping] is then discussed. 
And then you hear yes, is that really necessary? And that usually happens because 
in this case also often because I am convinced and then come up with a 
substantiation of what it can do and how we can earn it back” (John – CCO) 
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Embracing friction. As described before, the top management team members perceive friction 
as healthy, allowing them to shape and improve their perceptions, subsequently leading to 
improved ideas. As the COO notes: “They do not hide their opinion. That does cause some 
friction from time to time but yes, without friction there is no shine.”. This is supported by the 
CEO who says: “Yes, it is always, there will always be the tension, I think. But yes, without 
friction no shine”. 
The positive perception, which they refer to as “without friction, no shine” constitutes an 
important team level mechanism that helps the top management team to combine individual 
level capabilities in the team. While individual managers can be bound to myopia based on their 
own cognitive limitations, the combination of various perspectives helps them to overcome this 
pitfall. As a result of the interaction, individuals broaden their view and their perceptions 
change as a result of those iterations.  
“Because yes, sometimes that discussion also provides different insights, as a result 
of which the original idea is adjusted or improved and implemented in a slightly 
different form”. (John – CCO) 
Thus, discussions at the team level in which all TMT members shared their opinions about new 
initiatives has helped them to alter their individual cognitive frameworks, subsequently leading 
to the adjustment of the original idea. Hence, the team level friction helped them to enhance 
their individual level sensing capabilities leading to better ideas as a team. 
3.5.2.3 Collaborative value-driven decision making 
Top managerial collaboration. Also in this phase, the team members compromised in order to 
make decisions and by doing this, they moved from the sensing into the seizing stage. Whereas 
this process was rather extensive in the business model design phase, it was speeded up for the 
decisions that were made in order to leverage complementarities. For instance, not all managers 
were keen on supporting the personal shopping initiative. However, the fact that less resources 
had to be invested in order to test the initiative and the fact that the initial impact on the 
organization was smaller, the individuals were sooner inclined to assent. This indicates that 
compromising in decision making still occurred, but the impact of decisions influenced the 
speed in which the perspectives could be brought together. 
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 “I also think that that is part of life and also of entrepreneurship and leadership. 
Give and take, you get much further with that. And once in a while one has to 
compromise, the other time the other … so far we have always come out without a 
real vote or something” (Roger – COO) 
Value driven decision making. The organization’s core values were paramount in the further 
development of the new business model. As the decision was made to introduce the online 
business model as an extension of their physical store, key in the further development of the 
online business model was the translation of the core values into new initiatives. More 
precisely, all ideas were reflected against the core values in order to determine their relevance 
for further integrating both channels and hence leverage the complementarity advantages. 
“That idea [personal shopping] actually came about because of course our added 
value is mainly in the service you get on the floor, so really the personal shopping 
feeling. Yes, our added value lies primarily in the added value that employees 
deliver on the floor. And by definition you don't have that online. So, this [shopping-
by-appointment] is a nice crossover between the two channels” (John – CCO) 
The importance of the core value in new initiatives offered managers clear guidance in the 
decision-making process. Namely, it allowed the top managers to assess initiatives easily based 
on some clear standards. The fact that all TMT members were well aware of these core values 
further helped them to quickly bring together divergent perspectives in the seizing phase.  
“In our case at least it is true that for all important matters, yes, we have the same 
ideas about the direction of the company, we are really all on the same page.” 
(Roger – COO) 
3.5.2.4 Experimental implementation 
Experimental decision making. Even though the decisions with the aim to stimulate 
complementarities between the online and offline business model were smaller than the initial 
BMI decision, a similar process took place. When the TMT decides to introduce a new 
initiative, they always start experimenting. The experiment is used to test the decision and 
subsequently leads to the decision to further develop the initiative or to stop. 
“Depending on the state of the experiment, it is then scaled up or scaled down. Or 
yes, expanded or scaled down. We are then already executing it” (John – CCO) 
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When the first results of the experiment look promising and the decision is made to further 
develop it, as was the case with the personal shopping initiative, they keep experimenting in 
order to constantly make improvements. This is important because it helps them to further 
concentrate their efforts on exploiting the complementarity advantages of operating with a 
hybrid business model. 
“It's just trying out to explore how it works … from advanced insights into how we 
can best tackle this? How can we use this as a service to our customers? How can 
we facilitate them? how can we inform them?” (Bryan – CEO) 
The top management team led these experimentation processes. This was important as it helped 
them to make quick decisions and to quickly communicate the developments to their team 
members. As the CEO notes: “Just continue to develop and yes, take lessons learned into the 
process. That is, of course, always staying close to it, staying really close to it, and ensuring 
that everything is alright”. 
Besides improving their processes, experimentation is an important means to sense new 
developments in the industry. By being involved in innovative projects, the firm was able to 
test certain industry developments themselves in order to understand their possible value to the 
firm. For instance, the COO stumbled upon interactive mirrors as a new development in the 
industry which he believed could contribute to the further alignment of their online and offline 
business model. Rather than deciding whether or not to adopt this technological development 
up front, experimentation was used to be able to better interpret its possible value for the 
organization.  
“So we keep, we continue to get involved in innovative projects. We do not turn our 
back on that … These are all new concepts that you can either say "yes, just let the 
others try and fail" or you can test them yourself. We like to do tests ourselves” 
(Roger – COO) 
Being closely involved in this kind of innovative projects constitutes an important sensing 
capability of the organization. By experimenting with new developments, the firm is better able 
to form a well-informed interpretation of the value of these new initiatives. Because the top 
management team members are personally involved, this leads to the re-initiation of the 
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process. Namely, the involved manager senses an opportunity for the organization which he 
then shares within the top management team. Our data indicates that with all opportunities that 
are either strategic or tactical, the cycle of interpersonal interaction is repeated. 
Conservative resource allocation. To make this a viable decision-making process, the 
experiment always starts with primitive means. This means that they not immediately invest 
heavily but test the idea in a primitive manner. For instance, the tailor-made fashion box was 
initially set up very basic: “Well we also have such a concept that we send fashion boxes to 
customers. But we have set that up very basic.” (Middle Manager). This allowed them to test 
this concept without allocating strategic resources to it. 
Furthermore, this approach allows the organization to engage in experimentation frequently, 
helping them to look for ways in which they can strengthen the complementarities between the 
two business models. This also keeps the speed in the organization which is crucial for the 
timely adaptation of the business model in times of constant change: 
“I always say when you write it out completely, then you are already too late. You 
better just start sometime. We always say start with primitive means. And then just 
look if we want to invest more in it, and if so, then we just have to invest money in 
it, hoping that it comes back. And that will indeed remain, you win some you lose 
some. But just start small with the resources at your disposal. And unite the forces 
and then try to actually insert the thermometer there and, yes, just watch if we have 
to continue or stop” (Roger – COO) 
3.6 DISCUSSION 
So far, we have described how the top management team of CLOTHING combined the dynamic 
managerial capabilities of its individual top managers in the team in the process of business 
model innovation. Combining these insights with the current literature resulted in the process 
model that is depicted in Figure 3.2. As shown in the process model, CLOTHING’s top 
managers first scanned the business environment individually. Based on their cognitive frames 
they made sense of the environmental stimuli and interpreted them individually. The individual 
top manager then proposed his perspective in the top management team. The other TMT 
members interpreted the idea individually based on their personal cognitive frames. Through 
frequent informal interaction the different, and sometimes conflicting, perspectives were 
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discussed what resulted in cognitive friction within the team. This friction was embraced by the 
team members because they believed that this would lead to the improvement of initial ideas, 
and eventually better decisions for the organization. The positive perception of friction helped 
them to adjust and modify the proposed initiative as well as the perceptions of each individual. 
By assessing the transformed initiative along the lines of the company’s core values, the TMT 
then made the decision to start experimenting with the business model innovation. 
Experimentation was part of the two-stage decision-making process and helped the team in two 
ways: (1) to validate the decision and (2) to refine and shape the original idea. Having close 
involvement of an individual top manager in the experimentation process ensured short 
communication lines what allowed the TMT to make fast changes and adjustments. Namely, 
the involved TMT members could communicate directly to the other TMT members, and the 
team was able to immediately act upon those insights. Moreover, as the TMT stayed closely 
involved, the cycle repeated itself because the involved individual top manager was able to 
identify new environmental stimuli related to his area of attention. We depict the grounded 
process model that emerged from our analysis in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2 Process model of combining DMC in the process of BMI 
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3.6.1 Theoretical implications 
On a more theoretical level, our model proposes “purposeful friction” and “collaborative value-
driven decision making” as two mechanisms that together help to combine and shape 
individual’s cognition in a team. By identifying these interpersonal mechanisms, we open the 
black box of how individual’s dynamic managerial capabilities combine within the team.  
Dynamic managerial sensing capabilities. Sensing new opportunities “is very much a 
scanning, creation, learning, and interpretive activity” (Teece, 2007: 1322). At CLOTHING we 
observed that the scanning activities are conducted by individual top managers. In line with 
what prior studies suggests, our findings indicate that individual top managers use their human 
and social capital to scan the business environment (Adner & Helfat, 2003). Our findings 
suggest that the functional division of tasks is an important structural component that allows 
for the enhancement of individual cognition within the team. This functional division makes 
that each individual manager is closely involved, and therefore knowledgeable of, the 
operational activities within his department. Both the human capital (shaped by the experience 
within the department) and social capital (which are the relations with the employees in the 
department and the network in which the department operates) of the top managers are 
influenced by this structural decision and will hence influence the way in which managers 
interpret new initiatives. Because functional experience shapes the cognitive frames of 
individuals (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015), each individual top manager 
is biased in his perception of a given situation. For instance, the CCO is responsible for the 
online business model. His social relations, both inside and outside the firm, are mainly linked 
to the online business. By having those relations, he is best informed about the developments 
within the field of online. Hence, the initiatives he proposes are mainly closely linked with the 
online business model. This indicates the cognitive biases of the individual top managers.   
Purposeful friction represents an interpersonal mechanism that allows the TMT to move beyond 
the cognitive limitations of individual top managers. Given that cognitive capabilities for 
attention and perception are distributed heterogeneously among individuals (Helfat & Peteraf, 
2015), bringing together different perspectives enhances the team level sensing capabilities. 
Our empirical insights show that through frequent informal interaction in which the idea is 
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viewed from various perspectives, individuals are capable of moving beyond their cognitive 
boundaries which leads to an improvement of the original idea. This insight is in line with what 
Zollo and Winter (2002: 341) called “constructive confrontations”, which they argued to be a 
fundamental mechanism for the development of collective competence. As typified in the 
opening quote, if you want a gemstone to be shiny you smoothen it and polish it by way of 
friction, removing the parts that are unwanted. In a similar vein, cognitive friction provides a 
pathway to improve the interpretations of individuals, leading to better informed strategic 
decisions.  
Prior research has suggested that cognitive friction only occurs when there is enough cognitive 
distance between individuals (Hagel & Brown, 2005; Hautala, 2011). While our study confirms 
cognitive distance to be important for cognitive friction, it provides deeper understanding of 
how top managers can purposefully create cognitive distance by dividing the functional 
responsibility of top managers across departments. Structurally dividing responsibilities will 
influence the underlying managerial resources of individual top managers and hence provide 
different perspectives in discussions.  
Our study also contributes to new insights on capability development for strategic renewal. 
Prior research suggests that external sources of capability development may help unfreeze 
mental maps, structures and processes compared to the more exploitative internally developed 
capabilities (Singh & Mitchell, 2005). Scholars suggest that when capabilities are developed 
internally, managers tend to seek exploitative activities to avoid internal conflict (Capron & 
Mitchell, 2009; Singh & Mitchell, 2005). By introducing the notion of purposeful friction, our 
findings reveal an interpersonal mechanism in which managers purposefully seek friction which 
allows the top management team to overcome this social constraint. By purposefully creating 
friction rather than avoiding it, CLOTHING was able to internally develop the capabilities 
needed to engage in business model innovation.   
Prior studies have also shown that dynamic managerial capabilities often rely on stable 
underpinnings that enable practiced and patterned behavior (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat & 
Martin, 2015; Schilke et al., 2018). Our process model shows that purposeful friction is an 
interpersonal mechanism that has been present throughout the entire period of study. For 
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instance, when the CCO came up with the idea to innovate the business model, this was 
extensively discussed in the TMT. When he later proposed the idea to introduce the concept of 
personal shopping, this was again proposed in the top management team. In both instances, the 
original idea was shaped in this process and implemented in a modified manner. The routinized 
nature of purposeful friction in interpreting strategic ideas within CLOTHING makes it an 
important dynamic capability. Therefore, our study offers an important contribution to the 
dynamic capability literature (Augier & Teece, 2009; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). Furthermore, 
we identify a relevant boundary condition for purposeful friction to be productive (Hagel & 
Brown, 2005). Namely, our findings suggest that purposeful friction is an essential 
interpersonal mechanism when the issue to be addressed is considered strategic. By identifying 
strategic issues as a boundary condition for productive friction, we complement prior research 
on the ingredients of productive friction in teams (Hagel & Brown, 2005). 
A final note in our model is that with purposeful friction we refer to the friction of the 
perceptions of individual top managers i.e., cognitive friction (Hautala, 2011). Our model 
shows that cognitive friction becomes effective when there is harmony between the team 
members and other frictions such as knowledge stickiness (Szulanski, 1996) and power 
inequality (Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, 2010) are mitigated.  
The bridge between sensing and seizing capabilities. Prior research has remained silent on the 
bridge between the procedural levels sensing and seizing (Roberts & Grover, 2012; Schilke et 
al., 2018). Our process model shows that the fact that the TMT members perceive friction as 
healthy allows them to move beyond opposing believes and combine their perspectives to seize 
the identified opportunities. “Without friction, no shine” as the top managers of CLOTHING 
described it, is an important part of the model that bridges sensing and seizing capabilities. 
Scholars have shown that information does not flow effectively between parties when either 
the sender or receiver has a lack of motivation to send or absorb information (Ghosh & 
Rosenkopf, 2015; Szulanski, 1996). In a similar vein, our findings indicate because of the 
willingness to hear and share different perspectives, information flows fluently, even when 
perspectives are conflicting. Because of the fluent information flow and hence the richness of 
information available, collective perceptions can be shaped. Moreover, being motivated to send 
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and receive information about different perspectives led to alterations in the perceptions of 
individuals. This process constitutes the bridge that allowed the team to move from individual 
interpretations to a collective decision. Therefore, our model provides an important contribution 
to the dynamic capability literature by unraveling the mechanism that bridges managerial 
sensing and seizing capabilities (Roberts & Grover, 2012; Schilke et al., 2018). 
Dynamic managerial seizing capabilities. Managers have to seize the identified opportunities 
in order to be able to capitalize on them. Designing business model innovation is a crucial 
dynamic managerial seizing capability (Teece, 2007).  
Compromising in decision making constitutes a key value in the top management team of 
CLOTHING. This allowed the top management team members to move from discussing 
opposing perspectives to making decisions, even if not all managers completely agreed. Our 
study shows how consensus in decision making is an effective means to move from discussions 
towards collaborative decisions. What is more, our findings reveal that if there is no consensus, 
majority decision making can act as a substitute in triadic top management teams.  
Our findings contribute to prior research in at least two ways. First, we build on prior research 
that has shown that power inequality can be an important source of social friction (Greve et al., 
2010). We complement this view by highlighting how equally distributing the decision-making 
power over the top management team members helps to mitigate the social friction that can 
derive from power inequality. What is more, prior research has shown that triadic relations can 
enforce shared norms and behavior and therefore serve as a social constraint that lead members 
to act in accordance with each other’s expectations and to expect the same from the other 
members (Krackhardt, 1998, 1999). Also, having three parties involved means that the third 
party can act as mediator in times of conflict (Greve et al., 2010). Our study complements the 
notion of triadic relations by revealing how they act as a means to move beyond discussions 
towards collaborative decisions. Taken together, our findings reveal that triadic relationships in 
the top management team where the decision-making power is equally distributed among the 
individuals can be an important condition for team dynamic managerial seizing capabilities. 
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Our model also suggests that having well established core values guides the top management 
team in the decision-making process. Having a shared understanding of the direction of the 
organization helps the top management team to bring together the perspectives of individuals 
in the decision-making process. Prior research has shown that conflicting perspectives could be 
a source of novelty when individuals agree on the mainline of a project but have different 
interpretations of how to achieve this (Hautala, 2011). Our study acknowledges this insight and 
expands it by showing how having well defined values in the organization can create this 
mainline. The values that are explicitly defined in the organization constitute a red thread 
throughout both the sensing and seizing phase. Because each manager has a shared 
understanding of what the organization stands for, the purpose in the purposeful friction process 
is clear. Moreover, when making decisions, all managers agree that the decision should 
contribute to the traditional values of the organization. This provides common ground in the 
decision-making process and helps the top management team to make a collective decision. 
As shown in our process model, at CLOTHING the BMI design was not a one moment in time, 
static decision. Rather, it is a process in which the BMI design is crafted. First collectively the 
decision was taken to experiment with the business model innovation along the lines of the 
company’s core values. While the direction was set, the definite decision was not yet made. 
Based on advanced insights the TMT decided whether or not to continue. Moreover, the BMI 
design was shaped and adjusted by having close TMT involvement in the experimental 
implementation phase. Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) in their study on cognitive and experiential 
search found that cognitive representations provide a powerful suggestion for the initial choice 
of experimentation. Especially in times of change, the cognitive representations of managers 
that are formed by their prior experience help managers to make better initial experimentation 
decisions. Moreover, experiential learning allows managers to shift cognitions which also 
increases relative performance. Taken together, this suggests that managers should rely on their 
cognitive representations in making the choice about how to experiment. Then, they should 
allow experimentation to result in cognitive shifts, leading to performance enhancement in 
times of change (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). While our study supports this, we move beyond 
this insight and show how interaction at the TMT level leads to the refinement of cognitive 
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representations before the experiential search decision is made. This is important as it leads to 
an improved decision about the experimentation. Our findings suggest that because of 
purposeful friction, top management teams are able to make performance enhancing 
experimentation decisions in times of change. Hence, we show that combining top managerial 
cognitions by ways of purposeful friction is a team level dynamic managerial sensing capability 
that subsequently strengthens the dynamic managerial seizing process.  
3.6.2 Managerial implications 
Our findings have important implications for managerial practice. Our study provides new 
insights into how top management teams may combine the dynamic managerial capabilities of 
individual top managers, enhance these capabilities within the team, and successfully innovate 
established business models. Our findings suggest that top managers should compose triadic 
top management teams consisting of top managers with diverse backgrounds and functional 
responsibilities. This will help the TMT to approach new ideas from various perspectives. Our 
findings may help top managers to embrace cognitive friction as it may be a fruitful process for 
better business model innovation choices. Equally distributing decision power among the top 
managers also constitutes an insight about the team structure that could help top managers to 
compose a top management team that is able to move beyond cognitive friction towards 
collaborative decisions. If CEOs, and decision makers alike, explicitly define core values, it 
will further allow them to have a team that is able to work towards the long-term goals of his 
organization, despite different interpretations about how to achieve those goals. Finally, our 
findings may help top managers to be closely involved in experimentation as we show how this 
could contribute to quickly detect opportunities and to shape BMI in line with the overarching 
company goals. 
3.6.3 Limitations and future research lines 
We studied how dynamic managerial capabilities combine in the process of business model 
innovation in the case of CLOTHING. While we believe our study provides valuable insights 
into how individual’s dynamic managerial combine within a team, our study also has limitations 
that represents opportunities for future research. 
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The fact that it is a one-company case study raises questions about the generalizability of our 
model (Sigglekow, 2007). Future research is needed to test the applicability of our process 
model in other cases and contexts. The fact that CLOTHING is a family firm might influence 
the insights in our study. Family firms tend to be more inclined to overcome personal conflicts 
and focus more on the long-term viability of their firms (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Greenhaus 
& Powell, 2006). In our study we explain underlying mechanisms of the interpersonal 
interaction in the BMI process of CLOTHING and we believe it to be an exemplary case for 
nonfamily firms. However, for TMTs of nonfamily firms, other forces, such as stakeholder 
pressure and agency conflicts, might be at play in this process. We therefore encourage scholars 
to explore the replication, extension and boundary conditions of our model (Smith & Besharov, 
2019). 
Another limitation of our study is that the results might be biased by the ex-post rationalization 
of top managers. While researching the role of top management in the process of business model 
innovation requires the use of historic data, as shown by other recent publications in the field 
(Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019; Velu & Stiles, 2013), we carefully applied good practices of 
qualitative research (described in the methods section) to mitigate the potential risk of ex-post 
rationalization. We see a promising future for ethnographic and more longitudinal studies on 
how top managers dynamic capabilities combine in the process of BMI and in broader 
organizational change processes. 
Future research may further explore the potential performance effects of purposeful cognitive 
friction. Although CLOTHING has been rather successful, we need additional insights into the 
performance differences between the presence and absence of cognitive friction. Future 
research might provide additional insights into how specific dimensions and boundary 
conditions may impact the overall effectiveness of combining individuals’ dynamic capabilities 
by the means of purposeful friction within the team. 
We hope that our study inspires future work to continue exploring how top managers enhance 
the power of individuals within top management teams.  
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3.7 APPENDIX 
Table 3.3 Data supporting the data structure 
Triggers of different perceptions 
Individual differences: Selected evidence on second-order theme 





“It is still a bit of that old and new perspective. After all, I am a little bit the old generation 
and the new generation will always have different opinions, prioritize other aspects” 
(Bryan – CEO). 
“When we started in 2010, the feeling of the established order was that clothes are an 
emotional product that you have to see, that you have to feel, that you have to fit, that it 
was not going to be sold online. Yes, and so the CEO’s generation also had that conviction” 




“It’s also a matter of personality too. Because some people don’t like to be in touch with 
the customers in the store, because you have to like that, it has to suit you too. And the 
other person who thinks well, I will take care of the business side, I facilitate and I do 
everything that is needed but for the rest I do not go with the hassle of that customer” 
(Bryan – CEO) 
“I am more of an emotional person than a real analyst. I am not someone who does a lot 




“[The CCO] is also doing a lot for the webshop because it is also his merit that he has been 
working on for the past ten years. So of course, he is also very focused on that” (Middle 
Manager) 
“I focus a lot of time on the store management and purchasing and [the CCO] is much 
more involved with internet, marketing” (Roger – COO) 
Triggers of different perceptions 
Prioritization differences: Selected evidence on second-order theme 





“I am more open than the previous generation to innovation” (Roger – COO) 
“When it comes to all kinds of other new things that we were talking about later, about 
RFID and about yes, those potential breaches of privacy or privacy issues, yes I am a bit 
more cautious and I tend to hold back.” (Bryan – CEO) 
Emphasis on 
extant vs. new 
business model 
“Yes, the store that remains the most important, and I hope it stays that way for years to 
come” (Bryan – CEO) 
“So I think we all know that. That the core business will remain the store” (Roger – COO) 
Customer vs. 
process focus 
“That is the difference between the people who are more in the office managing the 
business and who have only indirect contact with customers versus the people in the store 
who have to solve it. So that will always be a difference of opinion within the 
management” (Bryan – CEO) 
“Yes, but for me that [using technological solutions to improve the process] is still a bridge 
too far. Because I think that you don't really need that to properly serve the store, people 
and customers in the store.” (Bryan – CEO) 
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Purposeful friction 
Frequent informal interaction: Selected evidence on second-order theme 
First-order codes Selected evidence on first-order codes 
Frequent 
interaction 
between the TMT 
members 
“We have lunch every afternoon with everyone at home, that is also a sort of MT meeting, 
right, then we also have minor maintenance” (Roger – COO) 




“Yes or there are conversations about it among ourselves informally, but that does not 
necessarily have to be through an official meeting in which it is determined in advance 
that we are going to vote about this or something” (John – CCO) 
“We certainly do not have a formal meeting culture” (Bryan – CEO) 
Purposeful friction 
Top managerial discussion: Selected evidence on second-order theme 
First-order codes Selected evidence on first-order codes 
Offer resistance 
against ideas 
“And then you also always taste that resistance. Also, during the process in the case of 
online sales.” (John – CCO) 




“[The CEO] told [the CCO} to “go ahead” because he kept on pushing with the idea of 
introducing a webshop” (field notes) 
“Yes, that is simply because the person who comes up with the idea perseveres and 




“And they had to persuade me with sound arguments to make money available for that” 
(Bryan – CEO) 
“But yes, it must be overcome. Then you also have arguments, then you also get a 
supported opinion, a supported decision” (Bryan – CEO) 
Purposeful friction 
Embracing friction: Selected evidence on second-order theme 
First-order codes Selected evidence on first-order codes 
Perceiving 
friction as healthy 
“Yes, it is always, there will always be the friction, I think. But yes, without friction no 
shine” (Bryan – CEO) 
“Interviewer: They say friction is healthy. Can you agree with that? 
CCO: Yes certainly. I can also agree with that, yes, without friction, there is no shine. 
Perceptions 
change as result 
of friction 
“And yes, I have had that feeling myself and got it more and more that, we have to move 
more into that direction” (Bryan – CEO) 
“So that has cost some alterations. But in the end, I think that everyone is now really 
convinced that it really is an addition to the store” (John – CCO) 
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Collaborative value-driven decision making 
Top managerial collaboration: Selected evidence on second-order theme 
First-order codes Selected evidence on first-order codes 
Compromising in 
decision making 
“Agreeing and making the decision in a good way indeed. Yes, so it is cooperation, the 
power of cooperation” (Bryan – CEO) 
More so: if you are so convinced then you can do it even though I still am not that 
convinced” (John – CCO) 
Consultation in 
the TMT in 
decision making 
“That there is as much support as possible, the familial. We are all behind it, including the 
propagating to our employees. It is nice if there, yes, no camps are formed” (Roger – COO) 
“So as a service to make it possible to shop at [CLOTHING] 24/7 with an ipad on your 
lap … Yes, in good consultation we have decided that together, yes.” (Bryan – CEO) 
Collaborative value-driven decision making 
Value driven decision making: Selected evidence on second-order theme 
First-order codes Selected evidence on first-order codes 
TMT members are 
ingrained with 
core values of the 
organization 
“Of course, [the CEO] is pre-eminently someone who simply has the [CLOTHING]  
norms and values and vision” (Middle Manager) 
“And we all know, we have been brought up with that, it has been always emphasized, this 
physical company has something unique” (Roger – COO) 
Translation of 
values into new 
initiatives 
“We have such concepts as personal shopping where people can make an appointment 
online to come to the store or a fashion box that people get delivered at home if they order 
it online. Yes so that is, I think, an "up" on the website that you can show like these are 
qualities and talents that we have as a company” (Middle Manager) 
“In any case, we operate online using the same standards and values as in-store. So yes, 
we think that service is very important, and we do everything we can to deliver it as good 
as possible. That expresses itself more in, for instance, good customer service, the ease of 
good ordering, delivery options that you can also get it delivered in the evening and that 
you can indicate your preferences yourself … But it is something that we find important. 
So we also want to bring the values that we find important in the store to the best of our 
ability online” (John – CCO) 
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Experimental implementation 
Experimental decision making: Selected evidence on second-order theme 





“And at some point we say, yes okay we go and enter test phase 1, test phase 2, test phase 
3. And at some point it is okay, it all looks really good, we are going to make it bigger” 
(Roger – COO) 
“When you start, you don't know how it will turn out. And when you see that it is a 
promising future, then you continue to invest in it, then you expand it, then you make it 
bigger” (Bryan – CEO) 
Experimentation 
to convince others 
“Just start. And everyone has something like that, yes, this is not nice and that is not good 
and are you sure we should do it like that? Just start, just start and they’ll see” (Middle 
Manager)” 
“And then bam, there is a blow in the MT and then everyone stands behind it, or the 





“So yes, [the CCO] started it then and he has it, yes he has put his teeth in it and continued 
to develop and continued to focus on that” (Roger – COO) 
“Just continue to develop and yes, take lessons learned into the process. That is, of course, 
always staying close to it, staying really close to it, and ensuring that everything is right” 
(Bryan – CEO) 
Try, learn and 
adapt 
“No, not really a business plan was made no. Just, yes, think extensively about things but 
more just a sort of trial-and-error approach” (Roger – COO) 
“Because yes, building the site and connecting all those different systems there, we just 
got wiser by trial and error” (John – CCO) 
Experimental implementation 
Conservative resource allocation: Selected evidence on second-order theme 
First-order codes Selected evidence on first-order codes 
Start with 
primitive means 
“These are then just small pilots without immediately investing too much” (John – CCO) 
“We always say start with primitive means” (Roger – COO) 
Use resources at 
your disposal 
“Because yes, with online marketing you can, if you open the tap far enough, you can grow 
as fast as you want. But yes, that should not cost too much money either” (John – CCO) 
“But just start small with the resources at your disposal” (Roger – COO) 
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Table 3.4 Temporal changes in second order themes over time 
Second order 
themes 
Building the BM 
2010 - 2016 
Leveraging Complementarities 
2016 - 2019 
Individual 
differences 
Younger generation was in favor of BMI 
while older generation was against it 
Older generation (CEO) and top managers 
with functional responsibility for physical 
store (CEO and COO) perceived new 
initiatives as not in line with core 
competencies of the firm while the CCO 
who was responsible for the online 
development perceived new initiatives as 
good for the firm. 
Prioritization 
differences 
Younger generation with shorter tenure at 
CLOTHING advocated for the new 
business while the long tenured CEO of the 
older generation emphasized the extant 
BM. 
TMT members with responsibilities for 
the physical store (CEO and COO) 
prioritized extant BM while TMT member 
with responsibility for online (CCO) 
prioritized online BM. 
Frequent informal 
interaction 
Small consultations because of “all under 
one roof formula” and during lunch 
Small consultations because of “all under 
one roof formula” and during lunch 
Top managerial 
discussion 
CEO offered resistance against web shop, 
CCO persevered and used arguments to 
convince him 
Managers offer resistance to protect the 
BM they prioritize, manager who comes 
up with the initiative supports the idea 
with calculations and arguments how it 
can strengthen the complementarities of 
both BMs.  
Embracing 
friction 
“Without friction, no shine” 
CEO starts to see the need for BMI as 
result of frequent discussions. Original idea 
of CCO is adopted in a slightly changed 
manner as a result of discussions. 
“Without friction, no shine” 
Friction leads to different insights what 




CEO compromised and gave CCO room to 
develop the BMI initiative 
Quicker support for ideas because of the 
smaller resource investments needed and 
the smaller impact on the organization.  
Value driven 
decision making 
Decision to innovate BM as an extension of 
the offline BM as extra service for current 
customers 
Translate traditional core values of the 
organization in new online initiatives to 
leverage offline strengths in online BM 
Experimental 
decision making 
CCO led the embedded BM 
experimentation process in which the BM 
was experimentally designed 
Decision to start experimenting is made 
collectively, experimentation is to test the 
initiative. TMT members are closely 




Embedded BMI experimentation with 
limited investments 
Start new initiatives very basic without 
heavily investing in it before the concept 
has proven its viability 
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High-growth firms (HGFs), often referred to as scale-ups, have become the center of both 
scholars’ and practitioners’ interest. Although HGFs present only around three percent of all 
firms (Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 2000; Feindt et al., 2002; Lopez-Garcia & Puente, 2012), they 
have been shown to be a main driver of job-creation within regional and national economies 
(Du & Temouri, 2015). In addition, despite their relatively small proportion in the economy, 
HGFs generate important positive externalities for entire industries or regions, by enhancing 
their productivity and innovativeness (Bos & Stam, 2014). In recent years, high-growth firms, 
have received ample attention within a variety of research domains, such as entrepreneurship, 
strategic management and public policy (Daunfeldt et al., 2016; Krasniqi & Desai, 2016; Stam, 
2015). Typically, the main focus of such literature has been on the question of ‘how many’ of 
these types of firms can achieve steep growth paths over time (Dobbs & Hamilton, 2007; 
Henrekson & Johansson, 2010), as opposed to trying to understand ‘how’ and ‘why’ they are 
able to do so.  
However, only a very small proportion of start-ups is able to survive and transition into a scale-
up (Demir et al., 2017). Even fewer of those sustain their growth over extended periods of time 
(Daunfeldt & Halvarsson, 2015). Some authors have already hinted at the unique nature of 
rapidly growing firms (Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner, 2003; Powell & Sandholtz, 2012), and 
highlighted the challenges of operating in continuous fast change, where organizational routines 
and practices need to be consistently adapted (Nicholls-Nixon, 2005) Yet, there is still a dearth 
of research addressing how HGFs are able to overcome these challenges and maintain high 
growth over time (Lee, 2014). Therefore, our current understanding about the factors and 
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processes that sustain high growth has remained rather limited (Demir et al., 2017; Wright & 
Stigliani, 2013), along with our capacity to document any systematic, as opposed to stochastic, 
variation that can support high growth (McKelvie & Wiklund, 2010). This is a crucial omission 
because a thorough understanding of HGFs requires not only the identification of its 
determinants and outcomes (Demir et al., 2017; Jansen & Roelofsen, 2018), but also a clear 
focus on the way in which high growth is built and manifested over time. Currently, how scale-
ups manage the intricate balance of continued growth, while limiting inertial forces (Demir et 
al., 2017), and continuously align organizational capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) to 
internal and external contingencies (Simsek, 2009), remains a puzzle.  
To understand this puzzle, there is a clear need for insights about how strategic leaders 
purposefully assemble and match resources, practices, and processes (Danneels, 2011; Eggers 
& Kaplan, 2013) in HGFs in order to capture and fuel high growth opportunities and sustain 
rapid scaling over time. To deepen our existing understanding of this puzzle, we will focus on 
the managerial and organizational capabilities required to sustain high growth, and examine 
the way in which they build and sustain rapid growth over time (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat 
& Peteraf, 2003).  
In order to gain rich understanding of the dynamic nature of high growth, we have adopted a 
qualitative lens and focused on a single case (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984). Specifically, we 
have chosen one of the most successful Dutch HGFs, Takeaway, which was one of the first to 
enter the online food delivery market and has been sustaining its rapid growth rates over a span 
of more than 10 years. Studying this case in depth has allowed us to document the processes, 
events and outcomes of the company’s growth trajectory in extensive detail over an extended 
period of time (Langley, 1999) and to gain a deeper understanding of first, what are the specific 
capabilities that enable sustained rapid scaling and second, how these are enacted and 
developed over time.  
Our findings show that strategic leaders within an HGF take deliberate actions to identify and 
prioritize key growth driving activities in the organization, which we refer to as capturing the 
growth logic, and assemble them into routines and capabilities that help ensure a continued 
match with the external and internal contingencies the firm faces during growth. In particular, 
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we have seen that the top management developed three core organizational capabilities, namely 
pooling resources, focused intervention, and controlled empowerment, which were enacted in 
order to establish and sustain high growth rates over time. Thus, in contrast to prior research, 
which has addressed rather generic dynamic capabilities such as financial, innovation, and 
marketing capabilities as antecedents of achieving high growth (Barbero et al., 2011; Chan et 
al., 2006; Stam & Wennberg, 2009), our findings are able to highlight specific capabilities for 
not only achieving but also sustaining growth.  
In addition, we observe that the capacity of the top management to consciously reflect on their 
existing constellation of routines and capabilities, and create opportunities to develop new ones 
as needed over time, is another key managerial capability in helping them to break away from 
inertial loops (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Levine, Bernard, & Nagel, 2017), and in remaining 
nimble and flexible to quickly change their course of action as needed. We label this capability 
as reinforcing complementarities, which plays a key role in facilitating high growth. It entails 
not only identifying, orchestrating and renewing a set of organizational routines that each 
contribute to sustained growth, but also deliberately seeking for complementarities among these 
capabilities in order to accelerate their joint impact on the company’s growth. We argue that 
noticing how to enact these different capabilities in different combinations together, and thus 
reinforcing the complementarities among them, not only supports growth, but actually leads to 
amplifying its velocity, thus allowing HGFs to achieve their ambitious targets. This managerial 
capability goes beyond the recognized ability of firms to retain and improve their performance 
levels through effectively reconfiguring their resources and knowledge base (Dibella, Nevis, & 
Gould, 1996; Teece et al., 1997; Zollo & Winter, 2002), and offers insight into the specific 
ways in which strategic leaders’ capabilities contribute to the development of high-growth 
outcomes.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on HGFs by providing a process model that captures 
dynamically how high growth can be sustained over time, which can serve as a valuable 
blueprint for fast-scaling organizations. By identifying specific high growth dynamic 
capabilities and more importantly, illuminating how these evolve and contribute to sustaining 
rapid growth over time, we therefore move beyond recent static insights about the initiation and 
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achievement of high growth (Barbero et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2006; Stam & Wennberg, 2009), 
and illustrate the process through which HGFs may dynamically sustain their rapid scaling over 
time. 
4.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
High-growth firms are defined as organizations with at least 20% of annual growth rate in terms 
of revenue and/or employees over a three-year period, and with at least 10 employees in the 
base year (OECD, 2007). Nevertheless, HGFs often double in size and they often do so on an 
annual basis. When companies rapidly scale in size, their internal environments ‘suffer’ from 
dramatic changes in managerial scope. Such contexts are characterized by continuous, fast, and 
often uncertain changes, which quickly renders the companies’ practices and structures as 
obsolete (Nicholls-Nixon, 2005). In order to effectively meet the challenges of high growth, 
some authors emphasize the importance of balancing between rapid changes and stable 
structure within the organization (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017) –a setting that often calls for a 
fast paced development of dynamic capabilities in the firm that can enable it to adapt to the 
changing circumstances (Winter, 2003). Thus, a unique challenge in the high-growth context is 
the recognition of not only when to take action, but also how to adjust or reconfigure the 
organizational responses to internal or external contingencies, and to maintain or even improve 
the organizational performance.  
The high-growth context is thus unique in the way that the internal and external environments 
are in constant flux, which brings important challenges of continuous adaptation. Lee (2014) 
provided a general overview of frequent challenges within high-growth firms, being lack of 
management skills, recruitment and financial issues. Other authors (Barbero et al., 2011; Chan 
et al., 2006; Stam & Wennberg, 2009) examined potential organizational capabilities that might 
be important for dealing with the challenges of high growth. Functional capabilities such as 
marketing, financial and innovation capabilities have been identified as important prerequisites 
of high growth. While this has broadened our understanding of such companies, the dominant 
focus of prior studies took a rather static approach in examining such a dynamic phenomenon 
(Dobbs & Hamilton, 2007; Henrekson & Johansson, 2010). Moreover, the generic capabilities 
identified seem to appear in other not necessarily rapidly growing firms. Therefore, it remains 
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unclear what the specific capabilities that enable and fuel sustained rapid scaling of HGFs are 
and how they operate over time. Consequently, little if any attention has been allocated to 
studying how HGFs develop and reconfigure their capabilities over time in the face of rapidly 
changing internal and external contingencies (Demir et al., 2017). Hence, there is a clear need 
for insights into the ways strategic leaders of HGFs dynamically enact, assemble and 
reassemble routines into such specific capabilities with the aim of maintaining their steep 
growth rates. In order to address this, the dynamic capabilities literature provides an important 
theoretical backdrop to study, as its fundamental idea is that firms continually reconfigure 
tangible and intangible resources and capabilities to take advantage of the changing conditions 
and maintain their performance levels (Teece et al., 1997).  
The current state in the dynamic capabilities literature indicates that the development of 
dynamic capabilities is either examined in new ventures or more mature firms (Autio et al., 
2011). Namely, prior work has mostly focused on capability development in different types of 
settings, such as internationalization of new ventures (Autio et al., 2011), in conditions of 
proactively constructed crisis (Kim, 1998), in support of newly formed strategy (Montealegre, 
2002), and in incumbents’ response to environmental change (Danneels, 2011). While these 
findings are certainly valuable, they offer limited insight about the development of specific 
capabilities that are needed for facing rapid growth environments, such as in scale-ups. 
Dynamic capabilities reflect the ability of the organization, and thus top management, to 
purposefully extend and modify the routine and capability base of the organization (Helfat et 
al., 2007; Helfat & Winter, 2011). The dynamic development and modification of the routine 
and capability base is guided by the managerial capabilities of strategic leaders (Eggers & 
Kaplan, 2013; Helfat & Martin, 2015; Schilke, Hu, & Helfat, 2018; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; 
Levine, Bernard, & Nagel, 2017). According to Eggers and Kaplan (2013), there are three 
processes through which managerial capabilities guide and orchestrate organizational 
capabilities. First, they guide the construction of experiences into organizational routines. The 
knowledge base of managers which is formed by their prior experience forms the basis of 
capability development (Zahra, Neubaum, & Hayton, 2020). Then, deliberate conscious 
reflection on these experiences allows management to update and enrich their knowledge base 
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and to construct organizational routines, which represent the building blocks of organizational 
capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Salvato, 2009).  
Managerial capabilities, in turn, orchestrate the assemblage of routines into organizational 
capabilities. Capability assembly is an important instance of capability development as it 
reflects top management’s capacity to first identify an organizational purpose for which the 
routines might be applied, and second, to combine the organizational routines into capabilities 
in order to facilitate the achievement of an organizational purpose (Kaplan, 2015; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992). The process of capability assembly is an iterative one of trial and reflection by 
the top management team (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Helfat & Winter, 2011) and hence, is 
governed by managerial capabilities as it reflects the attention managers pay to certain routines 
and organizational purposes (Ocasio, 2011; Zahra et al., 2020). While the purposeful assembly 
of routines into capabilities, which are aligned with the organizational purpose, is certainly 
important and can be challenging for all firms, it is even more striking how managers who 
operate in circumstances of constant internal and external flux are capable of processing and 
even acknowledging all the ongoing changes. It remains unclear how in such high velocity 
contexts managers are able to prioritize, select, and assemble an effective set of routines and 
capabilities that can enable and sustain their high growth over time. 
Besides the alignment of routines with the organizational purpose, matching the assembled 
capabilities to the internal and external conditions constitutes an important managerial 
capability which depends on the way in which managers conceptualize both their capability 
base and the environmental conditions (Danneels, 2011; Helfat & Campo-rembado, 2016). 
Notably, perceived mismatches between the firm’s capabilities and external conditions 
motivate the revision of established capabilities and the addition of new ones (Eggers & Kaplan, 
2009, 2013; Taylor & Helfat, 2009; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000).  
Prior research has shown that management ‘updates’ its knowledge base through learning from 
experience (Collis, 1994; Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Kogut & Zander, 1992). The infusion of new 
knowledge that management gains from experience with the existing capabilities within the 
organization allows them to improve the combination of routines in such ways that their 
resulting assembly into organizational capabilities increases the value of the firm’s capability 
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base. Strategic leaders do so by incorporating best practices and renewing routines and 
capabilities to keep them useful for the alignment with the organizational purposes (Gavetti, 
2005; Zahra et al., 2020). As Zahra and colleagues (2020: 47) note, the process of developing 
and integrating routines into “a coherent organizational capability” often entails the integration 
of “diverse knowledge” and its conversion “into useful commercial applications” with the aim 
of maintaining the firm’s competitive advantage. 
HGFs thus face the challenge of constant adaptation to continuously changing internal and 
external circumstances that come with rapid growth (Nicholls-Nixon, 2005). Scholars have 
emphasized that being alert to altering conditions and recognizing when and how to 
(re)orchestrate the routines and dynamic capabilities is guided by the dynamic managerial 
capabilities of strategic leaders of a firm (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Kaplan, 2015; Salvato, 2009; 
Taylor & Helfat, 2009; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). The dynamic capabilities framework, and 
specifically the managerial capability lens therefore provide an important theoretical backdrop 
for our study of how HGFs dynamically develop and maintain high growth rates over time and 
notably, support answering our research question: What are the managerial and organizational 
capabilities that enable sustained high growth and how are they created and enacted over time?  
In what follows, we will first reflect on the steps taken in order to collect and analyze our data, 
and second outline how we have successfully addressed this research question in our empirical 
study through demonstrating and elaborating upon our emerging insights about the case. 
4.3 RESEARCH METHODS 
4.3.1 Research design and empirical context 
As our primary focus in the paper is on understanding the mechanisms that support 
organizations’ capacity to establish and sustain fast growth over extended periods of time, 
which still remains a poorly understood phenomenon, we have adopted a grounded theory 
approach. This has allowed us to gain a deep understanding and to develop a rich 
contextualization and vivid description of the experiences and processes that characterize fast 
growing organizations (Lee, 1999), and to engage in theory building and elaboration (Fisher & 
Aguinis, 2017; Gioia et al., 2013). We have specifically chosen to focus on a single organization 
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for our study, which represents a prototypical exemplar of a highly successful scale-up 
company as it has achieved uninterrupted high growth from its establishment till present day.  
Takeaway, originally founded in the Netherlands in 2000, was an early entrant in the online 
food delivery market and took advantage of the introduction of broadband internet in order to 
grow its operations. It leveraged its online presence successfully as it grew from 200 orders per 
month in 2003 to 600,000 per month in 2013 to more than 6 million per month at the end of 
2017. In 2019 alone, the company created 2,272 new jobs, now leading them to employ over 
5,600 employees worldwide. Takeaway has also grown internationally since 2007, where they 
established their initial presence in Belgium and Germany, followed by Austria, Switzerland, 
UK and France, and more recently taking a position in Eastern European markets as well. It has 
further grown by aggressively acquiring emergent competitors in their attempt to retain a 
market leader position. At present, it is the fastest growing company in the Netherlands with an 
impressive growth rate of 96% in FTE numbers. This makes it a revelatory case (see Eisenhardt 
& Graebner, 2007) for the study of fast growth and the underlying processes that help to 
establish and sustain it. Takeaway is also a unique case for this, as in contrast to many other 
similar organizations, it still retains its original founder who can offer unique insights into the 
challenges and changes that the company underwent over time. In addition, it succeeded to 
grow in a self-funded manner in the initial years of operation, while at the same time managing 
to achieve sound profitability over the years that many other high-growth firms fail to 
accomplish. 
4.3.2 Data Collection 
We collected the data for our research over a 30-month period. In 2017 we conducted the first 
explorative interview with the founder and CEO of Takeaway.com. The insights gathered 
during the interview guided further data collection and helped us to identify respondents. The 
first formal round of data collection was done in 2018, where we collected 17 in-depth 
interviews with senior-ranking employees in the organization. In this period, we followed an 
open-ended interview protocol, where we asked informants about the most important 
challenges of high growth that they experienced and how these challenges were addressed. In 
2019, a second wave of interviews was conducted, where we collected further 12 interviews 
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with senior-level employees. During the interviews, we specifically zoomed in on the 
challenges identified earlier in order to verify our initial understanding, as well as to gain more 
in-depth insights into these topics. In total, we conducted 29 formal interviews with the 
founder/CEO, board members and senior managers, divided over two time periods. This 
resulted in 25 hours and 59 minutes of interviews, which lasted 52 minutes on average and 
produced 312 pages of transcript.  
We further collected archival data that helped us to triangulate our findings (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). The documents collected took four forms: (1) annual reports; (2) company 
communications and legal documents; (3) a teaching case about the company; and (4) press 
coverage, including press releases by the company and news articles about the company. A 
total of 1.822 pages, divided over 107 documents were consulted and extensively analyzed. We 
used many of the company and press documents to verify some of our emergent themes, as well 
as to further ensure the correct timeline of our event history. Table 4.1 provides a detailed 
overview of the data. 
As our research interest is in mapping how the company established, maintained and persisted 
in its high growth trajectory, we were particularly careful about the risk of ex-post 
rationalization when discussing early challenges with our informants. In order to mitigate this, 
first of all we asked multiple participants across the organization to review and interpret the 
core events we were documenting about the company’s early growth stage period, so as to 
verify and validate the narratives that we were developing (for a similar approach, see Vuori & 
Huy, 2016). Furthermore, as we had excellent access to the organization, and as our case 
represents a rare example where the original founder is still leading the company, we had an 
opportunity to verify our emergent understanding with him and the senior management and to 
confirm all key events and interpretations that we developed in our narratives of growth 
trajectory that characterized the organization. A final technique that we employed to support 
memory accuracy was to ask for very concrete examples and illustrations when discussing 
particular critical events or challenges in order to help us obtain more realistic and 
comprehensive accounts of the past events (see Fisher, Ross, & Cahill, 2010; Tulving, 2002; 
Vuori & Huy, 2016).  
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Table 4.1 Data Overview 










CEO & Founder (F) 1 3 1 231 (24 pages) 5 
Chief Financial Officer (B)  3 2 348 (38 pages) 5 
Chief Operating Officer (B)  1  61 (11 pages) 1 
Chief Technology Officer   2  68 (17 pages) 2 
Chief Technology Officer    1 43 (8 pages) 1 
Chief Marketing Officer   1 1 70 (16 pages) 2 
Director Human Resources   1 1 109 (26 pages) 2 
Director of Scoober Operations   1 1 105 (28 pages) 2 
Director of Customer Services   1 1 101 (25 pages) 2 
Director of Sales   1 1 120 (39 pages) 2 
Director of Product   1 1 87 (24 pages) 2 
Director of Data Analytics   1 1 109 (31 pages) 2 
Manager Investor Relations   1 1 107 (25 pages) 2 
      
Archival documents    1.822 pages 107 documents 
Annual reports    749 4 
Communications & legal documents    621 9 
Teaching case    23 1 
Press releases and coverage    429 93 
Lectures given by the board     2 
NOTES: Out of 30 interviews, 23 were recorded and transcribed. The labels in brackets indicate the hierarchical level of 
the interviewee. F refers to founder and CEO, B refers to board member, the remaining positions refer to senior management.  
 
4.3.3 Data Analysis 
To analyze our data, we have followed the guidelines of the ‘Gioia method’ as we had a single 
case study (Langley & Abdallah, 2011; Nicolini, 2009, 2013). Even though the data analysis 
process is iterative and not linear, we have summarized our approach in three main phases 
below. During the first phase, we developed a detailed timeline of events, juxtaposing 
information from each participant and paying particular attention to critical events and 
challenges that individuals highlighted about the company’s operations, from its foundation 
until the present day. We constructed this timeline, based on the two waves of interviews. As 
those were spread 18-months apart from each other, the first wave allowed us to identify the 
main critical events in the lifespan of the company, whereas the second allowed us to validate 
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our understanding of these events and to inquire further about the effects that each of these had 
on the operations of the company. In doing so, we also developed a thick description of how 
the various events and processes we noted took place and evolved over time (Langley, 1999).  
In the second phase of our analysis, which proceeded alongside the first phase, we coded all of 
our interviews in an ATLAS.ti database in order to systematically organize, code and recode 
our data as new patterns and themes were observed. In developing the first order codes, we used 
the constant comparative method (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to capture our emerging 
understanding of the factors that supported the company to establish, propel and sustain its fast 
growth (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). We then abductively engaged with existing theoretical 
frameworks (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013), which could help us address our theoretical puzzle, 
in order to develop more general second-order themes at a greater level of abstraction (Tavory 
& Eliasoph, 2013; Van Maanen, 1979). For a detailed overview of our first-order codes and 
supporting interview data, please see Table 4.2 in the Appendix. 
As our original focus was on identifying some of the critical events throughout the growth of 
the company, we also resorted to ‘temporal bracketing’ (Langley, 1999) in order to analyze our 
emergent themes in light of their impact on the organization over time. We developed a data 
structure (Gioia et al., 2013) as a device that facilitated the comparison and contrast of our codes 
as our understanding of the company’s processes evolved over time, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
Finally, in the third phase of our analysis, we looked for relationships between our second order 
theoretical constructs in order to develop a provisional grounded process model that took the 
temporal dynamics within our case into account (Langley, 1999). Specifically, we looked at the 
temporal connections between our second-order theoretical concepts. 
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                   1st Order Codes  2nd Order Themes   Aggregate Dimensions 
• Realization of winner takes all market 
• Identification of network effects 
• Recognition of cohorts (networks) 








• One platform 
• One brand strategy 
• One company 





• Profit pools – taking the resources from 
one country to fuel the growth in another 
• Re-invest for growth 
Pooling 
Resources 
• Board internal and external knowledge 
• Board micromanagement (on key 
resources) 
Push from the top 
Focused 
Intervention 
• Cultural imprinting 







• Communicating the bigger picture (simple 
core business logic – based on the 
flywheel) 
• Aligning employees towards the bigger 
picture 
• Output driven management 
• Data democratization 
• Faster implementation 
• Faster decision making 
• Faster integration 
Increased speed 
• Increasing returns on resources 
• Increased communication efficiency 
• Increased customer retention 
• Increased restaurant offer leads to 




Sustained   
High Growth 
• Board’s strategic focus 
Selective board 
attention to key 
growth driving 
activities 
Chapter 4: Reinforcing Complementarities for Sustained High Growth 
 101 
4.4 FINDINGS 
4.4.1 Capturing High Growth 
4.4.1.1 Unlocking the growth logic  
Unlocking the growth logic refers to the process of identifying the key growth contributing 
components of the business model and developing a framework that could guide all subsequent 
managerial decisions along this logic. 
Realization of winner takes all market. In 2007, the company expanded internationally by 
moving into the German and Belgian market. As they experienced growth immediately in 
Germany, they started investing heavily in marketing to stimulate growth in that market. Even 
though this helped them to grow strongly, they saw that their competitors grew at the same 
speed. This insight helped them to realize that if the bigger firm grows at the same rate, it would 
be impossible to catch up because their absolute growth would still be bigger, thus leading them 
to drop even further from their competitors. Knowing this helped them to realize that the market 
they operate in is a “winner takes all” market, in which eventually it is only the biggest firm 
that will reap all the benefits: 
“We were fourth in Germany; we had put a lot of money into it. It went pretty well 
too; we still grew in 2014 by eighty percent. That is quite a nice growth. But we 
also knew that there were three that were larger. One of those three, number three 
in Germany, they grew as fast as we. We thought that was pretty good, because they 
were three times as big in Germany, so we thought it was pretty good that they grew 
just as fast. And we just knew, we have to be number one.” (Interviewee 1, (F), 
interview 2)  
In 2014, led by the “winner takes all market” business logic, the firm decided to acquire their 
closest competitor in the German market, Lieferando, and hence move closer to the market 
leader position. 
Identification of network effects. Capturing the business notion of the “winner takes all 
market” led to an even more significant discovery for the board, namely that there is a clear 
reinforcement effect from growth on both sides of their platform. This implies that connecting 
more restaurants to the platform on one side, will drive an increase in the number of customers 
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on the other. In the words of our informants, this was labelled as network effects. The power of 
such network effects stems from the fact that they can create an upward growth spiral. Namely, 
growth on one side of the business model (i.e., more restaurants) leads to growth on the other 
side of the business model (i.e., more customers) and vice versa. Stimulating such 
complementary growth on each side of the platform could therefore perpetually fuel their 
expansion and help them achieve and retain top status. Enhancing the network effects was 
therefore seen as an important means to become a market leader. 
“Greater brand awareness means that they can sign up more customers and that 
they ultimately take more and more distance [from the competitors], even if I do my 
work equally well, they will increasingly take more distance. And that then told us: 
no, we just have to get bigger. Then our marketing becomes much more effective” 
(Interviewee 2, (B), interview 1) 
Recognition of cohorts. The acquisition of the Polish company called Pyszne in 2014, led to a 
significant discovery in the company’s growth trajectory. Namely, they discovered that groups 
of customers can have very similar behavioral patterns. Pyszne was the Polish branch of 
Lieferando, the German company they acquired that year. Due to the board’s unfamiliarity with 
the Eastern European market, it had started analyzing the data about customer behavior 
collected by the Polish company and comparing it with other countries. To their surprise, the 
board actually realized that despite the geographical and potential cultural differences, there 
were clear similarities in customers’ ordering time and frequency, events that trigger increased 
demand, and customer loyalty. The CFO describes the moment when the board looked at the 
comparison of customers’ behavior across markets and recognized patterns in their behavior: 
“And what we have seen, and that was evident from the cohort, was just the 
behavior of consumers ... And that is also a reason why we said: why do we treat 
each country separately, while when you see how consumers behave from the 
cohort, that's all the same. And so, if those people all behave the same, why do we 
have to approach them differently?” (Interviewee 2, (B), interview 1) 
This realization has helped the board to capture an additional component of their high growth 
logic, referring to the discovery that the knowledge and practices that have proven successful 
in one market can quickly be leveraged in all other markets as well. This recognition of cohorts, 
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or in other words groups of customers that behave similarly, has allowed the board to make 
faster decisions and to implement their knowledge across different markets, thus increasing 
their efficiency and further accelerating the firm’s growth.   
Creating artefacts. In order to effectively capture the high growth logic of their business and 
ensure that it is applied in all future business activities, the board members resorted to creating 
an essential artefact, called the ‘business logic flywheel’. “The flywheel” is a visual 
representation that captures the logic of the network effects and demonstrates the above-
outlined reinforcement effects between the number of restaurants and the number of customers 
on their platform. “The flywheel” was therefore seen as an important decision making ‘tool’, 
which helped the board members to further streamline all decision-making processes, by 
ensuring that every next step of the company aligns with the flywheel business logic. The 
establishment of this artefact helped to further channel their attention towards the activities that 
will increase the number of restaurants and hence the number of customers and the other way 
around.  
Starting from 2018, the board decided to enrich their current B2C operations with a B2B model, 
after the acquired the Israeli-based company 10Bis. 10Bis was servicing the B2B market, 
providing meal plans directly to corporations. In order to reflect their expansion into the B2B 
space and how this influenced their business logic, Takeaway, further revised the original 
artefact, in order to include a visual representation of the expected B2B benefits and 
reinforcement effects.  
“Well, network effect means all restaurants, more restaurants, more restaurants, 
more customers, more customers, more restaurants. But also, more restaurants 
means more orders per customer, so that's just the flywheel going to spin” 
(Interviewee 10, interview 1)  
4.4.2 Pooling Resources 
4.4.2.1 Knowledge diffusion 
Knowledge diffusion refers to the concentration of structures and insights in order to accelerate 
knowledge flows in the organization leading to increased speed and efficiency. 
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One platform. In the initial years (2000-2007) of operation of the company, while based still 
solely in the Netherlands, Takeaway had been developing and redefining their original two-
sided platform. Upon expanding internationally to Germany and Belgium in 2007, they insisted 
on retaining the same platform model by translating it into these foreign markets, which 
facilitated the effective adoption of a one platform strategy during subsequent expansions into 
foreign markets. Relying on the one platform strategy meant that after every acquisition, 
Takeaway would integrate the newly acquired platform into its existing platform. Operating 
with a centralized platform internationally allowed the firm to quickly apply the accumulated 
knowledge to a new location, as well as to avoid operating and having to coordinate multiple 
different standards and systems, which enhanced their efficiency.   
The greatest test for their one-platform approach took place during the acquisition of Lieferando 
in 2014, one of their largest competitors on the German market at the time. After acquiring 
Lieferando, they directly decided to integrate the two platforms in order to further leverage the 
one platform strategy. Even though integrating was time-consuming and complex, its success 
has influenced the firm’s decision to integrate every subsequently acquired platform as well. 
According to the senior managers, the process entailed a crucial learning component, which 
helped further integrations of acquired platforms. This is apparent in all acquisitions, but most 
impressive in the example of the Delivery Hero takeover in 2019: 
“If you look at the Lieferando acquisition, it took a little longer before we actually 
switched to a new platform. But you can see that we have also learned from that 
and that we now also want to go to one platform as quickly as possible. You can 
see that in the example of the Delivery Hero migration, in which, in three weeks’ 
time, we almost completely switched to the new platform, so that we no longer had 
that dependency.” (Interviewee 5, interview 2) 
This has allowed the firm to not only speed up the integration process of each subsequent 
acquisition, and hence grow even more rapidly, but also to quickly diffuse their newly 
developed resources across the new units and maintain its competitive advantage. Being able 
to allocate focused attention to one rather than numerous platforms has enabled the firm to 
distribute their accumulated business knowledge across all their locations more efficiently. 
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“But we have that one company, one platform approach that we really say, we want 
just one platform. If we innovate in one country, it should be a feature which should 
be used in all countries. That makes us way more efficient on that side” (Interviewee 
3, (B), interview 1) 
One brand strategy. Even though they used one platform across borders, a country specific 
brand strategy was initially adopted. After the acquisition of Lieferando in Germany, Takeaway 
operated with two different brands in the German market. Having the two separate brands in 
Germany created a strong need for a larger marketing budget, which would ‘fuel’ both brands 
at the same time and to the same extent. The understanding of the ‘Flywheel logic’ entailed in 
the firm’s knowledge base, in which a bigger size would further stimulate the upward spiral of 
growth, triggered the belief that integrating the two brands would allow them to further leverage 
the network effects. Exercising their commitment to the ‘Flywheel logic’ and the importance 
of fostering network effects and an upward growth spiral, the decision was made to move to a 
one brand strategy, transforming both brands into one. 
“We focused everything on one brand, on the Lieferando brand. And since, we’ve 
been growing very strongly in Germany, gained market share very successfully.” 
(Interviewee 3 (B), interview 1) 
The one brand approach discovered in Germany has enabled the company to overthrow their 
main competitor there and become a market leader as they could now, in contrast to some of 
their competitors, continuously allocate their marketing budget to ‘fuel’ a single brand rather 
than to split their resources into several different ones, which helped them to strengthen their 
efficiency. 
One company. Up until 2007, Takeaway was still a small company, centrally operating with 
all employees in their headquarters in Enschede. When expanding internationally, initially the 
organization retained a divisional structure, whereby each country’s manager was directly 
responsible for the operations of their branch. This had differential success across their existing 
markets, which limited Takeaway’s ability to establish significant market share in some 
locations and threatened to jeopardize the growth of the upward spiral. 
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The transformation from a Dutch to an international company with branches in various 
countries, while still applying the one platform strategy helped them to re-evaluate their 
business logic in line of following a function-specific, as opposed to a country-specific 
structural design. Initiating a transition towards a functional organizational structure helped 
them to speed up knowledge flows, thus shortening communication lines between the board 
and the functional departments. Having a centralized organization helped them to further speed 
up decision making, and the implementation thereof, across all markets directly. The company 
completed their transition to a functional organizational structure in 2012: 
“… And the platform, that's just 60% of us ... Almost everything revolves around 
the platform. If that is one platform, why don't we have one marketing department? 
One way of working. Why don't we just try to do best practices and some ... And 
concentrating knowledge in one place and I think that has been a very important 
decision for us” (Interviewee 2, (B), interview 1). 
Knowledge pools. Enabled by the centralized structure and operations, pooling knowledge 
gathered from one location to another became an important strategic tool to quickly disseminate 
newly gained insights and thus to accumulate and share learnings on the value adding activities 
of the company that could support its fast growth. For instance, by concentrating the marketing 
knowledge to one functional unit in the organization and focusing their marketing efforts in all 
countries on attracting more customers, and hence stimulating the flywheel, a coherent 
approach was adopted across all locations. This further increased the knowledge diffusion and 
enhanced the competencies of functional departments.  
“in Austria, Delivery Hero’s local marketer does not compete with Lieferservice.at, 
no, they compete with Takeaway. You compete with our entire marketing team” 
(Interviewee 2, (B), interview 1) 
Benefitting further from the identification of similar behavioral patterns among their customer 
groups in different markets (the cohort effect, discussed earlier), the company could also 
identify and translate best practices in achieving and maintaining the firm’s high growth from 
their home market to all other locations.  
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“For example, customer service, it appears that we do customer service 
everywhere, in the same way, so that the software is the best, so that the practice is 
the best, so that we have no different rules. So, oh, you don't have your food, well, 
then this is the procedure.” (Interviewee 1, (F), interview 2) 
Pooling the firm’s accumulated knowledge base across markets enabled higher efficiencies and 
operational speed, thus eliminating the need for identifying appropriate practices and mastering 
them within each market. 
4.4.2.2 Re-allocation of resources 
Reallocation of resources across markets captures the firm’s efforts to pool their resources 
across locations from areas where growth is already established to areas where greater growth 
investment, in order to reach a market leader status, is necessary. In addition, it also addresses 
their impetus to consistently re-invest their resources in key value adding activities, which could 
support the upward growth spiral. 
Profit pools. The switch towards a centralized organization constituted a structural change that 
allowed the board to speed up the implementation of strategic decisions contributing to the 
flywheel logic. Namely, the centralized organization enabled the fast pooling of slack resources 
across markets as less stakeholders had to be considered in the decision to pool profits out of 
one market and invest it into another. For example, being aware of the “winner takes all” market 
dynamics, the board was convinced that they had to become the number one in their key 
markets. As the board identified Germany as a key market, pooling profits from the Dutch 
market helped them to stimulate the network effects by investing in marketing to acquire more 
customers and hence stimulate growth in Germany. Continued resource pooling was also 
evident in their decision to sell out Just Eat in the United Kingdom in 2016, after the realization 
that it was not compatible with the ‘winner takes all market’ logic, and the takeover and transfer 
of investment in Just Eat Benelux in the same year. As a result, the company has been able to 
reallocate their resources to countries where the market leader position could be reached, 
stimulating further the network effects that help lead to high growth. 
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“Those profit pools, why did we win in Germany eventually? Actually because of 
the Netherlands. Because of the profits in the Netherlands. Of course, we had raised 
money with the IPO, but the profits in the Netherlands, that’s what we used to 
finance all growth elsewhere. So also those huge investments in Germany.” 
(Interviewee 2, (B), interview 4) 
(Re)invest in growth. The entrepreneurial spirit of the founder, who is still CEO of the 
organization, led the board to constantly seek new opportunities for growth and hence to 
reinvest the firm’s profits into further growth in order to ensure the long-term success of the 
organization. The prioritization of investment decisions for the board were driven by the 
flywheel logic. As the board knew that they had to connect more restaurants and attract more 
customers and that those two would stimulate each other leading to growth, coherent decisions 
could be made. Hence, they reinvested their profits into growth driving activities that either 
increased the number of restaurants or attracted more customers. 
“We thought it was important: you have to grow, and we had the money. So you 
have to hire a lot more sales people and you just need to have restaurants ... And 
you can also see that that very quickly has grown enormously. Precisely because 
the offering became much bigger.” (Interviewee 2, (B), interview 1) 
The strong (re)investment in growth is further reflected in different initiatives over time. Some 
examples of these initiatives in the period after the German takeover are numerous subsequent 
acquisitions, such as Delivery Hero, 10bis, and Just Eat, and the launch of the firm’s own 
delivery service in 2016. Eventually, the investments made into all of the listed initiatives have 
the ultimate aim of further reinforcing “the flywheel” and hence enabling the sustained high 
growth of the firm. Thus, even in the later years, after growing bigger, the board members 
succeeded in handling the shareholders’ pressure to pay out dividends, and instead allocated 
their resources to further growth.  
“But it is also important that we have always invested. Every- We never said of, 
now we're going to park that money on the bank or something like that. And that is 
very attractive because at a given moment you earn a lot of money with these kinds 
of companies. I only think that it is not smart in the long run. Ultimately, of course 
- if that entire market is online, you can get a nice dividend out of it. But you should 
not do that at the moment that you are still growing.” (Interviewee 1, (F), interview 
2) 
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4.4.3 Focused Intervention 
4.4.3.1 Push from the top 
Push from the top refers to the manner in which the board was closely involved in managing 
the operations at all levels of the organization.  
Board internal and external knowledge. In the early stages of the firm’s development, the 
founder was individually leading the company and often engaging also at operational levels. 
Throughout his years of experience in the industry, in which he had been actively involved as 
a managing director, he had gained a good understanding of the dynamics between the 
stakeholders in the industry. This knowledge, matched by a deep understanding of operational 
level processes, was a precondition for an increased interference of the board at the operational 
level of the organization, also in later stages of the growth trajectory.  
“Because all three of us have done the work, just really literally the work, the three 
of us can answer almost all questions” (Interviewee 2, (B), interview 1) 
While the recently reached size of the company has reduced the possibility of keeping detailed 
track of daily operations and interfering with them, the rich knowledge base gained over the 
years allowed the board to retain their grip and input on all actions related to key growth-driving 
activities. By relying on their understanding of both the internal and external environment of 
the organization, the board members could also make faster decisions as required.  
Board micromanagement (on key resources). The board’s deep knowledge pockets and 
intimate understanding of both the internal and external operations also created the 
preconditions for their more direct engagement, or as employees would refer to it, interference, 
at all levels of the organization, particularly at the early stages of high growth. As the board had 
a clear overview of employees’ activities, it could easily interfere indicating strong and frequent 
micromanagement in order to ensure the operations’ alignment with the high growth logic. 
“And I think [the CEO] and me and also [the CFO], we’re all pretty hands on. I 
mean, that might be criticized for micromanagement to some extent. But if we see 
things, even on a small scale which go wrong, why should I stay calm and not tell 
people?” (Interviewee 3, (B), interview 1) 
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Over time and due to the rapid increase in managerial scope, the board gradually started shifting 
towards a more selective interference, focusing their attention only on larger growth driving 
initiatives and key resources that absorbed their strategic focus. This is reflected in the CFO’s 
report, where he states that due to the rapid increase in the number of activities, he has recently 
narrowed his focus only on few key performance indicators: 
“So we see very big benefits and where you prioritize, that is of course the question, 
I think you should be there- For me, I focus on certain KPIs eventually and that is 
what I look at. And the rest, I don’t look at that so much.” (Interviewee 2, (B), 
interview 4). 
4.4.3.2 Selective board attention to key growth driving activities 
Board’s strategic focus. We observed that over time, as the company grew in size, the board 
was able to selectively attend to and prioritize key growth driving activities of the business, 
which allowed it to dedicate their time and attention to specifically nurture these areas. This 
evolved as a gradual process, where they would carefully evaluate and identify such key 
activities, where their own input would be most critical for supporting the flywheel logic of the 
organization, and would start dedicating their efforts more directly to supporting them, 
switching cognitive gears as soon as a new key value-adding activity for growth was identified.  
For example, in the early years of internationalization, the founder’s efforts were mainly 
focused on marketing, which they identified as the key growth driving activity. Following this, 
he recognized the importance of another key growth driving factor, namely the need to attract 
investment to fuel further international growth, which was then subsequently prioritized for the 
board until its successful execution. 
A further illustration of the board’s selective attention and capacity to shelter their time and 
energy for what they consider key growth-driving activities for the business, include the 
integration of Lieferando in 2014, the launch of their own delivery system (2016), their IPO 
(2016), and in the past year (2019) the start of B2B activities and the acquisition of the UK 
market leader. As these activities were all prioritized as important for reaching a market leader 
position, following the “Winner takes all market” growth logic, they were consistently attended 
to by the board. 
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“So, the status right now is little bit different, because I'm new and also, our CEO 
is focusing on Just Eat [UK market leader] merge a lot right now. So, he does not 
have enough time for, let's say tech...or product...So, he's focusing on investor 
relations and upcoming Just Eat merge.” (Interviewee 12, interview 1) 
4.4.4 Controlled Empowerment 
4.4.4.1 Cultural guidance 
Cultural guidance refers to ensuring that all organizational members understand the company 
values and act in accordance with them, which in turn enhances the communication efficiency 
and speeds up the decision making and operational activities.   
Cultural imprinting. Operating as a start-up, Takeaway initially made quick decisions and 
implemented them without the need to document them. The way the company operated was 
clearly embodied in the behavior of its founder and employees, thus making it easy to adopt 
and observe for potential newcomers. During the first years of international expansion, there 
was still a family-based culture in the organization. The strong social ties between individuals 
at all levels of the organization made that individuals were willing to help each other and hence 
contribute to the company-wide goals.  
“You start with about thirty or forty and then you really have that family-based 
culture. So, everyone knows what they do and help each other” (Interviewee 11, 
interview 2). 
Yet, with the rapid increase in the number of employees as the company grew, the awareness 
of the existing culture started to be a much greater challenge, shifting the company further and 
further away from the familiar family-like start-up environment. This became particularly 
prominent in early 2018, when the senior management started to become acutely aware that 
distilling and communicating to their ever-growing employee base what the organization stands 
for, was an important next challenge. This realization was further fueled by their fear that losing 
grip of the culture can limit their capacity to direct everyone’s actions in alignment with the 
organization’s high growth business logic. As a result, the board triggered the process of 
formally defining and codifying the organization’s culture and its values in order to ensure that 
everyone understood what really drove the success of the company and its DNA. 
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“I actually see it as a kind of DNA, that is your personality of your organization. 
And if you do not - If you do not know what it is, then you cannot rely on it either, 
then you cannot judge it either, then you cannot train on it either, then you cannot 
even know about it. Then you cannot speak to your middle management about what 
you want to see in that leadership style. (Interviewee 13, interview 1) 
Enforcing the culture. Following the rapid increase in the number of employees, the board and 
the HR director launched a range of initiatives, whose purpose was to clarify and solidify the 
identified core cultural values of the organization. For example, they relied on social induction, 
engaging employees in informal interactions, and encouraging and facilitating cohesion 
through joint social events. In addition, the firm started to allocate more effort and time to 
thorough onboarding processes, which entailed detailed presentations and explanations of the 
established organizational culture. 
“And what we did afterwards, that we all held workshops in the company that said 
- who very clearly linked those values to the company and therefore also spoke to 
people about what is important, what do we expect from them?(…) So in this way 
you try to give content to each individual's environment and to make that link 
between environment and those concepts. Then people know why they do things and 
what is expected of them.” (Interviewee 2, (B), interview 4) 
Moreover, the firm made sure that the codified cultural values are institutionalized through 
involving them in the definition of main competences needed for enacting all roles and by 
including them into the formal performance evaluation process. Lastly, the firm assigned 
cultural change agents dispersed across different levels of the organization, who would facilitate 
the process of value adoption, through reminding the employees of the expected and valued 
behaviors within the firm.  
“We have done all kinds of change programs, but we actually have the core values 
there- If you define them, you have them- Then the question is, but how do you let 
this live? So we opted for a bottom-up approach in which we have appointed change 
agents in the organization.” (Interviewee 13, interview 2) 
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4.4.4.2 Fostering engagement 
Fostering engagement refers to creating a clear understanding of the overall organizational 
purpose and the employees’ role in achieving such purpose, which enables communication 
efficiencies and speeding up of operational processes. 
Communicating the bigger picture. Initially, the small organizational size allowed the firm to 
have a flat organizational structure in which each department reported directly to the board. By 
being close to the central company goals, it was clear for each department how they contributed 
to the bigger picture and organizational growth more broadly. Over time and after an 
exponential increase in the number of employees, however, the firm realized that many people 
at different organizational levels do not understand what the company’s business logic of 
spiraling growth really stands for. This reduced the employees’ engagement and led to a 
reactive, rather than a proactive approach of meeting challenges, often causing a passive wait 
for a ‘command’ response, rather than a proactive initiative. The board’s response to this issue 
was enhanced communication of “The flywheel” business logic first to senior managers and 
shareholders, and later after further expansion to the employees at all levels in the organization 
with the aim of aligning their behavior with that logic. Hence, the previously described flywheel 
has an additional function, besides being a decision-making tool for the board, it also serves a 
communicational purpose. Namely, the visualization of the firm’s high growth logic, through 
presentation slides, posters, and other artefacts, helps the firm to engage in and align employees’ 
behavior.  
For instance, during the launch of the firm’s delivery service (2016), the board needed to justify 
their decision about logistics activities that are unfavorable for the firm’s overall profitability. 
This need has motivated the board to actively start communicating to senior managers the 
flywheel logic that supported the new initiative. Such frequent communication of the growth 
logic helped the firm to gain the senior management’s agreement and facilitate their 
engagement in implementing the new initiative. Most importantly, better understanding of the 
high growth logic at senior management level aligned these managers’ further decision-making 
processes, channeling it towards the overarching company goals, and engaging their team’s 
actions in the same direction.  
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“And indeed, it is part of the fact that if we have done something, it must also be 
clear in that silo, to the managers in that silo, why we do it. And sometimes that is 
not entirely clear, so then we have to explain it better again "(Interviewee 1, (F), 
interview 5) 
Aligning employees towards the bigger picture. In order to further facilitate the employee 
engagement and initiative in a desired way, the board also started to emphasize and explain 
how individual roles within the firm jointly contribute to the overall flywheel business logic, 
which in turn enables the firm’s growth and success. In this communication process, the firm 
has recently (2019) started relying on developed tools, such as a KPI tree that adapts each 
department’s goals to the overall company goal and a Job Family Framework, which outlines 
the possible career trajectories within the firm.  
The KPI tree is a recent initiative led by the Data and Analytics director aimed at increasing 
employee engagement, reflecting the measurable objectives of employees and illustrating how 
the KPIs at each level gradually converge towards the top-level objectives, being the overall 
organizational high growth goals. The Operations Director explains how the KPI that is 
important for him at the senior management level is broken down and translated into lower 
level KPIs of his delivery team in order to create understanding, engagement and alignment of 
his team’s action: 
Cost per order is important to me. That is less important for the team [delivery 
team]. So for the team we often translate that into, for example, whatever we do 
with efficiency, so that is, how efficiently do we use such a courier how much orders 
he does in an hour, on average? (…) More orders per courier. So that's the most 
important task they [delivery team] have. And that still stimulates and can simply 
influence them. And even that they cannot fully influence, but they do understand 
that if you are an operations manager, that is the target.” (Interviewee 9, 
interviewee 2) 
Due to the passive and reactive, rather than proactive behavior of employees, which endangered 
the further expansion of the company, the HR department has also recently created an overview 
of career development trajectories for each starting position, called “Job Family Framework”. 
This tool further reinforces the proactivity of employees, through providing clear information 
about what is expected from them in their current and potentially further positions and what 
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requirements they should fulfill in order to reach these desired functions. Through increasing 
the desired engagement of employees, this tool has reduced the employees’ lack of motivation 
and proactivity and established a foundation for sustainably maintaining such engagement 
towards the firm’s growth logic over time.  
“…another trajectory is that we have defined job families actually for different 
levels. So that has nothing to do with your profile, with your job description, but at 
a certain level you need certain skills, you are expected to do. And so you can once 
again hang on to those core concepts and that can give you substance.” 
(Interviewee 13, interview 2) 
4.4.4.3 Enabling decision-making  
This theme is about providing employees with tools to come up with decisions themselves 
leading to the goals that are set by the board, and hence increasing decision making efficiency 
and speeding up the firm’s operations.  
Output driven management. Because of the board’s initial close involvement (and 
interference) at all levels of the organization, they made most of the operational decisions, 
leaving little room for employees to do so. 
Following the surge in number of employees however, a gradual shift from a strongly top-down 
managed company to an output driven and managed company was initiated with the aim of 
empowering employees at all organizational levels to make informed decisions. The firm 
started relying heavily on result-oriented goal setting, which was aligned with the overall 
organizational goals, and thus required limited, if any, micromanagement at this stage. This 
allowed greater freedom for the employees to craft their own approach to the organizational 
goals, and further enhanced their perception of personal responsibility through strengthening 
their sense of task ownership. Certain departments attempted to further reinforce the result-
oriented management style, by only setting the “Objectives and Key Results” (OKRs) for the 
employees, leaving freedom and autonomy to make decisions and to find the means to the 
defined outcomes. 
“And within those OKRs, they have the freedom to come up with initiatives that 
support that. And we have just started, so that is still partly experimental. But we 
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do see that it causes them to think more and more about themselves, how can we 
contribute to this goal? And that is also important for scalability.” (Interviewee 5, 
interview 2) 
Through empowering employees to make decisions that are aligned with the overall 
organizational high-growth logic, the firm has effectively responded to the challenge of the 
rapidly increasing managerial scope and hence, increased efficiencies and enabled the firm’s 
further expansion. 
Data democratization. The need to engage people and encourage them to take over 
responsibilities in combination with the rapid expansion of managerial scope motivated the 
board to develop further performance management tools that would simultaneously empower 
lower level decision-making and guide the employees’ behavior in desired direction. This 
initiative has been gradually unfolding since 2015, when the company hired their Data and 
Analytics (D&A) Director.  
The D&A director’s vision was to enable access to the ‘right’ data for the ‘right’ people, in 
order to stimulate the engagement of employees. In the words of the D&A director, this has 
been labelled “Data democratization”. However, the top management team’s desire was to 
ensure that employees have access to parts of the data that will enable decision-making and 
hence facilitate not any action, but specifically the actions towards attaining the overall 
organizational goals. Hence, this initiative ensured decision-making power, but only to the 
extent that the actions were aligned with sustaining the high-growth logic of the firm.  
“We still control that like, these are the facts, but you can look up the why question 
yourself, that is a big data tool, in your self-service analytics. So, you go and see, 
well you know, so many restaurants we have now, these restaurants have done so 
many orders. You can analyze yourself, so we really try 'power to the people’, a bit 
of that principle” (Interviewee 6, interview 1) 
This initiative has resulted in a gradual development of task ownership among employees and 
consequently enhanced their sense of responsibility. The combination of providing more 
decision-making freedom to lower organizational levels with controlling the input for those 
decisions has helped the company to effectively deal with the rapidly increasing managerial 
scope through increasing efficiencies and pace, and hence enable further expansion. 
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4.4.5 Complementarities among Pooling Resources, Focused Intervention, and 
Controlled Empowerment  
In addition to developing the three core organizational capabilities, which we have outlined in 
the sections above, we have also observed that Takeaway’s board has been able to identify and 
leverage important complementary effects among these capabilities, which could further fuel 
the company’s ‘flywheel’ and support the network effects, key to driving the growth spiral for 
the company.  
In line with Kaplan and Eggers (2013), we conceive of this as a managerial capability, which 
is expressed in the capacity of the top management team to closely attend to and search for the 
fit between their changing external environment and the internal core capabilities of Takeaway. 
In doing so, they pursued a matching process, by either applying their existing set of routines 
and capabilities in response to any perceived changes, or by developing new ones and 
integrating them within their existing capabilities for high growth. In particular, we observe 
that Takeaway’s top management was able to combine and configure their existing set of 
routines in a dynamic way in response to internal or external demands (see Danneels, 2007; 
Taylor & Helfat, 2009), such that they not only leveraged the benefits of the individual routines 
themselves, but also built in complementarities among them in their execution. This helps to 
fuel a much faster response and to generate efficiencies that help reinforce the network effects 
and fuel their growth spiral. It is precisely this capacity of developing and orchestrating such 
complementarities and ensuring that they are deeply embedded in the day to day operations of 
Takeaway that we refer to as a managerial capability of reinforcing complementarities.  
Within that reinforcing process, the configurations of routines from each of the three 
organizational capabilities that build up the complementarity effects are not static, but rely on 
the top management’s ability to dynamically update them, by decreasing or amplifying their 
reliance on certain combinations of them, or by extending them and developing new ones from 
scratch, if a greater mismatch is perceived in terms of their strategic fit. In the next section, we 
outline several key examples of how they were able to achieve and exercise such 
complementarities among their core capabilities, and thus to further enhance their 
organizational outcomes.  
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One such illustration of the reinforcing effect of some of the organizational capabilities can be 
observed during the acquisition and integration of Lieferando, in which pooling resources and 
focused intervention were applied simultaneously to complement one another. In order to 
accomplish the growth logic, the board aimed at achieving as quick an expansion into Germany 
as possible. While doing so, they also decided to integrate the platform of Lieferando into 
Takeaway, following a one-platform approach. In addition, the firm moved to a one brand 
strategy in order to be able to strengthen the network effects in a more efficient manner and as 
a result enhance the firm’s position in its trajectory to becoming the market leader. This was 
further facilitated by the board’s deep knowledge and understanding of the market dynamics at 
the time, as they could clearly recognize how such a move would help them gain some 
advantage over their competitors. 
“Takeaway used its funds to grow in Germany. But they were the number four 
players, so they didn’t have big footprint in Germany, so for them, the combination 
was great, because they also had quite some losses in Germany, and if you combine 
the two businesses, we could spend the same amount of marketing on the combined, 
just on one brand, which is way more efficient” (Interviewee 3, (B), Interview 1) 
Furthermore, their one company approach enabled the reallocation of slack resources in the 
Netherlands to fuel their growth in Germany. This, in combination with the boards strong 
strategic focus on the German market, allowed them to invest the additional resources that were 
available after their IPO gained in The Netherlands in 2016 into their German operations and 
hence facilitated the accomplishment of their goal to become the German market leader. 
The close attention of the board on the integration was important as it allowed the firm to speed-
up the process. At first, employees tried to combine the best of both the Lieferando and the 
Takeaway platform in the new ‘integrated platform’. As this process turned out to be too time 
consuming, the executive board decided to interfere and stop the employees’ search for the best 
of both worlds. Instead, the board pushed the employees to migrate the entire German 
operations to the familiar Takeaway platform. Due to the board’s attention being fully absorbed 
by the integration process, Takeaway was able to reach higher efficiency and speed not only in 
the integration process, but in its further growth as well.  
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“We tried to go the smoother way in the sense of like take part of that system, take 
part of that system and try to use the best system of both, but the team wasn’t too 
focused, and they took too long, and at some point, we just took an executive 
decision to go for one platform” (Interviewee 3, (B), Interview 1) 
Taken together, the routines within two capabilities (pooling resources and focused 
intervention) strengthened each other when enacted together, thus leading to increased speed in 
the organizational operations, efficiency advantages and stimulated network effects. The 
findings highlight how pooling resources alone was not enough, but it was the additional board 
attention that, when enacted together, brought out the complementarity among the capabilities 
and reinforced their effectiveness, thus accelerating the process. Similarly, the board’s close 
attention and interference at lower levels would not have reached the same magnitude of 
positive outcomes without the effective and efficient pooling of resources, further emphasizing 
the importance of mutually reinforcing complementarities between these capabilities.  
Another key example to illustrate the reinforcing effect of all three core organizational 
capabilities can be found in Takeaway’s acquisition of the Israeli online food delivery market 
leader 10bis in 2018. Leveraging the board’s astute strategic focus on identifying opportunities 
for growth, it was recognized that 10bis had a strong potential to help them enter into B2B 
services, an area that the board assessed as promising to reinforce the flywheel. Since the board 
had deep knowledge and understanding of the importance of strengthening the firm’s network 
effects, implied by its growth business logic, the B2B model was interpreted as a great 
opportunity that would provide further reinforcements for the established B2C model, by 
expanding the customer base of the company and reinforcing the firm’s high growth logic.  
In order to accomplish the integration of the newly acquired firm, the company has relied firstly 
on pooling their profits and reinvesting them into this new initiative. Furthermore, Takeaway 
kept relying on the one platform strategy, integrating the newly acquired platform and even 
payment system into its own existing one. Moreover, the firm has kept the one brand and one 
company solutions, keeping the managerial control over the newly acquired B2B framework 
centralized under the ‘same roof’ as the existing B2C model. This has allowed Takeaway to 
rely on and quickly absorb the established B2B specific knowledge pools of the Israeli 
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company. Relying on the pooling resources capability enabled reaching higher long-term 
returns on the made investments reaching economies of growth.   
This initiative was further successful as it also absorbed the strategic focus of the board, who 
tried to provide strong pressure across the organization to finalize the integration as soon as 
possible. Relying on focused intervention, allowed the firm to ensure that all involved 
organizational members maximize and align their efforts to complete the started initiative as 
quickly as possible. The board’s occasional interference at lower organizational levels had the 
aim to monitor, highlight and/or even correct potential mistakes based on the board’s deep 
understanding and knowledge of the market conditions and internal organizational dynamics. 
By not only pooling its resources efficiently, but also having the board’s valuable attention and 
rich knowledge on hand, Takeaway was able to speed up the effective integration of the newly 
acquired firm even more. 
The integration of 10bis and its B2B framework into Takeaway’s existing B2C model has been 
one of the first growth driving activities that required full reliance on the firm’s third capability 
as well, being controlled empowerment. Upon engaging with the acquisition, the firm made 
sure to consistently communicate to employees the importance of this acquisition for the firm 
as a whole, and how everyone’s role can clearly help and contribute in order to complete this 
to a successful end. In order to ensure that employees understand not only what is expected 
from them, but also how it can contribute directly to business growth, the firm relied on its 
formally defined company culture and its active enforcement through previously described 
activities. Lastly, the board has empowered the employees to internally experiment on a smaller 
scale with the new B2B model through receiving and delivering orders to TA’s own employees. 
This has allowed for an increased decision-making power at lower levels as long as the 
employees reach the goals set by the company.  
While relying on pooling resources and focused intervention can increase efficiency, speed, 
and eventually strengthen network effects, simultaneously motivating and engaging the 
workforce through controlled empowerment really helped to bring the acquisition to a 
successful end. Recognizing that all three capabilities are necessary to work in tandem is 
important as, even though focused intervention could ensure that employees allocate their 
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attention and efforts towards accomplishing important growth activities, if employees are 
disengaged and have not seen how their input contributes to accomplishing the greater 
organizational objectives, it would not have been a success. Recognizing the complementary 
role of this third capability is also particularly important as it further demonstrates the board’s 
constant attention to the need to revise existing and develop new capabilities, given the evolving 
organizational context, in order to continue their growth and be able to consistently adapt.  
Given that over time with the growth in size it had become impossible for Takeaway’s board 
to keep a complete overview of everyone’s activities within the firm, noticing and developing 
the additional capability ensured that everyone still jointly contributes towards achieving 
economies of growth, speeding up, and strengthening the network externalities. 
Therefore, it was the capacity of the top management to dynamically match (Eggers & Kaplan, 
2009) the internal capabilities of the organization to the changing external environment through 
developing and reinforcing complementarities that helped them to ensure that the growth logic 
is consistently enacted and achieved. 
4.5 SUSTAINING HIGH GROWTH: A PROCESS MODEL 
Building on those core insights, we have also developed a process model, capturing Takeaway’s 
growth journey from its initial international expansion until present day. Illustrating the 
dynamic manner through which it established, orchestrated and revised its key capabilities and 
processes in order to sustain high growth is an important contribution to the high growth 
literature as it allows us to move beyond some of the current static models and to offer a richer, 
contextualized, dynamic representation of “how” such firms can achieve and sustain their 
growth over time (Dobbs & Hamilton, 2007; Henrekson & Johansson, 2010).  
The process model therefore represents the interplay of the managerial and organizational 
capabilities we identified earlier and demonstrates how the dynamic development and joint 
instantiation of different configurations of these capabilities in response to the day-to-day 
challenges perceived by the organization, helped it to increase its overall efficiency of 
operations, speed of adaptation to change, and eventually contributed to sustaining its high 
growth. 
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We observed two main learning loops in the process model that uniquely supported high 
growth, and those include the double-sided feedback loop between capturing the growth logic 
and the three organizational capabilities, as well as the learning from the orchestration of the 
organizational capabilities themselves and the development of complementarities among them. 
The two feedback learning loops, facilitated by the presence of the managerial capabilities 
capturing the growth logic and reinforcing complementarities, have helped to establish points 
of "reflection" (Schreyögg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007: 927) and "self-conscious inquiry" 
(Danneels, 2011: 21) in the hurried day-to-day operations of the organization. This was critical 
as it supported the top management team’s ability to regularly search for and attend to (see 
Ocasio, 1997; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) external and internal events and to stay attuned to the 
core drivers of success in their industry and to revise their existing capabilities assemblage once 
strategic fit was perceived as not optimal.  
The first learning loop entails the board and senior leaderships’ capacity to consistently search 
for, attend to and distill the key success factors for the company and to develop means through 
which they can embed the perceived growth logic in all their day-to-day operations. The initial 
recognition of the winner takes all market logic, for instance, which the senior management 
realized early on, spurred the development of a set of organizational routines and capabilities, 
in order to embody this logic in the organization’s operations. The enactment of these 
organizational capabilities, particularly the focused intervention at the time, facilitated in turn 
the recognition of the network and cohort effects, which became evident after the company’s 
initial internationalization and growth spurt. Those were then encoded back within the growth 
logic and served to further inform the subsequent actions of the organization, including a new 
capability development, called pooling resources. Finally, the attentiveness of the senior 
management to the challenges of managing their fast scaling employee base internally, further 
supported the development of a new organization capability (controlled empowerment) and 
spurred the decision to use artefacts to communicate the business logic more widely and 
perceptibly across all layers within the organization, which was further encoded in the growth 
logic. This learning process helped not only to ensure that all business lines operated in line 
with the core business logic, but also that any changes in the external or internal environment 
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were noted and relevant adaptations in the capability assemblage of the organization were 
made.  
The second feedback learning loop, reflected the top management team’s capacity to not only 
develop and revise routines and organizational capabilities that are in line with the high growth 
logic of the firm, but also to attend to the complementary effects among them and to orchestrate 
such complementarities by drawing upon and enacting different configurations of routines in 
response to key changes and challenges that they encounter. This played a particularly key role 
in high growth, since successfully identifying and developing new complementarities among 
routines and organizational capabilities increased the velocity and effectiveness with which the 
whole organization could execute, learn and adapt to its environment. In line with more 
dynamic approaches (e.g. Laamanen & Wallin, 2009; Schreyögg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007) we 
observed that the company engaged in enacting complementarities cyclically, both by pursuing 
existing combinations and by identifying new ones and reinforcing them in order to achieve its 
growth objectives.  
Finally, we observed that developing these managerial and organizational capabilities, and 
nurturing the two learning loops, greatly enhanced the company’s outcomes, instantiated in 
increased speed, economies of growth, and network externalities. The increased speed as a 
result of the interplay between managerial and organizational capabilities is evident in 
Takeaway’s capacity to implement faster decision making, faster integration of acquired 
companies and to roll out faster overall implementation of its decisions. For instance, whereas 
the first big integration of a newly acquired platform (Lieferando) in 2014 took over two years, 
the most recent (2019) integration only took them six months (Delivery Hero), and the expected 
time needed for upcoming integrations is even less. Moreover, repeatedly relying on and 
updating the reinforcing complementarities capability helped the firm to achieve economies of 
growth, entailing increased returns on resources and increased communication efficiency. For 
instance, Takeaway’s board emphasized the importance of the substantial growth in returns on 
the same amount of resources invested over time, for sustaining and even accelerating the firm’s 
fast growth. Lastly, dynamically and repeatedly exercising the reinforcing complementarities 
capability, the firm has achieved important network externalities. Namely, through constantly 
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finding new ways to stimulate the growth in the number of restaurants acquired on one side, 
and hence, reinforce the increase in number of customers on the other, as well as through 
retaining existing customers, the board has created an upward spiral of growth. As we have 
observed, these outcomes have jointly contributed to a steady and consistent high growth over 
the years, both in terms of keeping a far above 20% increase in the number of employees over 
three-year periods, as well as in terms of their sale targets and profits. An overview of the 
process model is provided in Figure 4.2.  




The importance of HGFs for job creation and wider economic benefits has been highlighted by 
prior studies (Henrekson & Johansson, 2010; Kirchoff, 1994; Lopez-Garcia & Puente, 2012; 
Shane, 2009) and has hence attracted the attention of many scholars over the last three decades 
in attempting to identify important determinants of high growth. The finding that such 
substantial benefits for the economy are created by a very small number of firms, able to survive 
and sustain their high growth over extended periods of time (Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 2000; 
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Feindt et al., 2002; Lopez-Garcia & Puente, 2012), emphasizes the difficulty of understanding 
the factors and processes that support such steep growth rates.  
In order to gain more insight about organizational growth drivers, earlier studies have focused 
on identifying and examining the relations of certain dynamic capabilities with organizational 
high growth (Barbero et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2006; Stam & Wennberg, 2009). While these 
studies have helped to gain insights into the functional and somewhat generic capabilities that 
might be important antecedents to high growth, we still lack a deeper understanding of the 
specific capabilities that can sustain high growth and how they are developed and revisited over 
time. By relying on an inductive logic, our study addresses this gap and provides a rich account 
of how strategic leaders within HGFs take deliberate actions to identify and prioritize key 
growth driving activities in the organization, assemble them into sets of routines that form 
specific high-growth capabilities, and ensure their continued enactment and adaptation in 
response to changing internal and external demands. 
4.6.1 Theoretical implications 
One of the important roles of strategic leaders within firms is to guide the construction and 
development of routines in order to meet organizational goals and maintain the firms’ 
competitive advantage (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). Prior studies 
emphasize the importance of a firm’s knowledge base, formed by managers’ experience, as a 
foundation for capability development (Zahra et al., 2020). Namely, conscious and deliberate 
reflection on prior experiences enables strategic leaders to revise, reconfigure, and even enrich 
their knowledge base and to construct and re-construct organizational routines (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2003; Salvato, 2009). The findings of our study provide insights into how strategic 
leaders capture the high-growth logic of the organization, representing a managerial capability, 
which continuously draws on the aggregated knowledge base formed by the leaders’ prior 
experience, and guides the construction of needed routines and organizational capabilities 
(Zahra et al., 2020). It reflects the strategic leaders’ ability to identify and prioritize key growth 
driving activities in the organization and translate them into organizational routines and 
capabilities that help sustain high growth over time.  
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Our study provides insights not only into specific managerial, but also specific organizational 
capabilities that allow HGFs to sustain fast growth over prolonged periods of time. We identify 
how the managerial capability capturing the high-growth logic guides the construction of 
routines and the assembling of these routines into three core organizational capabilities: pooling 
resources, focused intervention and controlled empowerment; and show how these capabilities 
interact in order to create an upward spiral to sustain and speed up growth. Earlier studies have 
conceptualized dynamic capabilities as identifiable and specific routines, such as product 
development routines and strategic decision-making (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), yet provided 
little insights into their configurations. Although the role of capabilities is among the most 
important dimensions of the study of organizational growth (Penrose, 1959), only a limited 
number of studies have illuminated the importance of certain functional capabilities, such as 
financial, marketing and innovation capabilities (Barbero et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2006; Helfat 
et al., 2007; Stam & Wennberg, 2009), for high growth (Demir et al., 2017). While these studies 
highlight the relevance of capabilities as antecedents of high growth, their insights are rather 
generic, and do not provide insights into what specific dynamic capabilities allow a firm to 
sustain high growth over time and how they are enacted and reinforced by the organization. Our 
study moves beyond these findings by not only identifying specific high growth capabilities, 
but also showing how strategic leaders of a HGF take deliberate action to develop and maintain 
its capability base in order to accelerate the upward growth spiral, leading to sustained high 
growth for prolonged periods of time. 
Prior research on high growth has predominantly applied a rather static approach to studying 
its determinants, by focusing on secondary data and quantitative techniques (Barbero et al., 
2011; Chan et al., 2006; Stam & Wennberg, 2009). However, high growth involves rapid 
changes and specific dynamics (Nicholls-Nixon, 2005) that call for more in-depth qualitative 
insights into how strategic leaders of HGFs manage to generate and sustain growth. Our study 
outlines some of these dynamics by explicating how a specific managerial capability of top 
managers (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000), which 
we label reinforcing complementarities, can help them to not only develop, but also 
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continuously orchestrate and reconfigure their organizational capabilities in order to sustain 
high growth.  
Prior research has already highlighted the importance of top managers cognitive capacity for 
firms’ capability development and reconfiguration. For instance, Montealegre (2002) 
demonstrates that the firm’s ability to capture rents does not merely depend on having better 
resources and capabilities; rather, it depends on managers ability to know more accurately the 
relative productive performances of these capabilities. In a similar vein, Danneels (2010) 
highlights that the extent to which dynamic capabilities are exercised depends on top managers 
mental representation of their capabilities and their applicability. Our study builds on this 
foundation by providing insight into the top management’s ability to consistently sense when 
new developments were necessary as a result of changes both in the external and the internal 
environment and to seize the opportunity to either develop new organizational capabilities, or 
to reconfigure their existing ones. Moreover, our study highlights the top management’s 
capacity to consistently develop and configure complementary combinations of the firm’s 
existing capabilities and hence emphasizes the top management’s important role in recognizing 
and building complementarities into the firm’s capability base. We argue that the reinforcing 
complementarities managerial capability hence plays a crucial role in ensuring the firm’s 
vigilant and effective response to the changing organizational environment and plays a key role 
in continuously facilitating sustained high growth (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Helfat & Peteraf, 
2015). Such a managerial capability captures the top management’s capacity to build 
configurations of organizational routines (across different organizational capabilities) that 
would mutually reinforce each other’s strengths and thus fuel the company’s growth spiral.  
Prior literature has defined complementarities as the situation where the combination of 
variables leads to more value than the sum of the amounts of value the variables could create 
independently (Clougherty & Moliterno, 2010), and broadened our understanding of 
technological complementarities (Teece, 2018a), routine complementarities (Parmigiani & 
Howard-Grenville, 2011), as well as resource complementarities (Adegbesan, 2009). While we 
know much about the importance of complementarities with regards to different instances 
within organizational settings, we lack insights about the nature of relations among dynamic 
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capabilities. Examining complementarities among capabilities is specifically important since 
complementarities are not stable and changing circumstances call for a change in the 
architecture of complementarities (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018). Our study demonstrates how 
top management, relying on its reinforcing complementarities capability, deliberately seeks and 
generates complementarities among the firm’s high-growth capabilities to accelerate the impact 
of each individual organizational capability. This not only supports growth, but actually leads 
to amplifying its velocity, thus allowing HGFs to achieve their ambitious targets. These insights 
complement prior research on routine assembling (e.g. Ford & Friesl, 2019; Laamanen & 
Wallin, 2009) by showing that managerial capabilities not only drive the assembly of routines 
into organizational capabilities, but also the specific way in which the individual organizational 
capabilities are assembled into a high-growth specific capability base. In addition, our study 
reaffirms prior studies that have argued that the development and deployment of dynamic 
capabilities depends on the cognitive process by which managers interpret the match between 
organizational capabilities and the internal and external environment (Kaplan, 2008; Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000).  
Even though prior studies have emphasized the importance of managerial capabilities for 
monitoring the changes in internal and external conditions (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2015), this is even more relevant in the high-velocity environments, in which HGFs 
need to operate (Nicholls-Nixon, 2005). Namely, in such environments strategic leaders have 
to maintain continuous vigilance and be able to effectively balance between maintaining 
stability and initiating change (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017). Our findings therefore demonstrate 
the readiness of strategic leaders, by relying on their reinforcing complementarities capability, 
to sense the need to revise the firms existing capabilities and seize the opportunities to enrich 
their established capability base, in order to effectively accomplish the firm’s ambitious growth 
targets. Our insights therefore not only reaffirm the important function of dynamic managerial 
capabilities to monitor and act upon perceived mismatches between the external and internal 
conditions of the firm (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013), but we also highlight the importance of a 
specific capability for creating and re-creating such high-performing capability assemblages. 
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4.6.2 Limitations and future research lines 
The challenge of sustaining high growth for prolonged periods of time represents a significant 
frontier for management research. We believe our study provides important insights; however, 
it also has a number of limitations, which represent rich avenues for future research. First, we 
studied Takeaway because its sustained high growth was “unusually revelatory” (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007: 27). This allowed us to unpack the specific organizational capabilities for 
sustaining high growth and their dynamic development and modification, but raises questions 
about the generalizability of our results (Sigglekow, 2007). Firm specific characteristics, such 
as the industry they operate in, their technological nature, and the fact that they were not backed 
by venture capital in the first five years of their growth trajectory, might introduce case-specific 
idiosyncrasies important for the results. Although our model provides higher conceptual 
insights, moving beyond the firm specific characteristics, we encourage future research to 
explore the extension and boundary conditions of our model (Smith & Besharov, 2019). 
A possible constraint in our data is that we collected data in a fixed, although lengthy, period 
of time (a 30-month data collection period). Although we carefully applied good practices of 
qualitative research in order to mitigate the risk of ex-post rationalization (extensively discussed 
in the methods section), future research would benefit from a more longitudinal and 
ethnographic approach. This would enable scholars to enrich the data with real-time 
observations, completely eliminating the risk of ex-post rationalization. 
The current study contributes to our understanding about the impact of managerial capabilities 
on organizational capabilities within HGFs. More longitudinal and ethnographic approaches 
would also allow scholars to observe more directly the actual interplay between managerial and 
organizational capabilities over time. Future research would also benefit from studies that 
explore and unpack the specific cognitive capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015) that underlie top 
management’s capacity to sense, seize and transform (Helfat & Martin, 2015; Teece, 2007) in 
such rapidly changing conditions generated by fast organizational growth. . 
We further urge future research to explore the applicability of our model to other settings. An 
important question concerns how incumbents that do not experience growth, or firms that 
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experience more modest growth rates, would benefit from our model. Future studies may 
identify various contingencies that affect the usefulness and feasibility of distinct capabilities 
for driving and sustaining high growth. 
Overall, our study is among the first that illuminates the importance of managerial capabilities 
in the deployment and development of organizational capabilities that allow HGFs to 
continuously adapt their resource base to the fast-changing circumstances. We hope our model 
of sustained high growth inspires future research to continue exploring how firms sustain high 
growth over prolonged periods of time and hence contribute to economic prosperity. 
 
  
Chapter 4: Reinforcing Complementarities for Sustained High Growth 
 131 
4.7 APPENDIX 
Table 4.2 Data supporting the data structure 
Capturing the (high) growth logic 
Unlocking the (high) growth logic: Selected evidence on second-order theme 
First-order codes Selected evidence on first-order codes 
Realization of 
winner takes all 
market 
 
“But we have said, it does not make sense to be number two, three or four in a country” 
(Interviewee 1, F) 
 “We do not want exclusivity; we also fight against that. And why? Because we know that 
the biggest party wins. Eventually the restaurant will be able to cater for the biggest party. 
Maybe the first two, but nobody wants eight of those... Because that just doesn't work for 




“But I think what you see, and that is funny, the bigger we get, and that is again that 
network effect, that is at least in recent years you have seen that, as long as we exist ... So 
the more restaurants we record, the more orders, the higher the average number of orders 
per restaurant” (Interviewee 2, B) 
“In addition, the network effects result in an increasing average number of orders per 
restaurant, despite the growing number of partner restaurants. The self-reinforcing nature 
of these network effects helps us to sustain our market leadership and ultimately enhances 





“We have already said, but if the behavior of consumers is the same, apart from the 
maturity of the market itself and that system is exactly the same. You use the same system. 
The way you do sales, just one thing, as many restaurants as possible. If a number of 
elements are exactly the same, why would we let every country reinvent the wheel? 
(Interviewee 2, B) 
“We have put all those cohorts from all those countries together and then you see that 
those cohorts are all the same” (Interviewee 2, B) 
Creating artefacts 
 
“We benefit from powerful network effects as the number of consumers and restaurants 
on our marketplace is growing continuously (Fig. 2). As the number of consumers 
increases, more orders and higher gross merchandise value are generated, attracting more 
restaurants to our marketplace, which enhances and diversifies the offering, in turn 
attracting more consumers.” (Annual Report 2017) 
Pooling Resources 
Knowledge diffusion: Selected evidence on second-order theme 
First-order codes Selected evidence on first-order codes 
One platform “And that had some issues in the very beginning, but by now, since we just have one 
platform, is the way faster option and way more efficient option to just run it on that one 
platform. In the past, when we had two systems, you also had to prioritize all the time, do 
we now implement that feature first for Germany or for the Dutch platform, and then you 
had that conflict of interest, which no longer exists now. You just implement it and then 
you roll it out for all the countries, and then straight away you have efficiency 
improvement.” (Interviewee 3, B) 




 “If you combine the two businesses, we could spend the same amount of marketing on 
the combined, just on one brand, which is way more efficient” (Interviewee 3, B) 
“In all of our markets, we are running a single brand strategy. This means we are focusing 
all our efforts on only one brand per country” (Annual Report 2016) 
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One company “We were a Dutch organization and we copied a lot abroad and that made us copy all the 
time. And the problem is that you pay a lot of attention to the Netherlands and little to 
foreign countries and the less important you work abroad, the less attention it had, so at 
some point said ok, now we no longer care for those boundaries, we no longer care for 
those languages, we just do one company” (Interviewee 1, F) 
 “One of the advantages of our company is that we run it as one entity, with one team 
supporting the entire operation. Our one company, one brand approach allows us to 
compete with our full weight in each of our countries and not just with a local entity” 
(Annual Report 2016) 
Knowledge pools 
– one best 
practice 
“…because the bidding process in the Netherlands is really not different from Poland. So 
some things are now so generic that you can say better: I build a team that can copy best 
practice from each other” (Interviewee 2, B) 
“Yes, and that is something that we already see so much advantage in the current situation. 
That something comes up in one country that might be a good idea or a problem or 
whatever, from which we can learn not to make those mistakes in other countries.” 
(Interviewee 10) 
Pooling Resources 
(Re)allocation of resources across markets: Selected evidence on second-order theme 
First-order codes Selected evidence on first-order codes 
Profit pools – 
taking the 
resources from 
one country to 
fuel the growth in 
another 
“We could never have made that investment if we did not have that profit pool in the 
Netherlands in this case. And I say, but so those profit pool, we think that profit pools, 
which give you the opportunity elsewhere to expand, but also to defend your entire 
market and to ensure that you retain the number one position.” (Interviewee 2, B) 
“And that means that if you are just a local player, you really have no chance. Because, 
then Amazon comes in, if you do not have that profit pool, if it is locally or elsewhere with 




 “And of course you could have put that money in the bank, but then you would have been 
much smaller now. So we decided to invest that money” (Interviewee 1, F) 
“We have not become profitable because we have the costs down - but it is just the turnover 
growing faster and this is all we can spend” (Interviewee 4) 
Focused Intervention 
Selective board attention to key growth driving activities: Selected evidence second-order theme 




“In addition, there have been a number of activities from the board and management that 
have led to major changes. For example, the acquisition in Germany, for example the 
implementation of a new payment system, Takeaway Pay, new service for business 
customers.” (Interviewee 10) 
“But I also know that the CEO [Interviewee 1, F] is very busy and with mergers and 
acquisitions. (Interviewee 8) 
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Focused Intervention 
Push from the top: Selected evidence on second-order theme 
First-order codes Selected evidence on first-order codes 




“I think the reason that we are successful is a little bit ... That is simply because the 
entrepreneur there knows exactly how things work. He [the CEO] knows: if you play 
there, something will change not only there but also there.” (Interviewee 2, B) 
“And also, I mean, in the end, sometimes the outside view also helps, but in the end, we’re 
still the deepest in terms of into the business, so we have to trust our opinion to some 
extent” (Interviewee 3, B) 
Board 
micromanagement 
(on key resources) 
 
“They want to do everything themselves, do not they? In any case, everything has to go 
about their desk. Everything that is released, everything that is done, every quotation, 
every investment, that is almost a kind of mindset that you will not change anymore, 
because at a certain age you no longer change in those fundamentals” (Interviewee 11) 
 “Now there are quite a lot on top of it, so the top. Just leave the work to them and that is 
still difficult. [The CEO] still tells us very often at detail level what we should do if we 
have seen this, or is that going well?” (Interviewee 10) 
Controlled Empowerment 
Cultural guidance: Selected evidence on second-order theme 




“We sometimes grow with h per month and if we don't define it, then you slowly transform 
into something you don't want to be. We have become successful with something, with 
certain behavior, I am convinced. We are apparently doing something right, but what is that? 
And what distinguishes us from T and from competitors in our behavior? And the moment 
your DNA is nothing but the personality of an organization.” (Interviewee 13) 
 “Culture and governance are important elements for a rapidly growing company like 
Takeaway.com. Consequently, the Supervisory Board frequently addressed these items in 
its meetings and was closely involved in reformulating Takeaway.com’s core values.” 




“Securing the DNA. That is a very important challenge. That you really make sure that we 
get the things that we want to see back in our culture, that we really guarantee them through 
systems” (Interviewee 13) 
“We are now in the process of enhancing these values and further embedding into our 
organisation. For this purpose, we will use a variety of HR instruments, such as management 
development programs, performance management, talent management programs and 
change management programs.” (Annual Report 2018) 
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Controlled Empowerment 
Fostering engagement: Selected evidence on second-order theme 
First-order codes Selected evidence on first-order codes 
Communicating 
the bigger picture 
(simple core 
business logic – 
based on the 
flywheel) 
 
 “People also want to get a direction, so not only direction of how they should act and 
behave, but also what the strategy - That's best - And for us it is all very clear, but for 
example, you see very clearly what is still going on if you go further down the organization, 
it is not always clear. So every now and then, every six months or so, we have to give some 
direction, where does that organization go, what do we find important, how- What is the 
strategy?” (Interviewee 2, B) 
 “And that flywheel is actually a very simple slide that is still not fully understood by very 
important investors who invest our pension money. Because then a new party is coming and 
it doesn't matter if that is Uber or who or Amazon. But the business model just works with 





“That was before I came, there was - It was sometimes hard to understand what - If the CEO 
then cried from, we go again, I don’t know, to a new market or - To that then to translate to, 
but what does that mean for us in marketing? And that- and it thereby helps a bit that can 
translate to every time and everyone in it also to understand, okay, this is a piece where I 
really have influence, where I can really make a difference.” (Interviewee 7) 
 “The goal setting goes as follows, we start with top level goal setting and then we can 
cascade the goals to the rest of the organization via Workday. So you- It is basically the case 
that- My supervisor sets goals and I start looking at, what does that mean for me? On that 
basis I set my goals and then my ... (0:36:19) look away again, what does that mean for me? 
And that actually works like a waterfall over the organization” (Interviewee 6)  
Controlled Empowerment 
Enabling decision-making: Selected evidence on second-order theme 




 “Both the CEO and CFO, both look at output. Input is not important, output. You simply 
ensure that you have the fixture. And I never have discussions so often about how I do 
things, no, it's just him- You are looking- You just do it.” (Interviewee 6) 
 “And above all it provides clarity about what must be achieved versus how you will achieve 
it. And you also notice that that helps in how the teams look at that. … Performing as well 
as possible is when they also have the freedom to fill it in themselves. I mean, I'm not going 
to decide for them what they do, how they're gonna do it. But as long as it ultimately 




“So data democratization. So ensuring that everyone has access to that information to be 
able to look at it, what happened yesterday? What is in which country? In which city? Which 
zip code even. What type of customer? Well, you can't think of it that crazy. But ensuring 
that everyone has access to it.” (Interviewee 6) 
“What I want to know is of course: what can I expect from the growth of such a market and 
how much do I have to spend on it? And that is only possible if I have the cohorts or if I 
have more insight into that market of: what does marketing cost, what does television cost, 
what does it cost to advertise, how many restaurants do I estimate there are, when is it for 
me? do you want to go on television? We now have much more ... We can substantiate that 
much better, we can make a much more balanced decision. (Interviewee 2, B)  
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Sustained High Growth 
Increased speed: Selected evidence on second-order theme 




“But we have that one company, one platform approach that we really say, we want just one 
platform. If we innovate in one country, it should be a feature which should be used in all 
countries. That makes us way more efficient on that side … and I think we would even be 
able to implement it faster, because our IT resources is for everyone rather than we having 
to prioritize then which country gets the resources first” (Interviewee 3, B) 
“I think this whole centralized scalable model is really different. I have previously worked 
in several companies, but I have never seen as extreme implementation as here. … The fact 
that you do not work with country structures, which means you also have less transactional 
hassle, because you don't have to be convinced in a team, this is really better or- We never 
have problems for example also, I know, best practices or roll out quickly. Because that just 
happens automatically within those teams” (Interviewee 7) 
Faster decision 
making 
“So, you're going to say, you know what? Tomorrow there will be a football match, you 
know that there- That there will be x number of orders, let’s say one hundred. And say ok, 
there is a relationship between hamburgers and that football game - people who go to such 
a game. I'm going to do my marketing on this group in that region, I'm going to give it a 
little extra. So without an employee in between. That you make the decision-making process 
happen automatically” (Interviewee 6) 
“But I think the people can still feel if the organization really wants to do somethings, then 
we can still act fast on certain things. And I think that’s also remarkably for startups, but 
which we also are in a position still, that we can still act very fast.” (Interviewee 3, B) 
Faster integration 
 
“Where we used to say, well, you're probably doing some good things, so let's get a good 
idea of what those good things are and then we'll implement that, now it's just said, sorry, 
we don't have time for that …And people don't always like that, because then they go, yes, 
but we really do this much better than Takeaway. And that's right, that could be. Only yes, 
if that then takes us a year and a half further, with integration, then that is a very bad idea. 
Because then you have argued with each other for a year and a half and then, well, you still 
have two teams. And then you don't get it all in the right direction. So, we have become 
somewhat rücksichtsloser in our approach. From, well, guys, this is the right way” 
(Interviewee 1, F) 
“That Delivery Hero integration is actually not normal. We did that in just six months. … 
There is actually no discussion either. We just do it as we say it's going to happen … So that 
is an advantage. And I also think that we simply, that- It also has a very big advantage that 
we are managed fairly centrally. It's just- That's what we're going to do. And then it goes- 
Then it can go fast.” (Interviewee 13) 
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Sustained High Growth 
Economies of growth: Selected evidence on second-order theme 




“But we said it might make sense to join forces with Takeaway to become even stronger. 
And Takeaway used its funds to grow in Germany. But they were the number four players, 
so they didn’t have big footprint in Germany, so for them, the combination was great, 
because they also had quite some losses in Germany, and if you combine the two businesses, 
we could spend the same amount of marketing on the combined, just on one brand, which 
is way more efficient” (Interviewee 3, B) 
“So adding more and more restaurants and getting also to a penetration level of eighty 
percent makes marketing way more efficient. It makes new customers convert better, and it 
makes existing costumers place more orders, because if your favourite restaurant is not on 
the marketplace, you might still order with that favourite restaurant on some other platform 




“let’s say for example, I see the sales numbers in Germany is not good, then it’s the 
responsibility of sales director. And I tell them, hey, what’s going on in Germany and then 
he should solve it. There’s no head of Germany or I’m not the head of Germany, so I’m 
going to the sales director and tell him, what’s up with the sales team, so is something in 
customer service is not right, I go to the customer service director and then he has to go to 
the country level. But this is the more better and efficient way to run it, because that keeps 
us in control way better than if it would be run in a more decentralized operations” 
(Interviewee 3, B) 
Sustained High Growth 
Network effects: Selected evidence on second-order theme 





“So app usage first of all, I mean, if you have already the app installed, you have a stronger 
engagement, and like you just need to open up the app, it’s very easy and smooth, and we 
know that, it’s a bit self-fulfilling, but still people who have installed or have ordered with 
the app order, in general two and a half more frequent, which is a bit of a self-fulfilling thing, 
because people who have already installed the app have in general already ordered more 
frequently before they installed the app, so it’s a bit like self-fulfilling, but still, they order 
more frequently” (Interviewee 3, B) 
“While we increased new consumer growth substantially, we also increased consumer 
retention, as evidenced by the increased number of Active Consumers and the higher number 
of Orders per Returning Active Consumer. Key drivers behind this include increased app 
adoption and the success of re-activation campaigns” (Annual Report, 2017) 
Increased 
restaurant offer 
leads to increased 
consumer orders 
“We benefit from powerful network effects as the number of consumers and restaurants on 
our marketplace is growing continuously (Fig. 2). As the number of consumers increases, 
more orders and higher gross merchandise value are generated, attracting more restaurants 
to our marketplace, which enhances and diversifies the offering, in turn attracting more 
consumers. In addition, the network effects result in an increasing average number of orders 
per restaurant, despite the growing number of partner restaurants. The self-reinforcing 
nature of these network effects helps us to sustain our market leadership and ultimately 
enhances profitability.” (Annual Report, 2017) 
“So it is more convenient for us to have more restaurants, because more restaurants increases 
our revenue …. For the portal, the consumer side is really important. And of course, to serve 
that consumer side well, you also need restaurants” (Interviewee 1, F) 
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High-growth firms (HFGs), often referred to as scale-ups, are defined as organizations with at 
least 20% of annual growth rate in terms of revenue and/or employees over a three-year period, 
and with at least 10 employees in the base year (OECD, 2007). Studies show that HGFs are a 
main driver of job-creation and therefore play a vital role in the modern economy (Coutu, 2014; 
Du & Temouri, 2015). By establishing new business models and leveraging new technologies, 
high-growth firms bring about change and innovation in regional and national ecosystems 
(Jansen, 2019). Despite the importance of HGFs, research has shown that only a small 
proportion of about three percent of all firms is able to sustain these high growth numbers over 
time (Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 2000; Feindt et al., 2002; Lopez-Garcia & Puente, 2012). 
Accordingly, scholars recently started showing interest into the strategic characteristics of the 
organizations that are able to sustain high growth numbers over time (Demir et al., 2017; Jansen 
et al., 2020). Scholars have argued that scalability, which broadly refers to the ability to obtain 
and sustain profitable growth (Picken, 2017), is a specific characteristic of HGFs that set them 
apart from other growing organizations (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017). Firms that are able to 
develop scalable business models are able to sustain high growth rates over time, while firms 
that do not accomplish this are bound to fail (Zhang et al., 2015). 
Within the business model literature, scalability is argued to be a critical characteristic of 
successful business model innovations (e.g. Amit & Zott, 2001; Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 
2011). New entrants that design scalable business models bring about disruptive change in 
established industries and hereby challenge and outclass traditional business models (Markides, 
2008; Teece, 2018b). Uber and Netflix are well-known examples of successful scalable 
business model designs. Both firms were able to achieve and sustain high growth numbers by 
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introducing innovative business models into traditional industries (Ahuja & Novelli, 2016; 
Sorescu, 2017). However, far from all firms are able to sustain rapid growth, even if their 
business model is new to the industries they enter (Foss & Saebi, 2017). One example is 
Pets.com, the firm that was among the first online pet stores, founded in 1998. After the 
foundation, they grew tremendously fast and only two years later they raised 82,5 million dollar 
during the IPO in 2000 (Weil, 2001). Despite its high growth rates, Pets.com never managed to 
capture the value they intended to create due to their immense marketing and delivery expenses 
and failed to become profitable. Therefore, Pets.com did not manage to sustain their high 
growth and only one year after their IPO, they went out of business (Hirakubo & Friedman, 
2002). These examples indicate that innovativeness alone does not explain the success of 
business model innovations. It is the degree of scalability that explains why firms are able to 
sustain high growth and bring disruptive change into established industries (Casadesus-
Masanell & Ricart, 2011; Markides, 2008; Nair & Blomquist, 2019).  
Taken together, research has shown that firms need to design scalable business models to not 
only achieve, but also sustain high growth over time (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017; Mom, 2019). 
Yet, despite our understanding of the importance of scalability, academic research in the field 
of business and management has barely touched upon this topic and existing literature fails to 
explain how HGFs should design their value creating and capturing activities to facilitate and 
manage high growth over time (Mom, 2019; Simsek et al., 2017). This is a crucial omission 
because a thorough understanding of high-growth firms requires in-depth understanding of the 
key characteristics of scalable business models (Jansen et al., 2020). As such, there is a clear 
need for insights about how HGFs configure their business model elements in order to ensure 
long term scalability. In this study, we therefore ask: how do high-growth firms design scalable 
business models that enable them to create and capture value over prolonged periods of high 
growth? 
To address this question, we study the business models of three of the most successful high-
growth firms in the Netherlands. We adopt a qualitative multiple case study approach 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and analyze in-depth field and archival data from multiple sources, including 
founders and CEO’s (Snihur & Zott, 2019). Because in each case firm the founder was still 
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present, we were able to track the business model design configurations over the entire lifespan 
of the organizations. Building on the business model activity perspective (Massa et al., 2017; 
Zott & Amit, 2010), our findings provide in-depth insights into how the core business model 
elements are configured in scalable business model designs.  
Our findings suggest that scalable business models are characterized by their Digitalized 
Activities (content); the Reinforcing Network Effects (structure) that links stakeholders and 
product/service groups in such a way that there is a reinforcing effect which creates an upward 
spiral of growth; and the Integrated Control (governance) which implies that strategic activities 
are internally managed by the focal firm. Moreover, our findings illustrate how the most 
successful HGFs architect these elements in conjunction in order to ensure long term scalability. 
We make several important contributions to the literature. By zooming into the core elements 
of scalable business models we move beyond the more generic and static business model design 
themes (Zott & Amit, 2010). Rather than labeling the business model as a whole, our findings 
provide an understanding of how the specific characteristics of each BM element facilitates 
scalability. By doing this, we not only identify themes that make a BM design successful, but 
also suggest ways in which firms can design their BMs to ensure value creation and capture 
over time. Hence, we make an important contribution to the literature on HGFs, a small though 
important proportion of firms of which we know little about their strategic characteristics 
(Rindova, Yeow, Martins, & Faraj, 2012; Senderovitz, Klyver, & Steffens, 2016). By revealing 
the configurations of scalable business models, our research provides important lessons of how 
managers design and refine scalable business models to enable value creation and capturing 
over prolonged periods of high growth.  
5.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
As the business model construct has attracted significant research attention, various business 
model perspectives have been developed (Massa et al., 2017; Ritter & Lettl, 2017). In this study, 
we rely on the perspective of business models as attributes of real firms i.e., the stream of 
research that describes how firms create and capture value (Massa et al., 2017). This stream of 
research, also referred to as the activity perspective (Zott & Amit, 2010), describes the 
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underlying logic of creating and capturing value and is key for understanding a firm’s business 
model (Ritter & Lettl, 2017). The business model as an activity system is defined as “a 
boundary-spanning activity system that centers on a focal firm, yet may encompass activities 
performed by its partners, suppliers, and customers in the pursuit of value creation and capture” 
(Snihur & Zott, 2019: 5; Zott & Amit, 2010). In line with this definition, Teece (2010) argues 
the business model to be the architecture of the firm’s activities. This means that the business 
model is not a mere list of activities for creating and capturing value. Rather, the architecture 
specifies the interdependencies and functional relations among the activities in the system (Foss 
& Saebi, 2017). 
Following this perspective, the business model composes of three core elements; content, 
structure and governance (Amit & Zott, 2001; Saebi & Foss, 2015; Zott & Amit, 2010). Content 
refers to the selection of activities that are performed within the system. This could be 
summarized as the ‘what’ question of the business model, ‘what activities does the firm 
perform?’. Structure describes how the activities are linked and refers to the architecture of the 
firm’s activities. As Teece (2010) describes, it is about mapping the functional relationships 
among and between the activities. The BM structure element thus makes the business model a 
dynamic concept, rather than a mere static representation of activities, and could be summarized 
by the how question, ‘how are the activities linked?’. Governance refers to who performs the 
activities. The focal firm has to decide whether it wants to outsource particular activities to third 
parties or to conduct them inhouse (Christensen, Bartman, & van Bever, 2016; Zott & Amit, 
2010). The focal firm could decide to outsource certain activities to for instance, IT partners 
(Timmers, 1998), customers (Hedman & Kalling, 2003), or via alliances (Foss & Saebi, 2015). 
For each activity within the system, firms have to answer the ‘who’ question, ‘who performs 
the activities?’. The combination of the three elements describes how firms do business and 
create and capture value (Saebi & Foss, 2015; Zott & Amit, 2010). The questions; What 
activities should be performed?, How should they be linked and sequenced?, and Who should 
perform them, and Where?, cover the most important aspects of the BM and can thus be framed 
as the BM design from an architectural activity perspective (Zott & Amit, 2010).  
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Building on the activity perspective of the business model, scholars have identified specific 
design themes that explain the dominant value creation drivers of the business model (Amit & 
Zott, 2001; Zott & Amit, 2010). Zott and Amit (2010) summarized these design themes by the 
acronym NICE, which refers to Novelty, Lock-In, Complementarities, and Efficiency. The 
NICE design framework has been extensively used in scientific research to explain the value 
creation logics of business model designs (Amit & Zott, 2015; Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019; 
Gerdoçi, Bortoluzzi, & Dibra, 2018). A number of studies have addressed the business model 
design themes as the dependent variable (Amit & Zott, 2015; Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019). 
These studies have investigated internal and external drivers such as goals, templates, 
environmental stimuli and managerial cognition as antecedents of particular BM designs. 
Others have looked at novelty and efficiency oriented designs and their effect on BMI capability 
development (Hock et al., 2016). Ultimately, studies have focused on performance differences 
between the business model design themes (Balboni, Bortoluzzi, Pugliese, & Tracogna, 2019; 
Zott & Amit, 2007), empirically showing the positive effect of mainly novelty and efficiency 
on firm performance. While these studies provide valuable insights, they provide a rather static 
view on business model designs. Namely, they do not consider size and therefore fail to explain 
how business models cannot only achieve successful performance, but also keep performing 
successful while growing bigger. Scalability, which is about achieving profitable growth, 
therefore is a fundamental consideration for organizations when designing and refining their 
business model (Nielsen & Lund, 2018). 
Research on scalable business models, however, is sparse (Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019). Only 
a limited number of studies has addressed the notion of scalable business models and the 
literature lacks congruence on what business model scalability actually is (Hagiu & Rothman, 
2016; Nielsen & Lund, 2018; Zhang et al., 2015) In the business context there seems to be no 
generally accepted definition of scalability (Stampfl, Prügl, & Osterloh, 2013). Nevertheless, 
the primary understanding of scalability is strongly related to the ability of an organization to 
achieve and sustain profitable growth (Nielsen & Lund, 2018; Picken, 2017; Stampfl et al., 
2013).  
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Since the business model has been defined as an activity system, building on the notion of 
scalability in the system literature may help us to define business model scalability. In the 
software and manufacturing system literature, scalability has been widely addressed, as it is 
regarded as one of the most important qualities of systems (Duboc, Letier, & Rosenblum, 2013; 
Koren, Wang, & Gu, 2017). In the software system literature, scalability has been defined as 
“the ability of a system to maintain the satisfaction of its quality goals to levels that are 
acceptable to its stakeholders when characteristics of the application domain and the system 
design vary over expected operational ranges” (Duboc, Letier, & Rosenblum, 2013: 119). 
Koren and colleagues (2017) in their study on the scalability of manufacturing systems argue 
that scalability enables the option of upgrading the system in a cost-effective and timely manner 
when throughput increases. They argue that scalable systems are able to scale-up rapidly, 
incrementally and in a cost-effective manner (Koren & Ulsoy, 2002; Koren et al., 2017). These 
definitions indicate that systems are scalable if they are able to (1) maintain the desired quality 
while (2) increasing in size and do this in a (3) rapid and (4) cost-efficient manner.  
When this is translated to the business context, scalability thus seems to refer to the ability of a 
business to grow rapidly without diminishing its quality goals and while doing this increasing 
its profitability (Dudnik, 2010). For business models this implicates that while growing rapidly, 
the desired value creation should be maintained or enhanced. Furthermore, while doing this, 
the created value should be captured by increasing profitability. This means that firms should 
monetize the created value by maintaining or decreasing the relative resources needed, that is, 
minimizing the additional resources needed to create this value (Zhang et al., 2015). This poses 
important challenges for the architecture of a focal firm’s value creation and capture logic. 
Namely, extra supporting activities (and thus resources), such as extra customer service agents, 
more delivery employees, etc., are often times needed to ‘solve’ the challenge of maintaining 
value creation while growing bigger. However, adding resources creates challenges of 
increasing profitability because the incremental costs are difficult to monetize by the focal firm 
(Datta, Dutta, Thomas, & VanderMeer, 2003). Hence, in order for a business model to be 
scalable, resource addition should be minimized while at the same time the created value 
maintained.  
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An important part of business model scalability thus relies in the ability to increase returns on 
resource input (Nielsen & Lund, 2018). That is, adding additional resources creates higher 
output than the sum of investments, and hence increases the efficiency of resource use (Datta 
et al., 2003; Zott & Amit, 2007). Nielsen and Lund (2018) add that more ideally, scalable 
business models should accelerate returns on input. This is important as it helps organizations 
to grow exponentially. Namely, with the same amount of resources, higher growth rates will be 
generated and as the organization grows, this will lead to further reinforcement of the absolute 
growth numbers (Arthur, 1988).  
Arthur (1988) in his work on technology markets states that scalability can come from several 
sources and he identifies five sources that are especially relevant for enhancing scalability; 
learning by using, network externalities, scale economies, informational increasing returns, and 
technological interrelatedness (Arthur, 1988, 1989). Besides this non inclusive list, other 
established concepts such as economies of scope and standardization can help to explain how 
the degree of scalability in the business model can be enhanced (Zhang et al., 2015). However, 
these concepts provide little insight into how firms orchestrate their activities to create value 
and at the same time monetize this value in a profitable manner, over prolonged periods of 
growth. Namely, while economies of scale, for instance, can increase efficiency and hence 
allow the firm to capture value, it explains little about how firms are able to create additional 
value for their stakeholders. How firms exactly achieve this has yet to be addressed in the 
literature (Mom, 2019). 
In sum, scalable business models allow a firm to maintain or enhance the desired value creation 
in times of rapid growth. While doing this, the created value should be captured by increasing 
profitability by the means of increasing returns on resource input. Taken together, we define 
business model scalability as follows:  
“Business model scalability is the extent to which a business model design enables the focal 
firm to maintain or enhance the desired value creation while at the same time minimizing the 
relative resources needed in times of rapid growth”. 
  
Managing High Growth and Innovation 
 146 
5.3 RESEARCH METHODS 
The aim of this study is to identify how high-growth firms design and refine scalable business 
models. Given the limited theory and evidence concerning our research question, we chose to 
adopt a multiple-case study research design (Eisenhardt, 1989). The multiple-case method 
allows us to follow the replication logic in which emerging insights are tested within each 
additional case (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). It also allows us to elaborate theory by building 
on extant business model literature (Gehman et al., 2018). Moreover, the in-depth qualitative 
approach suits the research best because of the complex and dynamic nature of the business 
model (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019). 
5.3.1 Research setting and case selection 
As the scalability of their business model is important for the sustainable growth of 
organizations (Nair & Blomquist, 2019), the setting of our study are high-growth firms. HGFs 
are defined as organizations with at least 20% of annual growth rate in terms of revenue and/or 
employees over a three-year period, and with at least 10 employees in the base year (OECD, 
2007). To select our cases, we consulted the Scale-up Dashboard that contains an annual list of 
the 250 most successful HGFs in the Netherlands. The data for the Dashboard is collected by 
The Erasmus Center for Entrepreneurship and Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus 
University. All organizations on the list comply with the above-mentioned definition of high-
growth organizations.  
As only a small part of all organizations is able to achieve high growth and turn into a scale-up, 
purposive sampling has been used in the case selection procedure to achieve comparability 
between the cases under study (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). We carefully selected three cases from 
the list for several reasons. First, to ensure comparability of cases, we selected cases that 
introduced a new business model with an important online component to the industry they 
entered. However, the HGFs from our sample all have different business model archetypes. 
This allowed us to move beyond the characteristics of specific business model archetypes and 
focus on the scalability of the underlying key elements. Second, to ensure similarity in both 
economic and legal context, we selected cases that were founded in the same time period and 
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geographic market. All our cases have been founded between 1999 and 2000 in the Netherlands 
which allowed us to keep environmental and geopolitical influences constant (Snihur & Zott, 
2019). Third, we mitigated industry effects by selecting three firms all operating in different 
industries. This allowed us to focus on the common internal sources of business model 
scalability, rather than external influences. Fourth, we looked for exemplary cases that had a 
proven record of scaling-up (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). We opted for cases that were in 
the top ten of the list, ranking them amongst the most successful high-growth firms in the 
Netherlands. Finally, we looked for cases that still retain their original founder(s) who could 
offer unique insights into the business model configurations over the entire lifespan of the 
organization. 
5.3.2 Case descriptions 
Based on the above-mentioned characteristics, we selected three high-growth firms for our 
study. In the following section, we briefly present our cases. For an overview of the business 
models of the sampled firms see table 5.1. 
Food. Founded in 2000 in the Netherlands, Food grew out to become one of world’s leading 
food-order sites. Operating on an international scale, all their websites combined cover around 
30.000 associated delivery restaurants. With a two-sided platform business model Food’s core 
focus is to make online food ordering accessible for everyone, customers and restaurants. The 
unique aspect of Food is their one company, one brand, and one platform approach they apply 
across all geographic markets. Food takes pride in developing and maintaining the world’s best 
food ordering site.  
E-commerce. Founded in 1999 as a college start-up in the Netherlands, E-commerce grew out 
to become one of the biggest online enterprises in the Netherlands and Belgium. Ever since 
they started in 1999, the company has one clear goal in mind: to make customers happy. E-
commerce’s uniqueness relies in their obsessive focus on improving the customer journey that 
helps to increase the customer satisfaction. To accomplish this, within the field of consumer 
electronics they wandered into over 300 different product groups, opened nine physical stores, 
started their own delivery service, and provide installation and repair services. 
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Recruiter. Founded in 2000 in the Netherlands, Recruiter connects high-educated, young talent 
to employers. They believe that young talents are the drivers of innovation and therefore 
stimulate organizations to utilize this strength. The unique aspect of Recruiter is its central 
database, in which data of thirty niche-job boards and websites (every single one specialized in 
the target group young talent) are bundled. The database gives access to a total population of 
more than 6 million subscribed candidates with which Recruiter covers the whole Netherlands 
and has the biggest network of Europe. 
Table 5.1 Business Model Overview of the case firms 
 Food E-commerce Recruiter 
Overview 
 
Two-sided platform business 
model that connects food 
(delivery) restaurants with 
customers 
 
Capture value by charging 
restaurants a commission 
percentage per order  
 
Originally e-commerce 
business model of consumer 
electronics 
 
Capture value by selling 
consumer electronics to 
consumers above purchase 
price 
Originally online recruitment 
agency business model that 
connects vacancies with 
candidates 
 
Capture value by charging 
companies a commission 
percentage per placed 
candidate 
 
Content Online platform that bundles 
(delivery) restaurant offer; 
biggest restaurant offer 
available in key markets; 
provides an easy ordering 
process for consumers 
Online overview and 
information providing of 
consumer electronics; strong 
focus on improving 
customer journey; expert 
advice to help clients find 
the right products 
 
Online platform with 
overview of available 
vacancies; large database of 
candidates to draw from; 
personal guidance of 
recruiters in matching process 
Structure Connects restaurants with 
consumers via online 
platform 
Online platform connects 
suppliers of electronic goods 
with consumers 
 
Connects candidates with 
corporate clients’ vacancies 
Governance Restaurants provide 
information on the platform; 
customers solely order using 
the platform; platform is 
managed internally 
Clients conduct product 
search; internal management 
of stock, website offering, 
and guiding clients through 
customer journey 
Clients apply for vacancies 
online; recruiters responsible 
for matching; internal vacancy 
and platform management 
 
5.3.3 Data collection 
Following the guidelines for multiple-case study research, the data has been collected from a 
variety of sources (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Our main source of data 
was interviews with key informants in the organizations. We conducted interviews with key 
informants at various levels of the organizations, including founders, board members, senior 
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managers and middle managers. Relying on multiple informants at various levels allowed us to 
triangulate findings (Miles & Huberman, 1994). A particular strength of our study is our access 
to the founders. As the founder of each of our case firms is still present in the organization, we 
were able to track the business model decisions over the entire lifetime of the organization. 
Furthermore, we used archival data such as internal documents and handbooks and publicly 
available data such as yearbooks, press releases, media coverage, among others, to complement 
and triangulate our findings. A particularly valuable secondary data source are the case studies 
that are written about the firms. Using different sources of data is important for enhancing the 
reliability and richness of our insights (Yin, 1984). In total, we conducted 33 interviews and 
collected 1,574 pages of archival material. For an overview of the data sources used in this 
study and the interviewees’ positions, see Table 5.2 and 5.3. 
Table 5.2 Case description and summary of data collection 
Characteristic Food E-commerce Recruiter 





Founding year 2000 1999 2000 
Number of employees 5632 3628 1300 
Revenue  240 million euros 1.35 billion euros 465 million euros 
Growth rate  88% 32% 55% 
New jobs created 2272 1557 944 
Number of interviews  12 10 11 
Duration of interviews  21 – 103 minutes 
59 minutes on average 
25 – 100 minutes 
64 minutes on average 
44 – 83 minutes 
56 minutes on average 
Transcript pages  176 154 155 












Video & audio 
Press releases & 
coverage 
Corporate website 
Pages archival data 886 pages 438 pages; 3:30 minutes 
(video) 
250 pages; 25:24 
minutes  
(video and audio) 
NOTES: Company data from the year 2018; all interviews are recorded and transcribed. 
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Table 5.3 Overview of interviewees' positions 




Chief Financial Officer 
Chief Technology Officer 
Chief Marketing Officer 
Chief Operating Officer 
Director of Human Resources 
Director of Operations 
Director of Customer Service 
Director of Sales 
Director of Product 
Development 
Director of Data and Analytics 
Manager of Investor Relations 
Founder-CEO 
Chief Strategy Officer 
Head of Customer Service 
Head of Delivery 
Head of Assortment and 
Pricing 
Head of Online Marketing 
Head of Returns 
Head of Organizational and 
Employee Development 
Head of Physical Stores 
Head of Sales and Marketing 
Founders (3) 
CEO 
Chief Information Officer 
Chief Technical Officer 
Operational Director 
Commercial Director 
Head of Marketing and 
Communications 
Director of Human 
Resources 
 
We conducted two formal waves of interviews with key informants of each of the case firms. 
The first formal wave of data collection (2018) was to understand the most important challenges 
of the firms related to their fast growth. During the first wave of interviews we conducted a 
total of 13 interviews that lasted 756 minutes (12 hours and 36 minutes) in total. Each interview 
was semi-structured, lasted on average 58 minutes, and was recorded and transcribed 
immediately after. We started with founders and top managers which are considered to be most 
knowledgeable about the business model design of their firms (Teece, 2010). In the first round 
of interviews, we started with predetermined questions to determine the most important 
challenges of HGFs. Questions such as “what are the major challenges you face during fast 
growth?” and “how do you address those challenges?” were included. The second part of the 
interviews was less structured and allowed us to pick up on emerging themes. This is how we 
noticed the importance of business model scalability for sustaining high growth over time. 
Following the snowball technique (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981) we identified further 
organizational members that were knowledgeable of the business model activities at the more 
operational level. This allowed us to further capture the perspectives of organizational members 
that were involved in both the strategic and the operational level of the organization. 
A second formal round of interviews allowed us to fill in gaps and to zoom in to certain topics 
that emerged as important during our first round of data analysis. In this second wave of data 
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collection we spoke with founders, senior managers, and middle managers. By relying on 
multiple informants at different organizational levels for each case, we mitigated subject bias 
(Miller et al., 1997). In total, we conducted 20 interviews that lasted in total 1,211 minutes (20 
hours and 11 minutes) in this wave of data collection. Each interview was semi-structured, 
lasted on average 61 minutes, and was recorded and transcribed immediately after. To further 
ensure data validity, we limited the interview questions to facts, events and decisions, in order 
to reduce the potential influence of retrospective bias (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007).  
Finally, in a third round of data collection we collected in-depth archival data that helped us to 
triangulate our findings (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). These documents included annual reports, 
company communications and legal documents, teaching cases about the company, and 
publicly available data such as press coverage including press releases, and audio and video 
coverage about the firms. A total of 1,574 pages of archival data was consulted and analyzed. 
Triangulation by relying on different data sources allowed us achieve higher reliability and 
richness of the emerging insights (Jick, 1979). Table 5.2 provides a detailed overview of the 
data that has been used. 
5.3.4 Data analysis 
We used an iterative process of data analysis, going back and forth between data and literature 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). First, thickly descriptive individual case histories were created by 
triangulating our interview and archival data (Snihur & Zott, 2019). The case narratives focused 
on the configurations of the business model elements (content, structure, and governance) to 
form a more complete understanding of the business model designs of our case firms. We 
focused on data that could be corroborated from multiple data sources in our narratives (Hannah 
& Eisenhardt, 2018). We started developing the case narratives after the first wave of 
interviews. When data was missing, we revisited our data and obtained additional information 
in the second wave of interviews or via archival material.  
To further enrich our understanding of the business model design configurations, we coded and 
recoded all of our data per individual case in an ATLAS.ti database. In this phase of data 
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analysis, we coded and recoded the data in several iterative rounds, hereby creating empirical 
codes (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). In developing these codes, we used the constant comparison 
method (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to capture our emerging understanding of the factors that 
supported our cases to design scalable business models. To link our insights to the existing 
business model literature, we iteratively moved between data and theory (Mantere & Ketokivi, 
2013) and linked our empirical codes to the key elements of the business model.  
After analyzing the business model designs of the individual cases in-depth, we compared the 
cases by focusing on similarities and differences, applying both within and across case 
comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994). We relied on the replication logic to 
assess whether our research findings could be confirmed across cases (Yin, 1984). 
Consequently, we only retained codes that applied to all cases. We further went through 
recursive cycling among the case data, emerging theory and extant literature to further refine 
our theoretical insights (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). During this analytical phase, we refined 
our empirical codes and grouped them into theory-based groups related to the business model 
content, structure and governance elements. We reached the point of theoretical saturation 
where all major categories were integrated and no new insights emerged from our recursive 
cycling (Corbin & Strauss, 2014).  
5.4 EMERGENT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Our emergent framework identifies the key characteristics of the core elements of scalable 
business models. By building on prior business model literature, we find that the content 
element is characterized by its digital nature, which we label as Digitalized Activities, the 
structure element by its Reinforcing Network Effects, and the governance element by its 
Integrated Control. By focusing on three of the most successful HGFs in the Netherlands, our 
analysis reveals how these firms design the BM elements in conjunction in order to be able to 
scale-up their business models. Our analysis moves beyond the identification of characteristics 
and provides an architectural business model understanding of how the core elements are linked 
and sequenced in order to create and capture value. Inspired by Hannah and Eisenhardt (2018) 
we provide a theoretical summary of our findings after discussing each individual business 
model element. We believe that this novel structure increases the readability of this study. In 
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line with Snihur and Zott (2019), we explain each empirical insight focusing on a concrete 
example of one case for the ease of exposition. For systematic evidence from all cases, see 
Table 5.7 in the appendix. 
5.4.1 Content: Digitalized Activities 
The content element refers to the value creating and capturing activities of the business model 
(Snihur & Zott, 2019; Zott & Amit, 2010). A key insight in our analysis is that the digitalized 
nature, which we label as Digitalized Activities, of activities enables HGFs to scale-up their 
business models. Namely, the digitalized activities allow them to collect information, analyze 
it and hence learn and increase the speed of their operations. This enables the firms to create 
more value by better matching their activities with the interests of their stakeholders. It also 
allows them to capture more value by lowering cost, increase the speed of adaptation, and 
increase the effectiveness of decisions. 
Online presence. While the industries in which they operate differ, a similarity between the 
business models is that all case firms were amongst the first to introduce a business model with 
an important online component to the industries they entered. All firms were able to build a 
strong online presence, meaning that they rank high in the online search results. Because of the 
online visibility scores, the firms are amongst the first to pop-up in Google, the most used search 
engine at the moment. This enables them to attract customers to their websites without 
additional marketing costs, making it an important source of their scalability. Recruiter 
illustrates: 
“We only look at our online visibility and our online visibility score. … It was from 
the start and it still is today. … For instance, our online visibility score is like sixty 
per cent. The market leader, Randstad, has like fifteen per cent. And Adecco, who 
was the market leader, only has a visibility score of two per cent. So, we know, and 
I know it’s going to take a long time, but we know in the end we will win from these 
companies, because we have a huge advantage.” (Founder 1, Recruiter, Interview) 
Database. Another important advantage of the online presence is the possibility to collect data 
and build, and constantly expand, a database in which important information is collected. The 
amount of data that the firms are able to gather as a result of their online presence considerably 
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exceeds the amount of data their offline competitors are able to collect, and hence has become 
an important source of competitive advantage. Recruiter built a database by letting their clients 
register online when applying for a position. An important scalability advantage thereof is that, 
in contrast to the labor-intensive traditional way of face to face candidate registration, no 
manual labor is required for Recruiter during this process. What is more, even in the case that 
the candidate did not match with that particular position, Recruiter was able to store detailed 
information about each candidate in a database. Cumulatively building a database with 
applicants was important for their business model scalability as it enabled a faster process of 
candidate placement, their key value creating activity, for subsequent vacancies. Namely, 
Recruiter could speed-up the process of candidate search by drawing on their database with 
candidates and hence lowered cost because employee productivity increased. 
“We have the resumes of the candidates in our database very soon so, okay, which 
type of guys are you looking for? Well, okay, we have for Rotterdam for that 
vacancy, we have like fifty to a hundred students already applied on these kinds of 
jobs, subscribed last week so” (Founder 2, Recruiter, Interview)  
Data analytics. The HGFs in our study all developed strong data analytic capabilities i.e., the 
ability to analyze the gathered data in order to come to advanced insights. By analyzing the 
gathered data in the database, the case firms were able to increasingly gain better insights into 
the environment, their customers, and their operations. This is an important source of scalability 
because when the organization grows, more data is gathered, and subsequently better 
information can be generated. Data analytics is thus an activity that is reinforced by growth and 
allows the HGFs in our sample to continuously improve their operations supported by real-time 
data, leading to increased value creation. 
E-commerce developed a matrix organizational structure in which the data science department 
on the vertical axis crossed with each functional department on the horizontal axis of the 
organization. By doing this, they ingrained the functional departments with data driven 
intelligence which allowed these departments to make faster and better-informed operational 
decisions. For instance, the marketing department was informed in detail about real-time trends 
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in consumer behavior as well as the price fluctuations of competitors. Hence, the department 
was able to quickly adjust its marketing strategy to the current circumstances.  
“What it implies is like the small, is a very complex nowadays data science driven, 
AI-driven- A shitload of technology is here about pricing, sales marketing bidding 
and buying conditions. And then that’s here. Traditional retailers cannot follow in 
the complexity that’s within. This is like where literally twenty data scientists work 
on at [e-commerce] fulltime, … it’s like the amount of intelligence here is insane” 
(CEO, E-commerce, Interview). 
Data driven decision-making. An important strategic decision-making activity that is present 
in each HGF of our sample, is the data driven decision-making approach. This refers to always 
supporting decisions with data, rather than making decisions based on gut feeling. This is an 
important source of scalability for a number of reasons. First, it is a control mechanism that 
allowed the board to give lower level managers more autonomy in operational decision making. 
Namely, their decisions will be based on the specific data that the firm decided to collect and 
provide to the specific departments. The optimum decision presents itself by analyzing the data, 
making the decision-making process easier, faster and more accurate.  
In the case of Food this process is referred to as “data democratization” (Director of Data & 
Analytics, Food, Interview). Within the organization, the departments are provided with the 
information that is relevant for them. By providing very specific information, the departments 
are then able to make fast day-to-day adjustments that allows them to constantly keep up with 
the increased complexity that results from scaling-up (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017). 
“So, ensuring that everyone has access to that information to be able to look at it, 
what happened yesterday? What is in which country? In which city? Which zip code 
even. What type of customer? Well, you can't think of it that crazy. But ensuring 
that everyone has access to it. … And actually - My motto is: Everyone within the 
organization must make choices based on data, on numbers, rather than on a gut 
feeling” (Director of Data & Analytics, Food, Interview) 
Automation of processes. Another emerging theme related to the content element of the 
business model is the automation of processes. All HGFs in our study automated activities 
mainly by digitizing them. This resulted in efficiency advantages in their business model (Zott 
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& Amit, 2007). While some activities were digitized from the beginning, others were automated 
when the firms realized that efficiency advantages could be obtained.  
An important department in the organization of E-commerce’s is the online marketing 
department. At its peak, they had forty full-time online marketers calculating and implementing 
the right bids for their Google advertisement campaigns. As the organization scaled-up, they 
realized that it was a labor-intensive activity that could be done more efficiently if it was 
automated. Also, they realized that machine learning improved the effectiveness of this task, 
hereby increasing the created value. By automating the activities related to Google 
advertisement, they were able to scale-down the department of forty employees to none, while 
at the same time increasing the performance levels of the activities. Hence, the automation of 
this process was an important source of the scalability of their business model.  
“If you look at all the bid modifiers that we have. So, a bid modifier can be age, 
gender, customer, time, day or the minute, whatever. That’s all, normally it was 
manually being calculated. And now all with machine learning and data scientists, 
they can just create a model and that’s being real-time available to us, which is 
more accurate and more precise. So it’s less work, once it works and the quality is 
better. …. So that’s really helped us to scale down, but be much more productive 
and effective” (Head of Online Marketing, E-commerce, Interview) 
5.4.1.1 Theoretical summary 
While all firms operate with different business model archetypes, the content element of the 
scalable business models of the HGFs in our sample is characterized by the Digitalized 
Activities. All firms have created a strong online presence which allowed them to collect data 
in a database. By building strong analytic capabilities, the firms are able to analyze the data and 
make fast and accurate data driven decisions that enables them to enhance the created value 
during growth. Moreover, automating operational activities enables them to lower cost while at 
the same time increasing the quality of output (see Table 5.4 for an overview). 
An important theoretical insight is that the business model component can be scaled-up by 
digitalizing activities, even when the key value creating activities require manual labor. In the 
case of Recruiter, for instance, value is created by connecting candidates with vacancies and 
recruitment professionals do this by having conversations via phone, email, and face-to-face, 
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with both parties. However, by improving online presence, creating a database, and automating 
the matching software, the recruitment professional is able to work more efficiently. This is an 
important insight as, in contrast to what prior studies suggest, it indicates that the scalability of 
Digitalized Activities in the content element applies to a broader set of firms than digital 
business models alone (Stampfl et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2015).  
Table 5.4 Business Model Content Element Design for Scalability 
 Content Element Design Impact on BM Scalability 
Food 
Content 
Online two-sided platform business model. Value is 
created for customers by offering big assortment of 
delivery restaurants, value is created for restaurants by 
attracting large number of consumers. 
Online visibility increases 
number of visitors and hence 
data accuracy. Decisions 
therefore get more accurate. 
By automating processes, less 




Platform ranks among top results in Google. Online 
presence allows them to capture data about consumer 
behavior on the internet. The data analytics department 
provides each department with real-time data and 
monthly training so they can themselves analyze and 
make decisions that are supported by data. Manual labor 




Online store with over 300 different product groups. 
Value created by strong client focused and constantly 
improving the entire customer journey.  
Online presence enhances data 
collection that allows for 
constantly improving 
customer journey. The more 
they grow; the more data is 
collected, and the more 
accurate insights become. 
Automation allows for 
scaling-down manual labor 
while increasing effectiveness 
of activities.  
Digitalized 
Activities 
Online component allows them to capture data about 
consumer behavior online and department with data 
scientist constantly monitors developments and NPS of 
customer journeys. Matrix structure allows data science 
department to interfere in functional departments to steer 
decisions based on advanced insights. High degree of 
automation by building algorithms (for online marketing, 
warehouse efficiency, among others). 
Recruiter 
Content 
Recruitment agency that searches for young talent for 
vacant positions in organizations. Value created for 
young talent by helping them to find the right position 
and for companies to find the right people for their open 
positions. 
Online presence leads to 
higher number of applicants 
and hence a bigger database 
that enables them to find 
better candidates faster. The 
automation of matching 
software further speeds-up 
and improves the process 
leading to a faster and better 
value creation process. 
Digitalized 
Activities 
Online visibility results in high number of applicants for 
open positions. It also enables a faster registration 
process of clients and the collection of all information in 
a database. By analyzing the data in the database, they 
can foresee upcoming shortages faster than competitors 
and make decisions accordingly. By building automated 
matching software, candidates and vacancies are 
matched faster and more accurately. 
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5.4.2 Structure: Reinforcing Network Effects 
The structure element describes how the value creation and capture activities are linked and 
captures their importance for the business model (Snihur & Zott, 2019; Zott & Amit, 2010). In 
Teece’s (2010) terms, the architecture of activities specifies the interdependencies and 
functional relations among the value creation and capture activities in the system.  
A key insight from our analysis is that the HGFs in our sample structure their value creating 
activities in such a way that they create reinforcing network effects among them. Network 
effects, or network externalities, can be distinguished into two types: direct and indirect effects 
(Katz & Shapiro, 1985). Direct network effects refer to the situation where the number of users 
drives the value of a product or service directly. Hence, the higher the number of users, the 
higher the value of the product or service (Goldenberg, Libai, & Muller, 2010; Suarez, 2005). 
Indirect network effects “arise when the link between consumer utility and the number of users 
occurs through the variety of complementary products” (Gandal, 1995: 599). Firms can enhance 
these effects by, for instance, the development of complementary products for the same 
customer base (Tanriverdi & Chi-Hyon, 2008). One such example is the consumption 
externalities that arise from compatible hardware and software (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). 
Both types of network effects are considered to be an important source of scalability (Arthur, 
1988; Hagiu & Rothman, 2016; Stampfl et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2015), and have been proven 
to create a lock-in effect in the business model (Amit & Zott, 2001). Although network effects 
have conceptually been argued to be important for business model scalability, our study moves 
beyond current insights by empirically showing how these effects can be established into the 
business model structure element of scalable business model designs. 
Reinforcement of value creating activities. An important insight from our analysis is that the 
HGFs create reinforcing links between their value creating activities. The case firms do this in 
two ways: (1) by establishing strong and interdependent links between product/service groups; 
and (2) by introducing value creating activities to strengthen the core.  
Establishing reinforcing connections between product and service groups means that increased 
value creation in one product/service group, leads to increased value creation in adjacent 
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product groups, and vice versa. Food illustrates this. In the first years of Food, their product 
offer consisted of mainly pizza, kebab, and other fast food restaurants. While this offering 
helped them grow over the years, the environment started to change because consumers started 
to opt for healthier alternatives. This triggered the adaptation of Food’s offering and they started 
to incorporate healthier alternatives into their assortment. Providing healthier alternatives did 
not only help them to create and capture more value in the ‘healthy’ product groups, it also 
helped them to increase the number of returning customers. Adding these product groups 
created a healthier image for Food which motivated consumers to order more often. This 
eventually led to an increase in orders from their ‘unhealthy’ product groups because their 
platform was used more often. By providing both product groups on the same platform, the 
product groups created additional value for one another. 
“And it strengthens our network effect, because people are thinking about ordering 
food with [Food] even more, because the variety is larger, the offering is better, 
and that makes you think even more about food ordering, and we even have some 
signs that it might even accelerate the amount of orders you place with regular 
marketplace restaurants. Just because you think about food ordering way more 
often … I mean, you can’t eat kebab and pizza 300 times a year, but if the variety 
is much larger, you think about ordering with us way more often, so we see signs 
that this contributes in a positive way to the effects” (Chief Operating Officer, 
Food, Interview) 
Another important way to increase scalability in the business model is the introduction of value 
creating activities that strengthen the core. The firms all undertook entrepreneurial activities 
that, independently speaking, did not increase the scalability of their business model. E-
commerce opened physical stores and started its own delivery service, Food started its own 
delivery network, and Recruiter opened physical offices and started its own academy. While 
the activities were different because of the differences in business model archetypes, all 
required additional resource input in the way of manual labor when the numbers increased. 
However, the HGFs established reinforcing links between their entrepreneurial activities and 
the core proposition of their business models and by doing this increased the created value.  
E-commerce illustrates this in two ways. First, opening physical stores increased the number of 
sales online because it helped them to increase the trust consumers had in their brand. Thus, 
Managing High Growth and Innovation 
 160 
opening physical stores increased the value for their web shop. As the Head of Online 
Marketing notes: 
“They didn’t trust an online company. It was really weird. That really improved 
actually when we opened a physical store. Alright, you got a physical store, so now 
I can throw a stone at your window, so you’re probably okay-ish kind of company 
now. Then we also see a conversion rate uplift online, because we have shops, 
which is still the case actually” (Head of Online Marketing, E-commerce, 
Interview) 
Second, the creation of their own delivery network enhanced the value creation of their business 
model. E-commerce strongly focuses on customer satisfaction, a value that is translated 
throughout the entire organization. In order to do so, one of the main focal area of E-commerce 
is the customer journey. Constantly optimizing and improving the customer journey is their key 
value creating activity and an important value proposition of E-commerce. When their data 
showed that their washing machine product group had a decrease in Net Promoter Score (NPS), 
their most important indicator for customer satisfaction, they started analyzing the customer 
journey of this product group. The analysis led to the realization that the problems with delivery 
were the major reason for the decline in NPS. Therefore, they started their own delivery 
network. The vertical integration of delivery significantly increased the resource requirements; 
however, it resulted in a clear uplift in NPS. This helped them to grow in the washing machine 
product group and capture a bigger market share. The increased customer satisfaction made 
customers more inclined to purchase other products at the firm because the perceived value for 
customers increased. Therefore, the entrepreneurial activities that strengthened their customer 
satisfaction, the core proposition of the business model, had a reinforcing effect in other parts 
of the business model. This increased the scalability because the total value creating effects on 
the activity system were higher than the sum of resource investments in the specific activity. 
“If you’re in the washing machine, hallelujah. Which is literally because we have 
this own delivery service. It’s the customer journey with the highest customer 
satisfaction rate. We want to make sure that it is a gateway drug to the rest or our 
assortment. So, the funny thing for instance now, is that a washing machine is the 
most effective way to become your Apple friend” (CEO, E-commerce, Interview) 
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The two ways of creating reinforcing effects between the value creating activities are not 
entirely independent. Rather, by introducing value creating activities that strengthen the core, 
more value is created for adjacent product/service groups as well. This consequently leads to 
an even stronger reinforcing effect. As the quote above illustrates, E-commerce created extra 
value for the washing machine product group by starting their own delivery service. Because 
of the value enhancing linkages with other product groups on their website, the firm managed 
to increase value not only in the focal product of interest, but for adjacent products as well. 
Two-sided user reinforcing network effects. Another important insight from our analysis are 
the two-sided user network effects. These two-sided network effects are important for the 
scalability of the business model because they can create an upward spiral of growth (Hagiu & 
Rothman, 2016). This means that there is a virtuous cycle of increasing the value for 
stakeholders on one side of the business model leading to increased value for stakeholders on 
the other side of the business model, and vice versa. The HGFs increased the scalability of their 
business models by designing the structure in such a way that different ‘users’ are connected 
via the business model and that this leads to increased value for both of them. Hence, the HGFs 
established reinforcing linkages between stakeholders on various sides of their business model. 
The two-sided platform business model of Food, that connects restaurants with customers, 
clearly demonstrates this. The network effect in this business model is presented as follows: 
when the number of restaurants increases, the value increases for consumers because the offer 
increases and consumers have a bigger chance of finding their favorite restaurant on the 
platform. On the other hand, when more consumers use their platform, for restaurants the value 
increases. Namely, more consumers lead to more possible clients for restaurants. This indicates 
that the BM is structured in such a way that increased value on one side of the business model 
leads to increased value on the other side of the business model.  
“So it is more convenient for us to have more restaurants because then we will 
generate more revenue. But it doesn't really matter to the consumer. The consumer 
simply wants to have a certain choice, so also- There is of course much talk about 
portals and things like that. For the portal, the consumer side is really important. 
And of course, to serve that consumer side well, you also need restaurants. ” (CEO, 
Food, Interview) 
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Recruiter has two key groups of stakeholders in its business model, candidates and corporate 
clients. When the number of vacancies and/or the attractiveness of vacancies increases on one 
side of the business model, it increases the value for candidates on the other side of the business 
model because they have more, and more interesting, options to choose from. On the other 
hand, when more candidates are subscribed into the database, for corporate clients it becomes 
more interesting to become part of the business model because the possibility to find the right 
candidate increases.  
“The scalability of our business model was like the database [of candidates] 
combined with vacancies [of companies] because we need content and candidates” 
(Founder 2, Recruiter, Interview)  
Two important stakeholders in the business model of E-commerce are suppliers and customers. 
Their BM connects the two and creates added value by creating an optimal customer journey. 
Important here is that when the number of customers increases, they become an important 
partner of their suppliers and therefore have more bargaining power in their relationship with 
suppliers. This allows them to negotiate better conditions such as shorter delivery times, better 
prices, and better service conditions. By doing this, they can improve their customer journey 
even more and hence create more value for their customers. This then leads to increased 
customer loyalty and increased sales numbers. Because the numbers grow, their bargaining 
position in the negotiations with suppliers increases even further. As in the other two cases, E-
commerce was able to create an upward growth spiral by creating these important network 
effects between the stakeholders in the business model, making it an important source of their 
scalability. 
“But that also, one of the other interesting things is that when you’re a small 
company and you sell HP laptops, then HP is going to tell you, this is how service 
works. When you grow and become a larger company, you can say, but we’re [E-
commerce] and this is how you’re going to service our things” (Head of Returns, 
E-commerce, Interview) 
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5.4.2.1 Theoretical summary 
Even though the HGFs in our study created value in different ways, their business models were 
all characterized by the Reinforcing Network Effects that linked their value creating activities. 
All firms established reinforcing links between product/service groups in their business models 
and did this by being entrepreneurial to strengthen their core. What is more, the business models 
were structured in a way that they created direct network effects because different stakeholders 
reinforced the created value for one another. This increased the scalability of their business 
models because it accelerated returns on input. That is, the interdependent connections led to 
virtuous cycles of value enhancement between the strengthened core and other product/service 
groups and stakeholders, resulting in an upward spiral of growth (see Table 5.5 for an 
overview). 
Our findings build upon prior studies that argued network externalities to be an important 
source of scalability (Amit & Zott, 2001; Zhang et al., 2015). By providing empirical insights 
into how HGFs were able to build scalable business models by establishing these network 
effects in their business model structure element we contribute to this stream of literature. An 
important theoretical insight is that by establishing network effects between value creating 
activities, the scalability of business models increased even though new value creating activities 
independently were not scalable. This is clearly illustrated in the delivery initiatives of E-
commerce and Food. Independently, the activities were not scalable as an increased number of 
orders would lead to an increase number of human resources needed, hereby not complying 
with the notion of ‘increased returns on input’ of scalable business models. However, the 
externalities created by these activities led to increased value in other parts of the business 
model and therefore led to an increase in returns. This is important as it indicates that network 
externalities, in contrast to what prior studies suggest (Stampfl et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2015), 
are sources of scalability also in organizations that are not entirely digital. Namely, also in 
business models that require much manual labor, network externalities lead to an increase in 
scalability by increasing returns on input. 
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Table 5.5 Business Model Structure Element Design for Scalability 
 Structure Element Design Impact on BM Scalability 
Food 
Structure 
Their two-sided platform connects restaurants with and 
without delivery service with consumers. 
The reinforcement between 
customers and restaurants 
leads to an upward spiral of 
growth that is constantly 
stimulated. Namely, increased 
value for restaurants leads to 
more value for customers, and 
vice versa. Growth spiral 
‘outgrows’ resource 
investments needed for 
growth because of reinforcing 




On one platform they offer the assortment of restaurants 
with their own delivery service and restaurants for which 
they provide the delivery service. Providing the delivery 
service enables a bigger assortment of ‘healthy’ products. 
Because both product groups are bundled on one platform, 
this subsequently leads to an increase number of orders for 
the other restaurants as the number of orders per client 
increases. More clients increase the value for restaurants 
(more orders) and more restaurants increases the value for 
customers (more options).    
E-commerce 
Structure 
Bundling of different customer journeys (product groups) 
on one platform under one brand and linking suppliers 
with consumers. 
The reinforcing link between 
customers and suppliers 
allows for constantly 
improving conditions and 
hence sustained value creation 
during growth. As product 
groups reinforce each other, 
no extra resources are needed 
to increase the number of 
orders, leading to a higher 




Bundling different customer journeys under one brand 
leads to network externalities of improved customer 
journey. Namely, increased customer satisfaction leads to 
repeating orders across different product groups. Improved 
customer journey leads to increased number of orders. 
This increases bargaining power with suppliers and 
therefore they are able to negotiate better conditions which 
further improves the customer journey and hence orders.  
Recruiter 
Structure 
Recruiter connects a big pool of young talent with open 
vacancies. They thus link candidates with organizations. 
One side of the business 
model increasing the other 
side of the BM, and vice 
versa, creates an upward spiral 
that is reinforced by an 
increase on either side of the 
platform. This means that 





Network effects between corporate clients and candidates 
in the organization. More available candidates increase 
value for corporate clients because they can find better 
candidates for the open positions faster. More available 
vacancies increase value for candidates because they have 
a bigger assortment to choose from and this increases the 
chances that they find a suitable position.  
 
5.4.3 Governance: Integrated Control 
The governance element refers to who is in charge of the activities performed within the 
boundary spanning system of the business model (Snihur & Zott, 2019; Zott & Amit, 2010). 
Firms can either decide to outsource certain activities or to conduct them in-house. A key insight 
in our analysis is that the governance element of the business models of HGFs is characterized 
by its Integrated Control. By the means of integration and centralization, the HGFs establish 
an important control mechanism that enables them to manage the desired ‘quality’ of their 
activities. It also enables them to increase the speed of decision making and to make growth 
stimulating decisions by overseeing the bigger picture. 
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One company approach. An important insight from our analysis is that each organization 
operates using a one company approach. Throughout the growth trajectory, the firms acquired 
competitors, wandered into different product groups by building new websites, and created 
different web domains to increase their online visibility. These growth stimulating decisions 
led to challenges for the scalability of their business models for at least two reasons. First, by 
having different brands and websites, the firms were not able to further stimulate their network 
externalities because users and product groups were no longer connected within one value 
enhancing system of activities. Second, management was no longer able to oversee the bigger 
picture, hereby making it difficult to make fast decisions that led to a reinforcement of the 
network effects of their business model and hence growth.  
To overcome this, all HGFs moved to a one company approach. One way they did this was by 
translating the scattered brand portfolio into one centralized brand. In the case of Food, the firm 
started with a singular brand. However, while expanding internationally, various brands were 
added to better fit the international markets they entered. As various countries succeeded each 
other, Food started to get a broad brand portfolio. In order to stimulate network effects and to 
emphasize the strength of their online platform, they decided to move to a single brand strategy 
and repositioned itself with an international brand name. In Germany, for instance, this meant 
a move from operating with two different brands, to operating with one brand. This increased 
the returns in investment because focusing on one brand helped them to stimulate the network 
effects. Namely, rather than having to divide the investments over two brands, investing it in 
one resulted in a stronger brand awareness. The increased brand awareness led to more direct 
visitors and this allowed them to lower the relative marketing expenditure per individual 
customer. 
“But we actually managed to overtake the two individual brands, because they have 
never integrated the two brands. They’re still separate brands, Lieferheld and 
Pizza.de. And by now, we’re about twice the size of Pizza.de and twice the size of 
Lieferheld. So our market share by now is over 50 percent. And their combined 
market share is a little under 50 percent, but you can’t really combine the market 
share, because the consumer doesn’t perceive them as one brand. And in this 
business, it’s all about network effects. And smaller brands don’t generate the same 
network effects as the large brands” (Chief Operating Officer, Food, Interview) 
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Besides the integration of brands, also their websites were converted into one centralized 
website. The centralization of the divided web portfolio of the HGFs helped them to increase 
speed considerably because updates and changes could be instantly diffused into all parts of 
their websites. This was a great advantage for scalability because prior to this decision, updates 
had to be done separately for each website and thus required more time and resources to obtain 
the same results. It also allowed the board to have a stronger control over their website (about 
which more in the next section), which was considered a key strategic asset of the organization. 
This characteristic is clearly shown in the case of E-commerce.  
E-commerce started in 2000 by selling MP3 players. To do so, they registered the domain 
mp3shop.nl. When expanding the assortment, new domains were registered that helped them 
to explain the content of their offer. This eventually led to over 300 different websites with 
which the firm was operating. In 2018, they decided to integrate all different websites into one 
domain: E-commerce.nl. This decision was made in order to be able to architect the business 
model in such a way that they were able to create network externalities between product groups, 
allowing them to engage in up- and cross-selling. This was an important decision for the focal 
firm’s governance element because they were now better able to control the linkages between 
the value creating activities and hence make sure that they reinforced each other. What is more, 
the decision allowed for faster technology diffusion and the automation of processes, such as 
online marketing. 
“Instead of having 325 separate webshops, we now offer unlimited storefronts. This 
means our customers can reach the right product page faster. Before, there was 
only a specific page for laptop bags, but now there is also a page for 13-inch brown 
leather laptop bags. One unified webshop also allows customers to reach the right 
page with a single click when they find us via Google. In addition, a single webshop 
means we can deploy smarter, fully-automated online campaigns.” (E-commerce 
Yearbook 2018) 
Integrated IT and Data. As described above, an important part of the one company approach 
is the one platform approach. The governance element of the scalable business models of the 
HGFs in our sample is further characterized by the integrated IT and data systems. This refers 
to the centralization of technology systems, such as the website and the database. By 
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centralizing these aspects, the firms create uniformity throughout the organization in their data 
which is important for the fast combination of information that comes from different 
departments. Moreover, integrated IT and data refers to the fact that all firms in our study 
governed these activities in-house. The HGFs all have a department that is responsible for the 
most important IT and data activities such as the platform, the database, and data analytics. This 
creates a greater control over these important value-creating and capturing activities, which are 
key for the scalability of their business model. 
A valuable illustration of the integrated technology is the unified data approach of E-commerce. 
The firm has one centrally managed data department. To make sure that all activities could be 
measured the same way, the firm decided to create one data system that allowed them to collect 
and combine the data across the entire organization. This means that the data that is collected 
in and distributed to each department is collected in a centralized system in which all data input 
‘speaks the same language’. This is an important governance mechanism because having such 
a unified data system allows for the fast comparison of departments and based on real-time data 
decisions can be made that help them to adapt and increase the value for the stakeholders in 
their business model. 
“But the thing is that I want it to be measured in the same- So, there’s one data 
system behind it as well. So, the systems that the people, that the EBITDA, NPS, so 
it’s one universe of data points language which roles up to the highest level. Which 
is the yearbook. And the lowest level, which is the result of yesterday. And there’s 
no separate systems, stuff like that” (CEO, E-commerce, Interview) 
What is more, key strategic activities within these departments are developed in-house. Food 
for instance developed their own platform and management systems, E-commerce developed 
their platform and data analytic tools, and Recruiter developed their own candidate-matching 
software and CRM system. This is a crucial insight from our analysis because the in-house 
development of key strategic activities increases the control on the quality of these systems. 
Moreover, it allows them to faster detect and address improvements. Finally, the in-house 
development of IT systems increases scalability because, in contrast to outsourced systems, an 
increased number of users only marginally increases the cost of these systems. 
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Centralized board control. In order to successfully manage the ‘one company approach’ and 
the associated integrated IT and data governance elements, the centralized board control is an 
important characteristic of the business model governance element that we derived from our 
analysis. The top management teams of our case firms all had at least one founder still on board. 
In order to make sure that the business model was aligned with the firm’s strategy, the board 
had a strong control over the activities that were performed within the system. While this seems 
counterintuitive to sources of scalability, the strong board control created several important 
advantages for scalability. First, having a founder and major shareholder as key decision maker 
allows for fast decision making. As there were not much stakeholders to consider, the board 
could act quickly which is of crucial importance in the scale-up context (Demir et al., 2017). 
Also, by having a strong control over the key strategic activities, the board was able to oversee 
the bigger picture of individual departments and therefore guard the network effects of the 
business model which are highlighted as a crucial source of scalability. As Food’s Director of 
Human Resources notes: “We have always had a centrally managed organization model and 
that is super successful, because that ensures scalability, transparency, you have one leader who 
oversees an entire spectrum” (Director of Human Resources, Food, Interview). 
The delivery initiatives of Food and E-commerce and the academy initiative of Recruiter, which 
independently did not result in scalability advantages nor increased profit illustrate this 
importance. In the case of Food, for instance, some minority shareholders were against the 
initiative because they considered it to be loss-letting. However, because the board realized the 
overarching reinforcing effects of these activities and had dominant ownership and hence 
control, the firm was able to implement it and increased the growth of their business model. 
This was important as without the initiative the BM would reach a saturation of its growth 
prospects and the long-term scalability would be compromised. 
While different from the other firms in our sample Recruiter decided to hire a CEO, the 
founders remained part of the executive board. The three founders realized that managing was 
not their strength and hired a CEO to take over that responsibility. This allowed them to free-
up their time and mental capacity to be focused on new initiatives and the operations. However, 
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they kept being closely involved in the organization, even at operational levels, in order to 
control the value creation processes in the organization. 
“One example, we still open offices. And when there is an office opened, I always 
go there. And the first thing I look at is the signing in the building. If candidates 
who come there, applicants, they understand the way. Because most of the time we 
are in big offices and there are a lot of companies and then I’m looking at the signs, 
as a candidate. And 90% at the time, it is shit. I can’t find my own office. So, I come 
in the office, I talk to the manager, I say this is shit, I can’t find our office. So, 
everyone who is visiting here as an applicant, they’re nervous, they’re here for a 
job, we have to do something about it. And that’s what we do the whole day. So my 
two partners also” (Founder, Recruiter, Interview). 
Integration of strategic activities. The integration of IT and data, which are important for the 
scalability of the business model has been already discussed. Another important insight from 
our analysis is that HGFs that were able to scale-up their business models integrated other 
strategic activities into their business model. These decisions were made, even though the 
positive effects could not be measured directly. However, the activities that were strategic, in 
the sense that they were important contributors to their strategic goals, were integrated 
regardless of the financial consequences. This resulted in increased scalability because the firms 
had more control over the quality of activities. Also, conducting them in-house let to better 
insights into the operations and simplified the creation of interdependent linkages with other 
activities within the system. This helped them to stimulate the virtuous cycles of value creation. 
E-commerce initially relied on third parties for their delivery service. Because E-commerce 
considers itself a customer journey agency, they strongly emphasize customer satisfaction by 
calculating the NPS score of customer journeys. While doing this, they realized that for certain 
product groups, the NPS score was low because of the way their products were delivered. 
Because this was considered a strategic activity for their firm, they decided to start delivery 
themselves. By experimenting they began to craft the delivery process and eventually made the 
decision to integrate this entire step in the customer journey rather than outsourcing it to third 
parties. An important additional insight is that this change was only made in product groups 
that suffered from decreased NPS because of delivery. For other groups, where this was not the 
case, they did not integrate this. This is important as it illustrates the vertical integration of key 
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strategic activities in the business model and thus the integrated control of key value creating 
activities. 
Self-supporting Business Model. Another finding related to the integrated control is the fact 
that the HGFs created self-supporting business models from the very beginning. This means 
that their business models were able to finance their own growth by being profitable. Because 
this was the case, no external funding had to be attracted in the early years, allowing them to 
keep a strong integrated control without short term pressure of investors. By only attracting 
external capital after achieving considerable growth rates, the founders were able to keep an 
important share themselves. Our findings indicate that this was an important characteristic of 
their governance element because it allowed them to make scalable investment decisions 
without being held responsible for short term losses.  
Even though profitable growth is at the very core of scalability (Nielsen & Lund, 2018), the 
insight that the HGFs in our sample built a profitable business model from the very beginning 
remains important. Namely, having a profitable business model allowed them to remain control 
over their business model which facilitated the refinement of their business model designs for 
scalability in later stages of their growth trajectory.  
5.4.3.1 Theoretical summary 
The governance element of the scalable business models of the HGFs in our sample is 
characterized by the Integrated Control. All firms operate using a one company approach with 
a strong single brand strategy. Their integrated IT and data systems allow the board to be the 
final decision maker because they possess the necessary information to do so. Moreover, the 
integration of strategic activities results in more control which is important to be able to guard 
the network effects of the business model, a key source of scalability. Being self-supportive 
further facilitates the integrated control of the business model (see Table 5.6 for an overview). 
On a general level, the in-house governance of key strategic activities is important as it enhances 
the control firms have on the quality of their value creating activities (Contractor, Kumar, 
Kundu, & Pedersen, 2010; Williamson, 1979). An important theoretical insight is that 
integrated control is important to guard and stimulate the growth logic of the business model. 
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Namely, by having in-house rather than outsourced data gathering and analysis capabilities, the 
firm ensures faster information flows, faster changes and thus faster improvements that allow 
the firms to increase the created value (Ghosh & Rosenkopf, 2015; Westerman, Tannou, 
Bonnet, Ferraris, & McAfee, 2012). Moreover, the integrated control allows the firm to make 
decisions overseeing the bigger picture. This is important because by doing this, the network 
externalities can be stimulated what leads to an enhancement of value creation throughout 
various parts of the business model. Prior research on both business model scalability (Zhang 
et al., 2015) and high-growth firms (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017; Hambrick & Crozier, 1985) has 
suggested that firms should decentralize control for scalability and sustained high growth. Our 
findings suggest differently. Our analysis indicates that centralized control is important for 
scalability for several reasons. First, it allows the focal firm to control and ensure the quality 
standards of their value creating activities. Second, the integrated control increases the speed 
of information flows, allowing the firm to detect improvements faster and hence quickly adjust 
the value creation activities to maintain quality standards. Third, it allows top management to 
structure the business model in such a way that the network effects are stimulated by looking 
beyond the scalability of individual activities. Our findings indicate that this is a critical 
characteristic of scalable business model designs. Rather than concentrating on isolated 
individual business model design choices, we provide a systematic and holistic approach and 
combine the key elements of the BM in our analysis of scalable business models (Zott & Amit, 
2010).  
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Table 5.6 Business Model Governance Element Design for Scalability 
 Governance Element Design Impact on BM Scalability 
Food 
Governance 
Centrally integrated governance of activities managed by 
the board of Food. 
The integrated control results 
in increased speed in the 
business model. Moreover, it 
allows the organization to 
oversee the bigger picture that 
helps to stimulate the network 
effects. By having a strong 
control, the desired value 
creation can be ensured. The 
factors combined leads to a 
reinforcement of the upward 
growth spiral.  
Integrated 
Control 
One centralized brand and platform across countries that 
is developed and managed internally. Related data 
system is managed by the centralized board and 
distributed across the organization. Delivery service, an 
activity that strengthens the network effects, is conducted 
in-house, is part of the centralized platform, and is 
centrally managed by the board. Business model was 
profitable from the beginning and therefore the Founder-
CEO was able to limit the short-term pressure of 
investors in the early years.  
E-commerce 
Governance 
Centrally integrated governance with a high degree of 
control of Founder-CEO. 
The integrated control allows 
the firm to control the 
customer journey and 
constantly improve it by 
making fast decisions. This 




One integrated platform in which over 300 websites are 
integrated, operating under one brand. One unified data 
language throughout entire organization that is guarded 
in a centralized system that is managed internally. The 
CEO is the final decision maker. Delivery service 
vertically integrated to increase control on customer 
journey which enabled the further strengthening of 
reinforcing linkages between product groups. Building 
on profitable business model resulted in strong control 




Centrally integrated governance with strong operational 
involvement of founders. 
The integrated control helps 
the firm to keep investing in 
stimulating the growth logic. 
Of key importance is the 
integrated database, which is 
key for their competitive 
advantage, the ‘quality’ of 
information. Integrating these 
activities ensures the desired 
value creation over-time as 
they are able to quickly adapt 
it to the need of the 
organization.   
Integrated 
Control 
Integration of various websites under one centralized 
brand. In-house development of software systems that 
increases control and can be better adapted to the needs 
of the organization. Centrally managed database which is 
a key strategic asset of the organization. New initiatives 
developed internally, even though they seem far away 
from core value creation, to ensure control and speed of 
operations and strengthen the core proposition. Founders 
are still closely involved in operational levels of the 
organization. Long-term orientation can be ensured 
because of self-supporting business model and limited 
pressure of shareholders. 
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5.5 DISCUSSION 
So far, we have described how E-commerce, Food and Recruiter have configured the content, 
structure and governance elements of their business models to increase scalability, allowing 
them to create and capture value over prolonged periods of high growth (see Figure 5.1). 
Our analysis has shown that HGFs design their business models for scalability by taking a 
holistic perspective of the activity system that is the business model. Our findings show that 
Digital Activities in the content element enhances the business model scalability because it 
allows firms to accumulatively collect information in times of growth and based on that make 
more accurate decisions that help them to make the operations more efficient, stimulate key 
value creating activities and doing this in a faster manner. What is more, the digital nature of 
activities enables the HGFs to architect their business models so that they are able to create 
direct and indirect network externalities between product/service groups and users. These 
Reinforcing Network Effects in the business models are a key source of scalability because it 
creates virtuous cycles of value creation. This means that resources invested in value creation 
for stakeholders or product/service groups on one side of the BM also increase value for the 
stakeholders or product/service groups on the other side of the BM, and vice versa. This allows 
them to increase, and even accelerate, the desired value creation relative to resource investment. 
The digital nature of the content element is important because it allows the firms to measure 
the overarching effects of decisions. Hence, it allows them to measure the effectiveness of 
network effects and steer the organization towards stimulating those. To do this more 
effectively, the HGFs’ business model governance element is characterized by the Integrated 
Control. By operating with a one company approach, integrating strategic activities, and 
integrating data and IT systems, the focal firm has a strong control over the entire activity 
system of value creation and capture. It also increases the speed of decisions because real-time 
data informs the board faster and the centralized control enables them to make fast decisions 
without considering a broad number of stakeholders. As the network effects constitute a main 
driver of growth, the centralized control enables HGFs’ top managements to move beyond the 
scalability of individual activities and look at the holistic logic of combining content, structure, 
and governance in order to ensure the long-term scalability of the entire activity system. 
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5.5.1 Implications for Business Model literature 
Our emergent theoretical framework in which we identify how HGFs design their core business 
model elements to enable scalability over time makes several contributions to the business 
model literature. First, by combining different literature streams, we update the definition of 
business model scalability. This helps us, and future research, to better capture what scalable 
business models are. 
Second, we contribute to the business model design literature. We move beyond the business 
model design themes that ‘labeled’ the value creation and capture logic of the activity system 
as a whole (Zott & Amit, 2010). In our study we zoom in to the key business model elements 
that enable business model scalability and hereby explain how firms can design scalable 
business models. Hence, we move beyond the more generic design themes which stopped at 
explaining what the business model design themes are (Amit & Zott, 2001). While these studies 
have made important contributions to our understanding of the performance effects of such 
Digitalized Activities 
Business Model Content Element for Scalability 
• Build a strong online presence 
• Collect data to build a database 
• Develop or acquire strong data analytic capabilities 
• Make decisions based on data rather than gut feeling 
• Automate processes to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Reinforcing Network Effects 
Business Model Structure Element for Scalability 
• Create reinforcing linkages between different value 
creating activities in the business model 
• Create reinforcing network effects between users on 
different sides of the business model 
Integrated Control 
Business Model Governance Element for Scalability 
• Operate under one centralized brand and company 
• Integrate and centrally govern IT and data systems 
• Ensure a centralized board control 
• Integrate strategic activities into the focal firm 
• Build a self-supporting Business Model 
Business Model Scalability 
• Maintained or enhanced value creation 
• Increased or accelerated returns on 
resource input 
• Faster and more accurate information 
flows 
• Increased speed in decision making  
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design themes, they provide a rather static perspective (Balboni et al., 2019; Zott & Amit, 2007) 
and do not explain how business models are prepared for the high growth they might experience 
after a successful business model innovation (Foss & Saebi, 2017). By analyzing the business 
model configurations of HGFs that have experienced sustained high growth, our study makes 
an important contribution by providing a more dynamic perspective on business model designs. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on business model scalability by providing much needed 
in-depth insights into how firms design scalable business models. Prior studies have argued 
business model scalability to be important for successful business model innovation (e.g. Amit 
& Zott, 2001; Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2011). However, only a limited number of studies 
have tried to define what business model scalability is and what its sources are (Stampfl et al., 
2013; Zhang et al., 2015). Moreover, studies that provide in-depth insights into how business 
models are designed for scalability are lacking, and authors call for further research into this 
phenomenon (Täuscher & Abdelkafi, 2018). Our study provides a deeper understanding of such 
business model configurations by explicating how the business model elements of successful 
HGFs are designed in conjunction to enable scalability. 
Finally, Arthur (1988) in his work identified different sources of scalability. Our grounded 
empirical analysis shows that one of these classical concepts, network effects (Katz & Shapiro, 
1985), is particularly important for business model scalability. Our study moves beyond the 
earlier established relation between network effects and scalability by empirically identifying 
not only that network effects are present in scalable business models, but also illustrating how 
these network effects are designed and implemented into the structure element of scalable 
business models. Moreover, our analysis shows how HGFs design the other business model 
elements, content and governance, in conjunction to stimulate these network effects. 
5.5.2 Implications for scale-up literature 
New innovative business models are considered important prerequisites for high growth (Foss 
& Saebi, 2017; Teece, 2018b). Moreover, scholars have acknowledged the importance of 
scalability in business model innovation for long term success (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 
2011). It are the business models that are able to sustain this growth over time, that are able to 
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capture an important market share in the industries they enter, and hence bring disruptive 
change into established industries (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2011; Markides, 2008). Yet, 
existing literature tells us little about how high-growth firms design such scalable business 
models that enable them to sustain high growth over time (Jansen et al., 2020). Our study makes 
at least two important contributions to this literature. First, by providing insight into the 
business model configurations of the most successful HGFs in the Netherlands, our study makes 
an important step in the understanding of this phenomenon. We extend prior studies in the high-
growth literature (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017) by not only explaining that scalability is 
important, but also providing insights into how this is accomplished.  
Second, prior research has often times focused on digital businesses in explaining high growth 
and scalability (Hagiu & Rothman, 2016; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005, 2018; Täuscher & 
Abdelkafi, 2018). While our study supports the notion that digitalization is an important 
characteristic of scalable business models, we extend this insight. First of all because the HGFs 
in our sample are firms of which their business models are not mere digital. Namely, an 
important part of their value creating activities requires manual labor such as the matching 
process of Recruiter, and the delivery services of Food and E-commerce. Second, an important 
insight in our analysis is that all HGFs develop initiatives that are not digital and independently 
are not scalable as they require increased manual labor (thus resources) with growth. However, 
by applying a holistic perspective on the business model activity system, our analysis shows 
that these activities allow the HGFs to stimulate the network effects of their business model and 
hence increase the created value. In contrast to prior studies that analyzed the scalability of 
digital business models (Vendrell-Herrero, Parry, Bustinza, & Gomes, 2018; Zhang et al., 2015) 
our study contributes to the study on high-growth firms in general. 
These insights allow for a greater application of our findings to traditional business models as 
well. Our findings show that different business model archetypes enhanced their scalability by 
incorporating similar content, structure and governance elements. Moreover, we find that 
business model scalability applies to a broader set of firms than born-digitals only. Our findings, 
which are summarized in figure 5.1, provide clear pathways in which firms with traditional 
business models can incorporate scalability in the core elements of their business models. This 
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might help more traditional firms to reconfigure their business models in order to thrive in the 
digital era in which digital business models put a lot of pressure on the survival of traditional 
BMs (Cozzolino et al., 2018; Teece & Linden, 2017).  
Third, our study provides a much needed more dynamic view on high growth. Research on high 
growth has a rather static view as it dominantly relies on secondary data and quantitative 
research approaches (Barbero et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2006; Stam & Wennberg, 2009). While 
those studies recognize scalable business models as an important ‘ingredient’ for achieving high 
growth and notably, sustaining such rapid growth, prior literature has mostly taken scalability 
for granted (Baron & Hannan, 2002). The idea that ‘HGFs are rapidly scaling, so their BMs 
must be scalable’ is not entirely wrong; however, studies lack that provide a more dynamic 
perspective that addresses what scalability actually means in such context (DeSantola & Gulati, 
2017). Therefore, there is a clear need for studies that explain how HGFs manage to create and 
capture value over prolonged periods of high growth (Achtenhagen et al., 2013). By empirically 
showing how HGFs manage to achieve sustained high growth by designing and refining 
scalable business models and illuminating how the key elements tie together into scalable BM 
architectures, our study expands our understanding of how HGFs’ business models are prepared 
for significant growth over time. 
5.5.3 Limitations and future research lines 
We believe that our study provides important insights into our understanding of the business 
model scalability of high-growth firms that enables them to create and capture value over 
prolonged periods of high growth. However, it also comes with limitations, which represent 
interesting paths for further research. First, we studied the business model characteristics of 
three of the most successful scale-ups in the Netherlands. Looking at the most successful HGFs 
allowed us to apply the replication logic to assess whether our research findings could be 
confirmed across cases, hereby creating more robust insights (Yin, 1984). However, our study 
only includes three cases. Future research would benefit from studies with a broader number 
cases in which the replication and extension of our theoretical insights could be assessed (Smith 
& Besharov, 2019). Moreover, the ‘Eisenhardt method’ encourages the use of ‘similar, yet 
distinct’ cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gehman et al., 2018). A limitation in our study is that we only 
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studied highly successful cases and did not compare them with less successful ones. Comparing 
the scalable business model characteristics of successful HGFs and firms that were not able to 
sustain their rapid growth is an important avenue for further research that might give us 
additional insights into this phenomenon. Furthermore, future research could benefit from 
comparing the scalable business models of entirely digital businesses and businesses with a 
more physical component, such as for instance consultancy firms. What the differences between 
scalable business models of these types of firms are would be an interesting question for future 
research and we urge researchers to explore the applicability of our propositions to other 
settings. 
A rich avenue for future research is also to quantitatively measure the impact of business model 
scalability on value capture over time. While the sustained growth of our case firms indicates 
that the HGFs of our study were able to create and capture the desired value over prolonged 
periods of growth, it would be interesting to measure the performance effects of scalable 
business model designs in a broader number of firms (Markman & Gartner, 2002). Furthermore, 
research on both internal and external antecedents of scalable business model designs 
constitutes an interesting avenue for future research in both the business model and high-growth 
literature.  
No theory in management could be expected to explain all the variance observed (Vuori & Huy, 
2016) and we do not claim business model scalability to be the only factor explaining the 
sustained growth of HGFs. In order for a firm to achieve and sustain high growth, other factors 
such as leadership, growth aspirations and organizational capabilities are important as well. 
Nevertheless, business model scalability seems to be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition 
for sustaining high growth in scale-ups. Overall, our study is among the first to empirically 
identify the characteristics of such scalable business models and provides important insights 
into the sustained value creation and capture over time of HGFs. We hope it inspires future 
research to continue exploring how firms are able to achieve and sustain rapid growth over 
time. 
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5.6 APPENDIX 
Table 5.7 Data Supporting Scalable Business Model Design 
 Food E-commerce Recruiter 
 Content: Digitalized Activities 
Online 
presence 
“if you don’t have anything top of 
mind, you go to Google and you 
search for it. So they were only 
able to bid on Google for one 
brand, on certain keywords. … So 
that had a huge impact on us, 
because by now, everyone says 
that Lieferando is by far the 
biggest. … so that was very 
important.” (COO, Interview) 
“Where we really add value to the 
restaurants, it’s at the moment in 
the marketplace model, it’s 
mainly on the marketing side and 
on the IT side … They have 
hardly any clue about marketing. 
I mean, the marketing that they 
used to do is printing flyers and 
getting them distributed, but in 
the online world, they don’t know 
how to do Google AdWords or 
these types of things. So, these 
two are the main areas where we 
focus, because we think we have 
the competency there” (COO, 
Interview) 
“Throughout 2018, we have 
increased our all-round 
visibility, mainly by expanding 
our delivery services with blue 
vans and by improving our 
online presence. As a result of 
our increased visibility, 
customers often think of us 
first. We are the first place they 
come looking when they want 
to buy a product” (Yearbook 
2018) 
“Going a bit back to, I think to 
understand the background is, 
… when the game changed, our 
approach did not really change. 
So, once online became more 
dominant and, we became a 
dominant online player, we still 
were playing the same game” 
(Head of Assortment and 
Pricing, Interview). 
 
“So, we had a lot of websites, 
… we had a lot of jobboards, 
we had bijbaan.nl, bijbanen.nl, 
scholierenwerk.nl, trainee.nl, 
studentenwerk.nl. And we had a 
lot of traffic online and then we 
got like applicants in a split 
second” (Founder 3, Interview) 
“Yes and our platform is 
already very high, because at 
the moment when you look at 
us - why are we doing better 
than the competition at the 
moment? That has three 
reasons. We are super strong 
online. So our online visibility 
is 60%” (CEO, Interview) 
Database “And then we just look at the 
public data sources that are 
available. We pick it up and we 
actually use it, we use Tableau as 
a visualization tool and I just put 
it in Tableau so that they are 
available. And if we find 
something interesting in that, it 
will be reported.” (Director of 
Data and Analytics, Interview) 
“We must also do certain ideas 
based on insight into data. That's 
actually where it starts. That is 
also something I always find 
interesting, it is often referred 
back to let's ask the customer, let 
the users do it. Then let's take a 
good look at what they actually 
do before they ask why we do it” 
(Director of Product, Interview). 
“Yes, so how we use that 
customer data, is by relying a 
lot on Google Analytics. So 
how do people use our website? 
Conversion rates, click rates, 
the use of filters, specifications, 
things like that. We rely quite a 
lot on Google trend data. So, 
what are brands, products, 
models, that people search for? 
A lot of it is market data, so 
how is the market as a whole 
behaving? (Head of Assortment 
and Pricing, Interview). 
“So, the data was just always 
present for us. And everything 
that we did, always need to 
incorporate the data to well, in a 
feed or in a database or in 
whatever we could talk to. So, I 
think that that really fired up the 
progress that we can make on 
our data-driven marketing 
strategy” (Head of Online 
Marketing, Interview) 
“So that made an advantage but 
also all the subscriptions in the 
database because when we put 
on a vacancy, like for instance 
do you want to do sampling for 
Red Bull, we get huge amount 
of applicants and then we could 
choose” (Founder 1, Interview) 
“It’s the database, because we 
have this online network which 
is the, which works the best in 
the Netherlands. We have six 
million profiles in our database. 
And if you check our online 
visibility, it’s like 84 per cent. 
And it’s growing. So we are 
online way ahead from our 
competitors” (Operational 
Director, Interview) 




“So everyone has access to that 
information. We provide monthly 
training. Where everyone with the 
access she has to these big data, 
that they themselves can find 
explanations therein” (Director of 
Data and Analytics, Interview). 
“Yes, that is, we also really 
looked for Bulgaria for then, 
where are they now, what are 
their comparable moments in 
time. Like we have just taken 
Poland as an example, put it next 
to it. The model applied to the 
Bulgarian and Romanian data and 
looked, yes you know, where do 
we end up. That was part of the 
due diligence to see what the 
potential of this business is” 
(Chief Marketing Officer, 
Interview). 
“The data setting that you need 
for this display is like literally 
insane. I think from a data 
perspective we’re a very, very, 
very mature company.” (CEO, 
Interview). 
“So, you need to give a lot of 
data to the category teams that 
they can actually go figure out, 
hey, but if that phone comes 
back in six percent of the cases, 
why does it actually come 
back? Do we need to improve 
the picture which we have, or 
do we need to explain a bit 
more clearly for what target 
audience this is?” (Head of 
Returns, Interview). 
“From the start, we counted the 
conversion and we had data and 
metrics to see if we were good 
in it and if we made progression 
and what worked best. And we 
tried calling, advertising, cold 
canvassing, we tried 
newspapers or newsletters or 
just letter. And then we said, 
did you got my letter. And we 
found a way, it was working for 
us and we had the highest 
conversion” (Founder 2, 
Interview) 
“We are investing even more in 
data analysts and data scientists, 
because that is just- That's what 
we need. Then you can feed 





“The fourth pillar is that you fully 
rely on what the data says. You 
need a whole process there, you 
have to make sure that everyone 
understands what the definitions 
are and wants to rely on them” 
(Director of Data and Analytics, 
Interview) 
“So, [the CEO] and [the CFO] 
looked at that consumer data and 
said wow, within two months 
such a customer will be earned 
back, we just have to invest a lot 
more in that” (Manager of 
Investor Relations, Interview) 
“We’re just always data driven, 
making data-driven decisions 
based on finding the optimum 
investment level for our 
marketing activities” (Head of 
Online Marketing, Interview) 
“To predict or to determine new 
store locations, we look at all 
kinds of data like what is the- 
You know what the uplift of a 
store in an area can be. And the 
uplift is, it depends on the 
amount that is already, the sales 
that we already have in that 
area. So then we can decide 
what are good locations to open 
a new store.” (Head of Physical 
Stores, Interview) 
“First we looked at, is there a 
university, is there a high 
school, are there companies? 
That’s what we looked at, very 
simple. And now we look like 
the numbers, like the revenue 
divided over the country and 
where it’s smart to open or to 
not open- But it’s- It’s all data-
driven” (Operational Director, 
Interview). 
“We absolutely are a data-
driven organization” (Chief 
Technology Officer, Interview) 
Automation 
of processes 
“We have an algorithm for that to 
look at the chance that it is a fake 
review. And then we identify that 
and we attach an action to it. That 
is, for example, typically 
something that we then signal and 
then bring into the organization, 
which then again looks at, yes, 
what we are going to do with this 
type of review. And those are 
then automatically deleted and 
things like that” (Director of Data 
and Analytics, Interview) 
“So they can if they release 
something in their own cell with 
the automated test tools, that the 
rest does not break and that you 
can of course keep completely 
contained, they do three releases 
per second, so they can bring new 
things live quickly. … There are 
companies that only do one every 
“And now we started well, 
automating a lot of stuff. So the 
manual labour of all the Google 
ads is not necessary anymore, 
because it’s now being done by 
our bid manager” (Head of 
Online Marketing, Interview) 
“We have like automated stuff 
for stock, automated things for 
pricing, automated things for 
marketing” (Head of 
Assortment and Pricing, 
Interview) 
“Or maybe the same thing I’m 
playing with right now is that 
you can actually if you have the 
phone number of the recruiter, 
we can make a system that 
whatever number you call, we 
see o, this is this candidate and 
we reroute the call 
automatically to the mobile 
number of the recruiter” (Chief 
Information Officer, Interview) 
“But, for example, that on the 
administration, my colleague 
finds out that someone is there, 
who has been doing this kind of 
job by hand for a year, while 
you can easily automate that 
without programming. And, 
well, he just put that tool live 
and we got rid of the extra 
work” (Founder 2, Interview) 
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quarter, you know?” (Chief 
Technology Officer, Interview) 






“So if we get someone who 
ordered for example and we 
deliver, then next time he might 
order with a regular marketplace 
model restaurant and then we get 
the poorer margin. So in the end, 
for us it’s a mixed calculation. 
And it strengthens our network 
effect, because people are 
thinking about ordering food with 
[Food] even more” (COO, 
Interview) 
“So everyone has to be a 
customer of ours and if that 
means that we also do this for a 
number of companies that do not 
deliver themselves, then we have 
to do that, because one in 50 
orders, or maybe it is one in 20 at 
a given moment , is a delivery 
order. That costs us, I know a lot, 
say: a tenner. If we can spread 
that on all orders, then our 
customer is still profitable, 
because I just look at the 
profitability of the customer, I 
don't look at the profitability of a 
delivery model” (CFO, Interview) 
“So, there speed is of the 
essence. So, if you can come up 
with a proposition where speed 
is really, really works. And that 
can either be with a loaner 
device or at least with a very, 
very quick turnaround on repair. 
Then that also becomes a 
competitive advantage on the 
sales side. So, that’s a bit of the 
thinking there” (Head of 
Returns, Interview) 
“But there’s different themes, 
so the delivery guys for 
washing machines, they’re 
actually organizing value for 
the Apple team. Advice for 
ourselves. So, there’s attribution 
modeling, we need that as well” 
(CEO, Interview) 
“We can see there’s going to be 
shortages, it’s going to be huge 
in that period of time. So that’s- 
We’re thinking okay, how can 
we meet up to these shortages 
and help these companies? 
Well, let’s start at universities, 
because if you’re seventeen or 
eighteen, you can develop what 
you want after your degree. So 
if we can combine these things, 
studying and getting your 
degree helping companies out, 
we know we’re sitting on a pile 
of gold” (Founder 1, Interview) 
“Well, if you put that together 
with the customer side, you can 
turn that into a very nice 
concept. We just did that. We 
have ensured that we have a 
higher professional education, 
now IT, but in addition to this 
this year we also have 
technology and care, training in 
which we ensure that customers 
can touch young people early in 
the chain with the right 
knowledge. And for the 
candidate we have arranged it 
so that they can start working 







“Was actually in our strategy 
from the start: it's all about your 
offering, so about the number of 
restaurants … You just need to 
have them all. You should not 
differentiate at all and why not? 
Every restaurant has its own type 
of customer ecosystem, because 
that restaurant only exists with the 
number of customers. So even 
though you may well have been 
covered in the offering on all 
Berlin postcodes, you have to 
order that one thing ... Because 
there ... It has unique customers, 
which you also need to have on 
your platform” (CFO, Interview) 
“There is of course much talk 
about portals and things like that. 
For the portal, the consumer side 
is really important. And of course, 
to serve that consumer side well, 
you also need restaurants” (CEO, 
Interview) 
“This funny thing, so on a 
market share level it works like 
this. It’s a shitload of work to 
get the ten percent. If I have the 
ten percent, I’ll demand to get 
[better conditions] to sit down 
and I demand some marketing 
funding and I demand and then, 
boom. We’re at twenty percent. 
This is a very short timeline “ 
(CEO, Interview) 
“The gross profit margin 
increased to 12.7% (2017: 
11.8%) by improving purchase 
conditions and the 
rationalization of our product 
assortment. We focused on 
offering an improved range of 
products and services which 
suit our customers best, for 
instance by only selling 
products with low return ratios, 
and by setting up reasonable 
return agreements with our 
suppliers” (Yearbook 2018) 
“So when we started we said, 
okay, if you don’t react on 
applicants you get a fine. And 
the company said, why? 
Because you have to answer 
their questions, because if you 
don’t, our website doesn’t 
work” (Founder 1, Interview) 
“So that made an advantage but 
also all the subscriptions in the 
database because when we put 
on a vacancy, like for instance 
do you want to do sampling for 
Red Bull, we get huge amount 
of applicants and then we could 
choose” (Founder 1, Interview) 
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“If you look at the company and 
our strategy as it is today, we’re 
very focused on one company, 
one brand and one technology 
platform strategy. Which means 
that makes us very efficient, 
because we can apply best 
practices from one country to the 
other” (COO, Interview) 
“Well, we have become much 
more scalable, I think, in terms of 
marketing, for example by 
centralizing the departments” 
(CFO, Interview) 
“We switched to a single 
domain in June 2018: [E-
commerce].nl and .be. Our 
customers no longer have to 
remember the names of 
product-specific webshops, 
such as Laptopshop.nl and 
Wasmachinestore.be; they can 
simply visit one central website 
instead” (Yearbook 2018) 
“We just fixed it, but every 
store had their own onboarding 
programme for new employees. 
,,, So what we did, we simply 
just made a central onboarding 
programme that is used in all 
stores” (Head of Physical 
Stores, Interview) 
“You have to centralize things 
more to make it really effective 
and that’s a process with is 
really a big step. So we take 
now the small steps to make the 
system work that way and then 
we have to centralize certain 
activities to make it really 
effective.” (Head of Marketing 
and Communications, 
Interview) 
“And in Germany we changed 
things and said okay, if you 
want to start here, we have to 
find somebody in the company 
with our DNA, not a German, 
with our DNA who’s going to 
hire Germans and introduce 
them with our culture, with our 
DNA” (Founder 1, Interview) 
Integrated IT 
and Data 
“That central platform is just very 
important to achieve that growth. 
And that ensures that with every 
takeover, there is another such 
migration as we call it. But that is 
again an investment to ensure that 
when we develop something new 
that will be the same in Romania 
and Bulgaria again - I think that's 
the most important thing when 
you talk about rapid growth in 
this company on the tech level” 
(Head of Product Development, 
Interview) 
“And one platform and that 
actually resulted from: yes, if we 
do everything the same ... And the 
platform, that's just 60% of us ... 
Almost everything revolves 
around the platform” (CFO, 
Interview) 
“So we said, why would we, 
why wouldn’t we create 
something like a huge 
centralised point that collects all 
customer feedback. And we can 
see a customer contact could be 
feedback as well. And if you 
well, visualise that in a smart 
way, for different kinds of 
users. Then a lot more people 
know what customers are 
contacting us about and a lot 
more people can improve the 
customer journey” (Head of 
Customer Service, Interview) 
“But looking now, if we have a 
bid manager for adverts, the 
data is the same as the data that 
we got for Facebook, the data is 
the same for Display. So 
basically, all the data is the 
same.” (Head of Sales and 
Marketing, Interview) 
“Our asset is the infrastructure 
we build on systems. So we 
have really software, our own 
software, where all the people 
will work on. And it’s matching 
technology. So we have built an 
application tracking system. 
You place an ad as a recruiter 
on the whole network. It’s our 
network, so it doesn’t cost you 
money.” (Founder 3, Interview) 
“Our own system. Yes. In fact, 
almost all components that are 
in the primary process - so that 
actually begins with the filing 
of an application, the placement 
of vacancies, your job boards 
on which those vacancies are 
presented, the registration 
processes for candidates, 
application flows that run 
through them, handling 
applications. Well and then the 
piece even further. That if an 
applicant is treated and goes to 
work with us, he or she will 
also register with the rest of his 
data, his bank details, his ID 
proof and the like. Then if he 
then receives the placement 
contract, submits his ID, or 
claims, and the like. That is, all 
are separate systems that we 





“Actually, you need people who 
lead the company, and then I talk 
about [the CEO], then I talk about 
[the COO] and to a lesser extent 
myself because I am not an 
“I think we saw the last year 
that the new concepts in 
Amsterdam and The Hague, 
they really work and now 
Pieter, the CEO, wants us to 
“And of course I can give my 
opinion, but in the end the one 
responsible for it has to discuss 
it with the CEO and or the three 
owners and there they have to 
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entrepreneur. Those two really 
have an idea. They drive it and 
then you need people who are 
going to steer that in the right 
direction. You need those 
managers for that.” (CFO, 
Interview) 
“Our board - And I understand 
that, our board doesn't care much 
about that. They say, just do it. If 
you don't do it - You will just do 
it, you know” (Director of Human 
Resources, Interview) 
open a lot more stores. I think 
that’s for me a big challenge in 
the coming months, just to 
make sure that we have the 
right team to also open five 
stores next year already, 
because that’s what he wants” 
(Head of Physical Stores, 
Interview) 
“It’s not to be honest, really a 
group discussion. It’s more, 
there’s, we have one boss, who 
is the clear end responsibility. 
And everybody knows what to 
do.” (Chief Strategy Officer, 
Interview) 
find a solution” (Head of 
Marketing and 
Communications, Interview) 
“Most of the decisions are 
actually made by the founders 
and with me, so the four of us, 
when it is really a strategic 
decision. And we have an MT 
that is executing it, right? … 
That is not a decision-making 






“And we actually integrated 
logistics model into our own 
network, so you can’t really 
differentiate whether a restaurant 
is being delivered by us or 
someone else.” (COO, Interview) 
“The logistics model sounds also 
controversial, because on the one 
hand you could say, it’s loss 
making so why are you doing it? 
But on the other hand, we believe 
it’s contributing a lot to the 
networking effect or even to 
reorder it.” (COO, Interview) 
“So, there you can think about 
outsourcing it. And we’ve been 
having those discussions but, in 
the end,, the innovation we 
want to do on that process is 
currently still so big that 
outsourcing it is going to hinder 
that. Because if you start 
working with an outsource 
party, you become way less 
flexible in the process changes” 
(Head of Returns, Interview) 
“With gaining complexity you 
can for instance, we always had 
a department of shipments and 
delivery. But well, and then you 
start deciding that you are going 
to build your own delivery 
service for, so we had like eight 
vans to replenish the stores. 
Which is called delivery. And 
then you start building and then 
before you know it, it’s like the 
biggest employee home” (CEO, 
Interview) 
“Buy temping agencies and 
then if there’s a culture fit, we 
put in our software, our 
machine and then it’s really 
like- Then we can really scale 
up” (Founder 3, Interview) 
“We do not believe in 
outsourcing because we believe 
in organic growth and that is 
very much from our own DNA 
and our own strength. We have 
however started a partnership 
with an accredited HBO IT 
course. I do. And yes, we did it 
quite honestly because we see 
that mums and dads really like 
it if there is an accredited story 






“Well, I think the most important 
thing, or the most important thing, 
as long as I am here, is for the 
company, I think, that in the end 
we… The Netherlands has 
become profitable, has always 
remained, has been, from the 
beginning, because of course… It 
was not funded in the beginning, 
so with that there was actually 
created a profit center” (CEO, 
Interview) 
“With the money that he started 
earning at some point, he 
reinvested abroad and he was able 
to do so until 2012 with no 
funding, because we were 
profitable. So we could use the 
excess cash that was there” (CFO, 
Interview) 
“So, the funny thing that 
happened, is that we went to a 
billion euros without taking any 
money whatsoever. So, we 
literally started with five 
hundred guilders, which is two 
hundred euros, the three of us. 
And that’s the only money that 
ever went in there” (CEO, 
Interview) 
“And the funny thing is, is we 
only, we never attracted 
financing. So, the, because the 
business model that we used 
financed its own growth” (CEO, 
Interview) 
“So, I actually started with a 
team of one and it just grew, 
grew, grew and I think, well, 
one of the key things here is 
that most of the time we build 
something. We make a little bit 
money with the thing we built 
and then we reinvest it, which is 
totally different than companies 
that just, you know, there’s 
financial backing to grow, we 
make total different choices” 
(CIO, Interview) 
“We were just investing all the 
money we earned … Yes, the 
first six, seven years we, all the 
money we gained went back to 
the company.” (Founder 1, 
Interview) 
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6.1 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
How do organizations deal with both internal and external changes when growing fast? And 
how do incumbent firms protect their competitive positions when they are challenged by their 
fast-growing competitors? Managers and academics are seeking to answer these questions for 
years (Wernerfelt, 1984). The dynamic capabilities framework has provided valuable insights 
into how firms are able to deal with, and prosper in, times of change (Schilke et al., 2018; Teece 
et al., 1997). In a similar vein, the concept of business models has expanded our understanding 
of how firms react to, and bring about, innovation (Foss & Saebi, 2017; Massa et al., 2017). 
Moreover, research on high-growth firms has increased significantly in the last years and started 
to provide answers to the questions of ‘what’ drives high growth and ‘how many’ firms are able 
to grow fast (Demir et al., 2017). While these concepts provide valuable insights, the literature 
indicates that there is still no complete answer to these questions. Specifically, there is still 
much left to learn about how firms and top managers deal with the critical questions of high 
growth and innovation in the pursuit of successful adaptation. Hence, in this dissertation, our 
aim is to contribute to the management literature by extending our understanding of these 
important questions. 
In the attempt to advance our understanding of these questions, we carried out three empirical 
studies. The first study zoomed in to how the top management team of an incumbent firm 
brought together the dynamic managerial capabilities of its individual top managers in order to 
successfully innovate the firm’s business model. The second study focused on how a successful 
scale-up company was able to sustain its high growth rates over prolonged periods of time by 
continuously adapting to the changing circumstances. The third study attempted to unravel the 
key characteristics of scalable business models that allowed the firms to create and capture 
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value over prolonged periods of high growth. In order to provide an overview of the main 
findings, we summarize the main conclusions from each of the empirical studies in this chapter.  
6.1.1 Conclusions Study 1 
In the first study we asked: How do top management’s dynamic managerial capabilities 
combine in the process of business model innovation? We conducted an in-depth case study of 
the business model innovation process of the biggest independent fashion retailer in the 
Netherlands. Building on the dynamic managerial capability literature, we aimed to open the 
black box of how dynamic managerial capabilities are brought together within the team (Brettel 
et al., 2018; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). 
By developing a grounded process model, we illustrate that the dynamic managerial capabilities 
of individual top managers are brought together by the means of purposeful friction. That is, 
the process in which top management purposefully creates friction between the cognitive 
interpretations of individuals in order to shape and enhance the collective interpretations of the 
team. We identify purposeful friction as an interpersonal mechanism that allows the top 
management team to move beyond the cognitive limitations of individuals, leading to better 
sensemaking as a team. This insight extends current literature by unraveling the interpersonal 
mechanism that allows top management teams to combine the dynamic managerial capabilities 
of their individual top managers (Brettel et al., 2018; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). Furthermore, 
our findings show that the fact that the TMT members embrace friction allows them to move 
beyond opposing believes of individuals and combine their perspectives in order to seize the 
identified opportunities. Hence, we contribute to research on dynamic capabilities by showing 
that embracing friction can bridge the gap between dynamic managerial sensing and seizing 
capabilities (Roberts & Grover, 2012; Schilke et al., 2018). 
6.1.2 Conclusion Study 2 
The research question of the second study was: What are the managerial and organizational 
capabilities that enable sustained high growth and how are they created and enacted over time? 
To answer this question, we conducted an in-depth case study of Takeaway, the most successful 
scale-up in the Netherlands and one of the leading food order and delivery platforms worldwide. 
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This study was performed to better understand how high-growth firms are able to achieve and 
sustain high growth over prolonged periods of time (Demir et al., 2017; Wright & Stigliani, 
2013).  
We find that strategic leaders within an HGF take deliberate actions to identify and prioritize 
key growth driving routines, a managerial capability we refer to as capturing the high-growth 
logic. We find that top management dynamically assembles the high-growth logic into 
organizational capabilities to ensure a continued match with the external and internal 
contingencies the firm faces during growth. These organizational capabilities involve pooling 
resources, focused interventions by senior management, and controlled empowerment of 
employees with the aim to continuously sustain and even increase high growth rates over time. 
These insights move beyond earlier research that has addressed rather generic capabilities for 
high growth (Barbero et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2006; Stam & Wennberg, 2009). Our findings 
suggest that HGFs (pro)actively address rapid scaling challenges through building and revising 
specific capabilities for sustained high growth. They do so by consciously reflecting on their 
existing constellation of organizational routines and capabilities, and by creating opportunities 
to develop new ones as needed, thus breaking away from inertial loops and remaining nimble 
and flexible to fundamentally change their course of action as needed. Our resulting model also 
illustrates how HGFs modify, reconfigure, and improve their established capabilities (pooling 
resources, focused intervention, and controlled empowerment) through continuously relying on 
a managerial capability, which we refer to as reinforcing complementarities. It captures the top 
management team’s capacity to identify complementarities among the high-growth routines 
that they have at a given time, and to orchestrate their joint execution in ways that enable a 
faster response to any challenges, greater learning and overall process efficiency. This insight 
complements prior research by providing insights about the specific way HGFs modify and 
develop their capabilities in order to sustain high growth over time (Dibella et al., 1996; Zollo 
& Winter, 2002). 
6.1.3 Conclusion Study 3 
The third study in the dissertation addressed the question: How do high-growth firms design 
scalable business models that enable them to create and capture value over prolonged periods 
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of high growth? We carried out a multiple-case study within three of the most successful scale-
ups in the Netherlands. By building on the business model literature, we aimed at identifying 
the key characteristics of their scalable business model designs (Jansen et al., 2020).  
Our findings suggest that scalable business models are characterized by their Digitalized 
Activities (content), Reinforcing Network Effects (structure), and Integrated Control 
(governance). The digital nature of the value creating and capturing processes is an important 
source of their scalability as it increases both efficiency and effectiveness. The reinforcing 
network effects imply that scalable business models are architected in such a way that there is 
a reinforcing interdependence between various stakeholders and product/service groups on 
different sides of the business model, leading to an upward spiral of growth. Finally, we find 
that in order to manage this scalable business model successfully and reinforce the upward 
spiral of growth, the scalable business models are characterized by a strong integrated control 
which implies that the strategic activities are internally managed by the focal firm. Moreover, 
our findings show how the most successful HGFs architect these elements to ensure long term 
scalability. Our findings contribute to prior research in at least two ways. First, we provide a 
more dynamic perspective on business model design themes by identifying business model 
design characteristics for scalable business models (Zott & Amit, 2010). Second, we provide a 
more dynamic perspective on high growth by illuminating the strategic characteristics of HGFs 
that allow them to create and capture value over prolonged periods of rapid scaling (Rindova 
et al., 2012; Senderovitz et al., 2016). 
6.2 GENERAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
6.2.1 Contributions to the literature 
The results of the empirical studies have several implications for the literature which have been 
extensively discussed within the respective chapters and outlined in the conclusions of this 
chapter. As the discussions in the empirical studies indicate, our findings have implications 
beyond the ‘Dynamic Capabilities’, ‘Business Models’ and ‘High-Growth’ literatures. 
However, since these concepts constitute the main focus of this dissertation, in this chapter, we 
will specifically highlight how the findings contribute to these three literatures. 
Chapter 6: General conclusions and contributions 
 191 
6.2.1.1 Contributions to the dynamic capabilities literature 
The dynamic capabilities literature has branched into various hierarchical levels (Schilke et al., 
2018). At the highest level there are the higher-order dynamic capabilities which have 
developed into a sub-field of dynamic managerial capabilities (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Teece, 
2018b). Our first study contributes to this part of the literature by opening the black box of how 
the interaction of dynamic managerial capabilities of individuals in the TMT affects team 
decision making with regard to strategic change (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). By illuminating how 
top managers can purposefully create cognitive friction between the perceptions of individuals 
and identify ways they overcome this in order to increase team-based sensemaking, we 
contribute to prior literature by opening the black box of how interpersonal interactions 
contribute to team-based dynamic capabilities (Brettel et al., 2018; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). 
Our findings address the recent call for further research that “there are many multilevel and 
cross-level issues to address. For example, the concept of dynamic managerial capabilities 
applies not only to individual managers but also to teams of managers” (Helfat & Martin, 2015: 
1305).  
Besides hierarchical levels, the procedural levels of sensing, seizing and transforming have 
been identified in the dynamic capabilities literature (Teece, 2007). While the different 
procedural levels are well-established in the literature, prior research has remained silent on 
how managers are able to move from identifying opportunities for the firm (sensing) to 
capitalizing on these opportunities (seizing) (Roberts & Grover, 2012; Schilke et al., 2018). Our 
first study contributes to this gap in the literature by showing how top managers were able to 
move from the identification of an opportunity by an individual top manager to collaborative 
team-level decision making by the means of purposeful friction. Our findings are a first step in 
understanding the bridge between the various procedural levels of dynamic capabilities. 
The current state of the dynamic capabilities literature also indicates that the development of 
dynamic capabilities is either examined in new ventures or in more mature firms (Autio et al., 
2011). Our second study expands this by analyzing the dynamic development and adaptation 
of dynamic capabilities in a scale-up firm, which places as a company in-between new ventures 
and mature firms. By introducing reinforcing complementarities as a managerial capability that 
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enables scale-ups to constantly ‘update’ their organizational capabilities to adapt to the 
changing circumstances, we provide valuable insights into the dynamic development of 
dynamic capabilities (Danneels, 2011; Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). Furthermore, by introducing 
specific dynamic capabilities for high growth, we enhance our understanding of the dynamic 
capability framework by expanding its applicability to new important organizational contexts. 
6.2.1.2 Contributions to the business model literature 
The business model has developed into an important theoretical concept to explain how a firm 
does business by creating and capturing value (Massa et al., 2017). The findings of our first 
study reaffirm the findings of prior studies that dynamic managerial capabilities and business 
models are interrelated concepts (Cosenz & Noto, 2018; Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019; Mezger, 
2014; Teece, 2018b). 
In our third study, we contribute to the literature on business model design themes (Amit & 
Zott, 2015; Gerdoçi et al., 2018). Prior research used to ‘label’ the entire activity system into 
different design themes and hence provided a rather generic and static view on business model 
designs (Zott & Amit, 2010). Our study moves beyond this generic perspective by zooming in 
to the core elements and identifying how each core element (content, structure, and governance) 
is characterized in scalable business models designs. Moreover, we provide a more dynamic 
view of business model designs as we consider how the core elements are configured to 
facilitate long-term value creation and capture and move beyond current insights that took a 
rather static ‘one-moment in time’ perspective (Amit & Zott, 2001; Hock et al., 2016).  
Furthermore, scholars have argued that scalability is an important source of ‘winning’ business 
models (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2011). Yet, there is no congruence on what scalable 
business models actually are and how firms can achieve business model scalability (Nielsen & 
Lund, 2018; Zhang et al., 2015). Our study addresses this research gap in several ways. First, 
by building on the system literature, we update the definition of scalable business models. Our 
updated definition provides more clarity in the literature which facilitates scholars in future 
research. Second, we provide a first empirical contribution and identify the key characteristics 
of the scalable business models of Netherlands’ most successful high-growth firms (Jansen et 
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al., 2020). By doing this, we provide much needed grounded insights into this important 
phenomenon and enhance our understanding of the characteristics of scalable business models. 
6.2.1.3 Contributions to the high growth literature 
Studies have shown that high-growth firms are important for economic growth and prosperity 
of entire countries and regions (Lopez-Garcia & Puente, 2012). In the field of management, 
current literature has applied mainly quantitative research approaches and have therefore 
offered rather static insights into these firms (Barbero et al., 2011). Both the second and third 
study aim to move beyond this static approach and to provide a more dynamic view on high 
growth. In our second study, we contribute to the literature on high-growth firms by providing 
a process model that captures dynamically how high growth can be sustained over time, which 
can serve as a valuable blueprint for fast-scaling organizations. By highlighting high-growth 
specific capabilities, we open the black box of how HGFs deal with the challenges of rapid 
scaling over time.  
Scholars have argued that scalability, which broadly refers to the ability to obtain and sustain 
profitable growth (Picken, 2017), is a specific characteristic of HGFs that set them apart from 
other growing organizations (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017). Yet, academic research in the field of 
business and management has barely touched upon this topic. Our third study extends our 
understanding of scalability in HGFs by revealing the configurations of scalable business 
models. Our findings provide important insights into how managers of HGFs design and refine 
scalable business models to enable value creation and capture over prolonged periods of high 
growth.  
6.2.2 Managerial implications 
The findings in this dissertation also have important implications for managerial practice. On 
the one hand, the findings of the empirical studies provide insights into how managers of HGFs 
deal with the internal and external challenges of rapid growth. On the other hand, this 
dissertation provides insights into how managers deliberately innovate their firm’s business 
model to protect the competitive position of their firm when it is challenged by fast growing 
competitors. 
Managing High Growth and Innovation 
 194 
Our first study provides new insights into how top managers bring together the perceptions of 
the individual top managers within the team in order to make better business model innovation 
decisions. Our process model suggests that managers should create a situation in which 
cognitive friction is embraced. Namely, purposeful cognitive friction may be a fruitful process 
for better business model innovation choices. For the successful implementation of the 
interpersonal mechanism purposeful friction, our findings suggest that top managers should 
compose triadic top management teams with managers with diverse backgrounds and functional 
responsibilities, and equally distribute the decision power among these managers. Moreover, 
our findings suggest that top managers should explicitly define core values because it stimulates 
the top management team members to work towards the long-term goals of the organization, 
even though the individual managers might have different interpretations about how to achieve 
these goals. Finally, our findings may help top managers to be closely involved in 
experimentation as we show how this could contribute to quickly detect opportunities and to 
shape BMI in line with the overarching company goals. 
The second study provides important insights for managers about how to achieve and sustain 
high growth over prolonged periods of times. Our findings suggest that strategic leaders within 
scale-up companies should take deliberate actions to identify the growth logic of their 
organizations. Capturing the growth logic is important for managers because it channels their 
attention to the activities that further enhance the growth of their organizations. Managers 
should closely intervene in these activities because it allows them to not only align the 
organization with the growth logic, it also allows them to develop the organizational capabilities 
that allow for the operationalization thereof. What is more, our findings highlight that managers 
of HGFs should assemble their dynamic capabilities in such a way that there are 
complementarities between their organizational capabilities. That is, reinforcing effects 
between capabilities that exceed the outcome of the sum of parts. By developing high growth 
specific capabilities and assembling complementarities between them, managers are able to 
further stimulate and enhance the growth logic of the organization. As such, managers of HGFs 
are able to achieve and sustain fast growth by having a strong emphasis on the high growth 
logic and aligning their organizations towards stimulating this logic. 
Chapter 6: General conclusions and contributions 
 195 
The third and last study of this dissertation provides insights into how managers can design 
their business models to ensure scalability over time. Our findings suggest that managers should 
digitalize the activities in the business model and create reinforcing network effects between 
them. Our findings also indicate that managers should create a strong integrated control over 
the activities in the system and take a centralized position within it. This allows them to oversee 
the bigger picture, make fast decisions, and make decisions to stimulate the network effects. By 
doing this, managers are able to make decisions that ensure long-term scalability and profits 
over mitigating short-term losses. Moreover, our findings suggest that managers should make 
investment decisions focusing on stimulating the network effects and prioritize this over short 
term profits in independent and isolated branches of their organizations.  
6.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH LINES 
The studies in this dissertation have addressed important gaps in the literature and answered 
recent calls for further research. However, each study has certain limitations that one should be 
aware of and which provide rich avenues for future research. In our first study, a limitation is 
that we built our insights on a single-case study of a family firm with a relative limited number 
of interviews. Although we have been able to talk to the key decision makers in the organization 
and form a complete understanding of the top management team interaction, future research 
could benefit from either ethnographic longitudinal research to further zoom in to the process 
in-depth, or a multiple-case study approach to see how the process evolves in other 
organizations, also nonfamily firms. 
In our second study, a similar limitation is present. We conducted an in-depth single case study 
in a revelatory case of sustained high growth. Although our model provides higher conceptual 
insights, firm specific characteristics such as the industry they operate in, their technological 
nature, and the fact that they were not backed by venture capital in the first five years of their 
growth trajectory, might introduce case-specific idiosyncrasies important for the results. We 
encourage future research to explore the extension and boundary conditions of our model 
(Smith & Besharov, 2019). A rich avenue for future research is to explore the applicability of 
the resulting model to other settings. Would mature, stable incumbents that are not growing or 
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start-ups which experience more modest growth rates also benefit from the model? These are 
interesting questions for future research. 
In the final study, we studied three cases of successful HGFs. Good practice in the ‘Eisenhardt 
method’ is to use at least four cases and include ‘similar yet distinct’ cases to capture the 
variance between them (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Even though we 
collected a broad number of interviews and other studies have preceded us in using less than 
four cases (e.g. Björkdahl, 2009; Lerch & Gotsch, 2015), the limited number of cases is a 
limitation of the study. Future research would benefit from multiple-case studies including more 
cases. Another limitation in our study is that we only studied highly successful cases and did 
not compare them with less successful ones. Comparing the characteristics of the scalable 
business models of successful HGFs with firms that were not able to sustain their rapid growth 
is an important avenue for future research. 
Overall, we believe the studies in this dissertation address important phenomena about which 
our understanding is limited. We hope the empirical insights extend our understanding of these 
phenomena and contribute to the important, yet complex challenges of sustaining high growth 
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INTRODUCCIÓN GENERAL AL TEMA DE INVESTIGACIÓN 
El entorno empresarial actual se caracteriza por su alto dinamismo causado por la disrupción 
tecnológica y digital y el crecimiento disruptivo de modelos de negocios innovadores (Teece, 
2018b). Las empresas que innovan el modelo de negocio pueden crecer rápidamente y presionar 
mucho a las empresas establecidas (Kim & Min, 2015). Un ejemplo bien conocido es Netflix, 
que cambió su modelo de negocio de entrega de DVD a una plataforma de transmisión online 
y, al hacerlo, cambió el estado del arte en la industria del alquiler de películas (Snihur & Zott, 
2019). Blockbuster, la empresa más grande de la industria en ese momento, que operaba con 
tiendas físicas de alquiler de películas, no logró ajustar su modelo de negocio a las nuevas 
circunstancias y solo unos años después se declaró en bancarrota (Ahuja & Novelli, 2016). 
Polaroid (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) y Nokia (Vuori & Huy, 2016), enfrentaron los mismos 
desafíos, las dos empresas con mejores resultados en sus industrias perdieron la batalla debido 
a su incapacidad para adaptarse al cambio del entorno. Estos casos ejemplifican dos tendencias 
importantes en el entorno empresarial actual. Por un lado, las empresas que pueden diseñar 
modelos de negocio innovadores que les permiten alcanzar y mantener un alto crecimiento 
pueden capturar rápidamente una parte importante del mercado en el que operan (Markides, 
2008). Por otro lado, las empresas establecidas enfrentan el desafío de ajustar sus modelos de 
negocio para proteger su posición competitiva en el actual entorno empresarial del cambio 
constante (Saebi, Lien, & Foss, 2017).  
Por qué algunas empresas saben adaptarse continuamente a las circunstancias cambiantes 
mientras que otras no lo consiguen es una pregunta que los académicos han tratado de responder 
durante años. La perspectiva de las capacidades dinámica tiene como objetivo responder a esta 
pregunta. En los últimos veinte años, los académicos han adoptado las capacidades dinámicas 
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como una capacidad importante de las organizaciones para poder extender y modificar su base 
de recursos y capacidades a las circunstancias cambiantes (Barreto, 2010; Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Helfat & Peteraf, 2009; Helfat & Winter, 2011; Schilke, Hu, & Helfat, 
2018; Teece, 2007; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). 
En los primeros estudios, el enfoque de las capacidades dinámicas se ha centrado 
particularmente en los procesos organizativos que permiten a las empresas alterar la forma en 
que hacen los negocios (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997). Sin embargo, dado que 
los directivos son los agentes clave de la adaptación y el cambio, y los procesos organizativos 
reflejan las creencias e ideas de ellos (Zahra, Sapienza, & Davidsson, 2006), se ha argumentado 
cada vez más que esas capacidades deben ser utilizadas adecuadamente por la alta dirección 
para poder ser efectivos (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). Debido a que los académicos han destacado 
cada vez más el papel de la alta dirección en la orientación de las capacidades dinámicas, la 
literatura se ha ramificado en un subcampo de capacidades directivas dinámicas (CDD) (Helfat 
& Martin, 2015; Teece, 2018a). Las capacidades directivas dinámicas son las capacidades con 
las cuales los directivos crean, extienden y modifican los recursos y competencias 
organizacionales (Adner & Helfat, 2003, p. 1012; Helfat & Martin, 2015). 
Teece (2018) argumenta que la capacidad de diseñar e implementar la innovación del modelo 
de negocio es una característica importante de las CDD. En el entorno actual que cambia 
rápidamente, argumenta él, podría ser incluso la característica más importante de las CDD 
(Teece, 2018a). Los estudios han demostrado que las empresas que innovan su modelo de 
negocio, es decir, las empresas que realizan cambios diseñados, novedosos y no triviales en la 
forma en que crean y capturan valor, tienden a superar a sus competidores en casi todas las 
industrias (Zott & Amit, 2007). Sin embargo, la innovación del modelo de negocio (IMN) es 
una tarea muy compleja para los directivos (Snihur & Zott, 2019). Aunque algunos gerentes 
hayan diseñado un IMN exitoso en respuesta a las circunstancias cambiantes, muchos otros han 
experimentado grandes dificultades y no han podido realizar el proceso de IMN con éxito 
(Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). El mayor número de estudios 
sobre la relación entre CDD y IMN indica que las CDD del equipo directivo son de crucial 
importancia para la innovación exitosa del modelo de negocio (Foss & Saebi, 2017; 
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Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019; Helfat & Martin, 2015; Martins, Rindova, & Greenbaum, 2015; 
Schneider & Spieth, 2013). 
La investigación sobre capacidades dinámicas se ha centrado principalmente en el desarrollo 
de capacidades dinámicas en nuevas empresas o en empresas más maduras (Autio, George, & 
Alexy, 2011). Sin embargo, también proporciona una teoría importante para estudiar cómo las 
empresas de alto crecimiento (EAC) logran adaptarse continuamente a las circunstancias 
cambiantes. Las EAC, a las que se refieren muchas veces como Scale-Ups, se definen como 
organizaciones con al menos el 20% de la tasa de crecimiento anual en términos de ingresos 
y/o empleados durante un período de tres años, y con al menos 10 empleados en el año base 
(OECD, 2007). Mientras el tamaño aumenta rápidamente, los entornos internos de las EAC 
‘sufren’ cambios drásticos que afectan a su gestión, están sometidas a un cambio continuo y 
rápido, que muchas veces resulta en la inadecuación de las prácticas y estructuras existentes 
(Nicholls-Nixon, 2005). Además, el rápido crecimiento genera desafíos importantes para las 
habilidades (directivas), las prácticas y estructuras organizativas y las necesidades de recursos 
(humanos) (Hambrick & Crozier, 1985; Lee, 2014). Aunque estos estudios proporcionan 
información valiosa sobre los desafíos que enfrentan los EAC, existe una escasez de estudios 
que aborden cómo estas empresas logran superar estos desafíos directivos. Esto significa que 
nuestra comprensión actual sobre los fundamentos y procesos que subyacen el alto crecimiento 
sostenido, se queda limitada (Demir, Wennberg, & McKelvie, 2017; Wright & Stigliani, 2013). 
Como solo un porcentaje pequeño de empresas puede superar los desafíos del alto crecimiento 
y, por lo tanto, mantener un alto crecimiento durante períodos prolongados de tiempo (Mom, 
2019), los académicos han comenzado a mostrar interés en las características estratégicas de 
tales organizaciones (Demir et al., 2017; Jansen et al., 2020). Se ha argumentado que la 
escalabilidad, que en general se refiere a la capacidad de obtener y mantener un crecimiento 
rentable (Picken, 2017), es una característica específica de las EAC que las distingue de otras 
organizaciones crecientes (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017). Las empresas que consiguen diseñar e 
implementar modelos de negocio escalables podrían lograr sostener un alto crecimiento a lo 
largo del tiempo (Zhang, Lichtenstein, & Gander, 2015). Sin embargo, faltan estudios que 
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explican cómo son los modelos de negocio escalables y cómo las empresas configuran sus 
modelos de negocio para que sean escalables (Jansen et al., 2020). 
En resumen, los estudios han demostrado que en el entorno empresarial actual, que está en 
constante cambio, o las empresas logran un alto crecimiento o su posición competitiva se ve 
desafiada por los competidores que lo hacen. Por un lado, las empresas que logran un alto 
crecimiento enfrentan desafíos directivos como diseñar modelos de negocios escalables y 
ajustar sus prácticas organizacionales a las circunstancias cambiantes. Por otro lado, las 
empresas que se enfrentan a competidores de alto crecimiento también enfrentan el desafío de 
innovar su modelo de negocio para proteger su posición competitiva. De cualquier manera, las 
empresas deben confiar en sus capacidades dinámicas, guiadas por el equipo directivo, para 
abordar esos desafíos. A pesar de la importancia, sigue habiendo lagunas significativas en 
nuestra comprensión de cómo las empresas consiguen esto. 
Primero, sabemos que las empresas establecidas confían en las capacidades directivas 
dinámicas de su equipo directivo en el proceso de innovación de sus modelos de negocios 
(Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019; Teece, 2018a). Sin embargo, sigue habiendo una brecha 
importante en nuestra comprensión de cómo se combinan estas  CDD de nivel individual dentro 
de un equipo directivo en este proceso de innovación del modelo de negocio (Brettel, Flatten, 
Bendig, da Costa, & Strese, 2018; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). Este es una omisión importante 
porque comprender cómo las empresas perciben y aprovechan las oportunidades requiere 
examinar los mecanismos interpersonales que permiten a los equipos directivos combinar los 
CDD individuales dentro del equipo y tener un consenso colectivo (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; 
Salvato & Vassolo, 2018).   
En segundo lugar, los estudios han demostrado que, aunque solo un pequeño porcentaje de 
empresas logra hacerlo, es posible lograr y mantener un alto crecimiento. Sin embargo, la 
literatura actual nos dice poco sobre cómo las EAC enfrentan los desafíos de la adaptación 
constante a las circunstancias cambiantes que vienen con el alto crecimiento (Demir et al., 2017; 
Wright & Stigliani, 2013). Esta es una omisión crucial porque una comprensión profunda de 
las EAC requiere examinar los patrones dinámicos mediante los cuales evoluciona el alto 
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crecimiento, y las capacidades específicas requeridas para adaptarse a las contingencias internas 
y externas a lo largo del tiempo (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Simsek, 2009). 
Tercero, los académicos han argumentado que diseñar modelos de negocio escalables es lo que 
distingue las empresas de alto crecimiento de otras organizaciones (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017; 
Zhang et al., 2015). Sin embargo, la literatura existente no explica cómo las EAC deben diseñar 
sus actividades de creación y captura de valor para facilitar y gestionar el alto crecimiento a lo 
largo del tiempo (Mom, 2019; Simsek, Heavey, & Fox, 2017). Esto es una omisión importante 
porque una comprensión profunda tanto de la escalabilidad del modelo de negocio como de las 
EAC requiere una comprensión profunda de las características clave de sus modelos de negocio 
(Jansen et al., 2020). Como tal, existe una necesidad clara de obtener información sobre cómo 
las EAC configuran los elementos de su modelo de negocio para garantizar la escalabilidad a 
largo plazo. 
En resumen, mientras que la literatura actual ha proporcionado importantes conocimientos 
sobre los fenómenos, esta tesis se basa en la noción de que aún queda mucho por aprender sobre 
cómo las organizaciones manejan los cambios internos y externos cuando crecen rápidamente, 
o como se protegen de los competidores que lo hacen. 
RESUMEN DE LOS ESTUDIOS DE LA TESIS 
Con el fin de fortalecer y desarrollar nuestra comprensión de cómo las organizaciones enfrentan 
estos desafíos, en esta tesis doctoral realizo tres estudios empíricos que tratan cada una de las 
omisiones identificadas en la literatura. En base a las oportunidades identificadas para futuras 
líneas de investigación, se han desarrollado tres preguntas de investigación que juntas intentan 
mejorar nuestra comprensión de los fenómenos: 
1) ¿Cómo se combinan las capacidades dinámicas directivas de los individuos en el equipo 
directivo en el proceso de innovación del modelo de negocio? 
2) ¿Cómo manejan las empresas de alto crecimiento lograr y mantener un alto crecimiento 
durante períodos prolongados de tiempo al tiempo que abordan los desafíos de la adaptación 
constante que conlleva el rápido crecimiento? 
Managing High Growth and Innovation 
 228 
3) ¿Cómo diseñan las empresas de alto crecimiento modelos de negocios escalables que les 
permitan crear y captar valor durante períodos prolongados de alto crecimiento? 
Cada pregunta tiene como objetivo resolver una parte diferente del puzle al que intentamos 
contribuir a lo largo de esta tesis y, por lo tanto, tiene diferentes objetivos y métodos. Por lo 
tanto, cada estudio proporciona diferentes contribuciones a los fenómenos. 
Resumen estudio 1 
Objetivos estudio 1 
El primer estudio tiene dos objetivos principales. Primero y más importante, mi objetivo es 
extender la investigación previa sobre las capacidades directivas dinámicas desentrañando los 
mecanismos interpersonales que permiten a los directivos combinar las CDD de los directivos 
individuales dentro del equipo directivo (Brettel et al., 2018; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). El 
segundo objetivo del primer estudio es cerrar la brecha entre las capacidades de ‘sensing’ y 
‘seizing’, un vinculo importante para el despliegue exitoso de capacidades dinámicas en el cual 
la investigación previa no se ha enfocado (Roberts & Grover, 2012; Schilke et al., 2018). 
Metodología estudio 1 
Para responder a la pregunta de cómo las capacidades directivas dinámicas de los altos 
directivos individuales se combinan dentro del equipo, en el primer estudio adopté un diseño 
de estudio de caso único. La construcción inductiva de teoría me permitió capturar la naturaleza 
longitudinal y procesal de este proceso (Langley, 1999; Yin, 2014). 
Llevé a cabo mi estudio en el comercio de moda más grande de los Países Bajos, al que nos 
referimos como Ropa, ya que creo que es un contexto revelador y ejemplar que nos permite 
obtener resultados que no se podrían obtener en casos más típicos (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007; Sigglekow, 2007). Enfoqué el análisis específicamente en el proceso en el que Ropa 
innovaba su modelo de negocio al agregar un modelo de negocio online a su modelo de negocio 
físico. 
Mi principal fuente de información fueron las entrevistas con los miembros del equipo directivo 
de Ropa que se realizaron en tres rondas formales de recogida de datos. En total, realicé nueve 
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entrevistas con los miembros del equipo directivo de Ropa y triangulé mis hallazgos analizando 
246 documentos de datos de archivo. Siguiendo la metodología de Gioia (Corley & Gioia, 2004; 
Langley & Abdallah, 2011) primero codifiqué las entrevistas para desarrollar códigos de primer 
orden. Luego, al usar el método de comparación constante (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), agrupé 
los códigos de primer orden en temas de segundo orden para llevar los datos a un nivel más 
conceptual. Después de eso, agrupé los temas de segundo orden en dimensiones agregadas y 
creé una estructura de datos (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012). Finalmente, empíricamente 
desarrollé un modelo de proceso que explica cómo las capacidades directivas dinámicas se 
combinan en el proceso de innovación del modelo de negocio.  
Conclusiones estudio 1 
Identificamos la fricción intencional como un mecanismo interpersonal que permite que el 
equipo directivo vaya más allá de las limitaciones cognitivas de los individuos, lo que lleva a 
una mejor creación de sentido o capacidad de percepción como equipo. Esta visión amplía la 
literatura actual al desentrañar el mecanismo interpersonal que permite a los equipos directivos 
combinar las capacidades directivas dinámicas de sus directivos individuales (Brettel et al., 
2018; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). Además, nuestros hallazgos muestran que el hecho de que los 
miembros del equipo directivo perciben la fricción como algo positivo les permite ir más allá 
de las percepciones opuestas de los individuos y combinar sus perspectivas para aprovechar las 
oportunidades identificadas. Por lo tanto, contribuimos a la investigación sobre capacidades 
dinámicas al mostrar que la percepción positiva de la fricción puede cerrar la brecha entre las 
capacidades dinámicas de ‘sensing’ y ‘seizing’ (Roberts & Grover, 2012; Schilke et al., 2018). 
Resumen estudio 2 
Objetivos estudio 2 
El objetivo principal del segundo estudio es ir más allá de las ideas estáticas sobre el inicio y el 
logro de alto crecimiento (Barbero, Casillas, & Feldman, 2011; Chan, Bhargava, & Street, 
2006; Stam & Wennberg, 2009) e ilustrar cómo las empresas de alto crecimiento mantienen 
dinámicamente su escalamiento durante períodos prolongados de tiempo. Para lograr esto, se 
han formulado dos objetivos concretos. Primero, mi objetivo es identificar las capacidades 
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dinámicas que permiten a las EAC mantener un rápido crecimiento a lo largo del tiempo e 
ilustrar cómo estas capacidades contribuyen a superar los desafíos de ello. El segundo objetivo 
es iluminar cómo las EAC mejoran y desarrollan sus capacidades dinámicas con el tiempo (Ford 
& Friesl, 2019; Montealegre, 2003). 
Metodología estudio 2 
Para responder a la segunda pregunta de investigación, cómo las empresas de alto crecimiento 
pueden establecer y mantener un crecimiento rápido durante largos períodos de tiempo, también 
adoptamos un enfoque de estudio de un caso único (Gehman et al., 2018). El caso seleccionado 
en este estudio fue TakeAway, una de las compañías de distribución de comida para llevar a 
domicilio más grandes del mundo y la EAC más exitosa de Países Bajos. Hemos elegido 
específicamente centrarnos en TakeAway como un caso único para nuestro estudio, ya que 
representa un ejemplo prototípico de una empresa de alto crecimiento altamente exitoso 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Sigglekow, 2007). 
Los datos se recogieron durante un período de 30 meses entre 2017 y 2019. En total, realizamos 
30 entrevistas con el fundador/CEO y los miembros de los equipos directivos. Triangulamos 
nuestros hallazgos analizando 1.598 páginas de documentos de archivo. Similar a nuestro 
enfoque en el estudio 1, nos basamos en la metodología de Gioia para analizar nuestros datos. 
Seguimos las buenas prácticas de análisis de datos cualitativos (Corbin & Strauss, 2014; Miles 
& Huberman, 1994) y desarrollamos una estructura de datos al agrupar códigos de primer orden 
en temas de segundo orden y combinarlos en una dimensión agregada. Finalmente, 
desarrollamos un modelo de proceso fundamentado en los datos empíricos que ilustra cómo 
TakeAway pudo lograr y mantener un alto crecimiento durante un período prolongado de 
tiempo. 
Conclusiones estudio 2 
Descubrimos que los líderes estratégicos dentro de una EAC toman medidas deliberadas para 
identificar y priorizar las rutinas clave que impulsan el crecimiento, que ensamblan 
dinámicamente en capacidades que aseguran una coincidencia continua con las contingencias 
externas e internas que enfrenta la empresa durante el crecimiento. Estas capacidades 
Resumen (Summary in Spanish) 
 231 
organizacionales incluyen capturar la lógica de (alto) crecimiento de la empresa, unir recursos, 
intervenciones enfocadas por los directivos y el empoderamiento controlado de los empleados 
con el objetivo de mantener e incluso aumentar las altas tasas de crecimiento a lo largo del 
tiempo. Estas ideas van más allá de investigaciones anteriores que han abordado capacidades 
bastante generales para el alto crecimiento (Barbero et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2006; Stam & 
Wennberg, 2009). Nuestros resultados sugieren que las EAC abordan activamente los desafíos 
de crecer rápido mediante la creación y revisión de capacidades específicas para el alto 
crecimiento sostenido. Lo hacen reflexionando conscientemente sobre su constelación existente 
de rutinas y capacidades organizativas, y creando oportunidades para desarrollar nuevas según 
sea necesario, separándose así de los bucles inerciales y permaneciendo ágiles y flexibles para 
cambiar fundamentalmente su curso de acción según sea necesario. Nuestro modelo resultante 
también ilustra cómo las EAC modifican, reconfiguran y mejoran sus capacidades establecidas 
(capturar la lógica de (alto) crecimiento, unir recursos, intervención enfocada y 
empoderamiento controlado) al depender continuamente de una capacidad cognitiva, a la que 
nos referimos como refuerzo de complementariedades. Captura la capacidad del equipo 
directivo para identificar complementariedades entre las rutinas de alto crecimiento que tienen 
en un momento dado y para organizar su ejecución conjunta de manera que permita una 
respuesta más rápida a cualquier desafío, mayor aprendizaje y eficiencia general del proceso. 
Estos resultados complementan la investigación previa al proporcionar información sobre la 
forma específica en que los EAC modifican y desarrollan sus capacidades para mantener un 
alto crecimiento en el tiempo (Dibella, Nevis, & Gould, 1996; Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
Resumen estudio 3 
Objetivos estudio 3 
El tercer estudio tiene un objetivo principal similar al estudio dos: proporcionar una perspectiva 
más dinámica del alto crecimiento. Para hacer esto, mi objetivo es identificar las características 
clave de los diseños de modelos de negocios escalables. Al acercarme a los elementos 
principales de los modelos de negocios de las EAC, mi objetivo es proporcionar una perspectiva 
más dinámica y una comprensión más profunda de cómo las características específicas de los 
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elementos del modelo de negocio facilitan la escalabilidad (Zhang et al., 2015; Zott & Amit, 
2010). 
Metodología estudio 3 
Mientras que los dos primeros estudios de esta tesis doctoral se basan en un estudio de caso 
único, el tercer y último se basa en un diseño de estudio de casos múltiple (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). Para responder a la pregunta de cómo las empresas de alto crecimiento 
diseñan sus modelos de negocio para garantizar su escalabilidad a lo largo del tiempo, opto por 
un método de casos múltiples porque me permite seguir la lógica de replicación y probar las 
ideas emergentes dentro de cada caso adicional (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). Seleccioné tres 
de las EAC más exitosas en los Países Bajos con una historia comprobada de crecimiento 
sostenido, ya que creía que estas empresas proporcionarían información valiosa sobre las 
características de los diseños de modelos de negocios escalables. 
La principal fuente de datos fueron entrevistas en profundidad con fundadores, directivos, y 
miembros de los equipos directivos. Se realizaron un total de 33 entrevistas y se analizaron 
1.574 páginas de material de archivo para triangular los hallazgos. Pasé por un proceso iterativo 
de análisis de datos y recorrí recursivamente los datos de casos, la teoría emergente y la 
literatura existente para refinar las ideas teóricas (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Al reflejar las hallazgos emergentes contra la teoría del modelo de negocio 
existente, pude agrupar los códigos empíricos en temas basados en la teoría relacionados con 
los elementos clave del modelo de negocio (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013). 
Conclusiones estudio 3 
Nuestros resultados sugieren que los modelos de negocio escalables se caracterizan por sus 
actividades digitalizadas (contenido), efectos de red (estructura) y control integrado 
(gobernanza). La naturaleza digital de los procesos de creación y captura de valor es una fuente 
importante de su escalabilidad, ya que aumenta tanto la eficiencia como la efectividad. Los 
efectos de red implican que los modelos de negocio escalables están diseñados de tal manera 
que existe un vínculo de refuerzo entre los diversos grupos de interés y los grupos de 
productos/servicios en diferentes lados del modelo de negocio, lo que lleva a una espiral 
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ascendente de crecimiento. Finalmente, encontramos que para gestionar este modelo de negocio 
escalable con éxito y reforzar la espiral ascendente de crecimiento, los modelos de negocio 
escalables se caracterizan por un fuerte control integrado que implica que las actividades 
estratégicas son gestionadas internamente por la empresa focal. Además, nuestros hallazgos 
muestran cómo las EAC más exitosas diseñan estos elementos para garantizar la escalabilidad 
a largo plazo. Nuestros hallazgos contribuyen a la investigación previa en al menos dos formas. 
Primero, brindamos una perspectiva más dinámica sobre los temas de diseño de modelos de 
negocios mediante la identificación de características de los elementos clave de modelos de 
negocios escalables (Zott & Amit, 2010). En segundo lugar, brindamos una perspectiva más 
dinámica sobre el alto crecimiento al iluminar las características estratégicas de las EAC que 
les permiten crear y captar valor durante períodos prolongados de rápido crecimiento (Rindova, 
Yeow, Martins, & Faraj, 2012; Senderovitz, Klyver, & Steffens, 2016). 
CONTRIBUCIONES A LA LITERATURA 
Los resultados de los estudios empíricos tienen varias implicaciones para la literatura de 
"Capacidades Dinámicas", "Modelos de Negocios" y "Empresas de Alto Crecimiento". En este 
capítulo, destacaré específicamente cómo mis hallazgos contribuyen a estas tres literaturas. 
Contribuciones a la literatura de Capacidades Dinámicas 
La literatura de capacidades dinámicas se ha ramificado en varios niveles jerárquicos (Schilke 
et al., 2018). En el nivel más alto están las capacidades dinámicas de orden superior que se han 
convertido en un subcampo de capacidades directivas dinámicas (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Teece, 
2018). Nuestro primer estudio contribuye a esta parte de la literatura al abrir el ‘black box’ de 
cómo la interacción de las capacidades directivas dinámicas de los individuos en el equipo 
directivo afecta la toma de decisiones del equipo con respecto al cambio estratégico (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2015). Al ilustrar cómo los altos directivos pueden crear a propósito fricciones 
cognitivas entre las percepciones de los individuos e identificar formas de superar esto para 
aumentar la creación de sentido basada en el equipo, contribuimos a la literatura previa al abrir 
el ‘black box’ de cómo las interacciones interpersonales contribuyen a las capacidades 
dinámicas del equipo (Brettel et al., 2018; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). Nuestros hallazgos 
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responden a recientes demandas de mayor investigación por parte de Helfat y Martin (2015), 
quienes afirman “hay muchos problemas multinivel y de niveles cruzados para abordar. Por 
ejemplo, el concepto de capacidades directivas dinámicas se aplica no solo a individuos sino 
también a equipos directivos” (Helfat & Martin, 2015, p. 1305). 
Además de los niveles jerárquicos, los niveles de proceso de percibir (sensing), aprovechar 
(seizing) y transformar (reconfiguring) se han identificado en la literatura de capacidades 
dinámicas (Teece, 2007). Aunque los diferentes niveles de proceso están bien establecidos en 
la literatura, la investigación previa no ha hablado sobre cómo los directivos pueden pasar de 
identificar oportunidades para la empresa (percibir) a capitalizar estas oportunidades 
(aprovechar) (Roberts & Grover, 2012; Schilke et al., 2018). Nuestro primer estudio contribuye 
a esta brecha en la literatura al mostrar cómo los altos directivos pudieron pasar de la 
identificación de una oportunidad por parte de un individuo a la toma de decisiones colaborativa 
a nivel de equipo por medio de una fricción intencionada. Nuestros hallazgos son un primer 
paso para comprender el ‘puente’ entre los diversos niveles de proceso de las capacidades 
dinámicas. 
El estado actual de la literatura de capacidades dinámicas indica que el desarrollo de 
capacidades dinámicas se examina en nuevas empresas o en empresas más maduras (Autio, 
George, & Alexy, 2011). Nuestro segundo estudio amplía esto al analizar el desarrollo dinámico 
y la adaptación de capacidades dinámicas en una empresa creciente. Al introducir el refuerzo 
de complementariedades como una capacidad cognitiva que permite a las empresas "actualizar" 
constantemente sus capacidades organizativas para adaptarse a las circunstancias cambiantes, 
proporcionamos información valiosa sobre el desarrollo dinámico de las capacidades 
dinámicas. Además, al introducir capacidades dinámicas específicas para el alto crecimiento, 
mejoramos aún más nuestra comprensión de las capacidades dinámicas al expandir su 
aplicabilidad a nuevos contextos organizativos importantes. 
Contribuciones a la literatura de Modelos de Negocios 
El modelo de negocio se ha convertido en un concepto teórico importante para explicar cómo 
una empresa crea y captura valor (Massa et al., 2017). Los hallazgos de nuestro primer estudio 
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reafirman los resultados de estudios anteriores de que las capacidades directivas dinámicas y 
los modelos de negocios son conceptos interrelacionados (Cosenz & Noto, 2018; 
Frankenberger & Sauer, 2019; Mezger, 2014; Teece, 2018). 
En nuestro tercer estudio, contribuimos a la literatura sobre temas de diseño de modelos de 
negocio (Amit & Zott, 2015; Gerdoçi, Bortoluzzi, & Dibra, 2018). La investigación previa solía 
"etiquetar" todo el sistema de actividades en diferentes temas de diseño y, por lo tanto, 
proporcionaba una visión bastante general y estática de los diseños de modelos de negocio (Zott 
& Amit, 2010). Nuestro estudio va más allá de esta perspectiva general al acercarse a los 
elementos centrales e identificar cómo cada elemento central (contenido, estructura y 
gobernanza) presenta unas determinadas características en el diseño de modelos de negocios 
escalables. Además, brindamos una visión más dinámica de los diseños de modelos de negocios 
al considerar cómo se configuran los elementos centrales para facilitar la creación y la captura 
de valor a largo plazo en tiempos de crecimiento rápido. Estos hallazgos van más allá de las 
ideas actuales que han tomado una perspectiva bastante estática de "un momento en el tiempo" 
(Amit & Zott, 2001; Hock, Clauss, & Schulz, 2016).  
Además, los académicos han argumentado que la escalabilidad es una fuente importante de 
modelos de negocios ‘ganadores’ (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2011). Sin embargo, no hay 
congruencia sobre qué son realmente los modelos de negocio escalables y cómo las empresas 
logran la escalabilidad del modelo de negocio (Nielsen & Lund, 2018; Zhang, Lichtenstein, & 
Gander, 2015).  
 Nuestro estudio aborda esta omisión en varias maneras. Primero, al basarnos en la literatura 
del sistema, actualizamos la definición de modelos de negocios escalables. Nuestra definición 
actualizada proporciona más claridad en la literatura, facilitando la tarea futura a los 
investigadores. En segundo lugar, proporcionamos una primera contribución empírica e 
identificamos las características clave de los modelos de negocio escalables de las empresas de 
alto crecimiento más exitosas de los Países Bajos (Jansen et al., 2020). Al hacer esto, 
proporcionamos información fundamental muy necesaria sobre este importante fenómeno y 
mejoramos nuestra comprensión de las características de los modelos de negocio escalables. 
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Contribuciones a la literatura de alto crecimiento 
Investigaciones han demostrado que las empresas de alto crecimiento son importantes para el 
crecimiento económico y la prosperidad de países y regiones enteras (Lopez-Garcia & Puente, 
2012). En el área de management, la literatura actual ha aplicado principalmente enfoques de 
investigación cuantitativa y, por lo tanto, ha ofrecido ideas bastante estáticas sobre estas 
empresas (Barbero et al., 2011). Tanto el segundo como el tercer estudio tienen como objetivo 
ir más allá de este enfoque estático y proporcionar una visión más dinámica del alto crecimiento. 
En nuestro segundo estudio, contribuimos a la literatura sobre EAC al proporcionar un modelo 
de proceso que captura dinámicamente cómo se puede mantener el alto crecimiento a lo largo 
del tiempo, lo que puede servir como un plan valioso para las organizaciones que crecen 
rápidamente. Al destacar las capacidades específicas de alto crecimiento, abrimos el ‘black box’ 
de cómo las EAC enfrentan los desafíos de la rápida ampliación a lo largo del tiempo. 
Los académicos han argumentado que la escalabilidad, que en general se refiere a la capacidad 
de obtener y mantener un crecimiento rentable (Picken, 2017), es una característica específica 
de las EAC que las distingue de otras organizaciones en crecimiento (DeSantola & Gulati, 
2017). Sin embargo, la investigación académica en el área de la dirección de empresas casi no 
ha abordado este tema. Nuestro tercer estudio amplía nuestra comprensión de la escalabilidad 
en EAC al revelar las configuraciones de los modelos de negocio escalables. Nuestros hallazgos 
proporcionan información importante sobre cómo los directivos de EAC diseñan y refinan 
modelos de negocio escalables para permitir la creación y la captura de valor durante períodos 
prolongados de alto crecimiento. 
Implicaciones prácticas 
Los hallazgos en esta tesis también tienen implicaciones importantes para la práctica. Por un 
lado, esta tesis proporciona información sobre cómo los directivos de EAC enfrentan los 
desafíos internos y externos del rápido crecimiento. Por otro lado, los resultados de los estudios 
empíricos proporcionan información sobre cómo los directivos deliberadamente innovan los 
modelos de negocios de sus empresas para proteger las posiciones competitivas de sus empresas 
cuando son desafiados por competidores que crecen rápidamente. Nuestro primer estudio 
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proporciona nuevos conocimientos sobre cómo los altos directivos reúnen las percepciones de 
los individuos dentro del equipo para tomar mejores decisiones de innovación del modelo de 
negocio. Nuestro modelo de proceso sugiere que los directivos deben crear una situación en la 
que aprecian la fricción cognitiva. Es decir, la intencional fricción cognitiva puede ser un 
proceso fructífero para mejores decisiones de innovación en el modelo de negocio. Para la 
implementación exitosa del mecanismo interpersonal de fricción intencional, nuestros 
hallazgos sugieren que los directivos deben componer equipos tríadicos con individuos con 
experiencia y responsabilidades funcionales diversas y distribuir equitativamente el poder de 
decisión entre estos directivos. Además, nuestros hallazgos sugieren que los directivos deben 
definir explícitamente los valores de la empresa, ya que estimula a los miembros del equipo 
directivo a trabajar hacia los objetivos a largo plazo de la organización, a pesar de que los 
individuos pueden tener diferentes interpretaciones sobre cómo lograr estos objetivos. 
Finalmente, nuestros hallazgos pueden ayudar a los directivos a participar estrechamente en la 
experimentación, ya que mostramos cómo esto podría contribuir a detectar rápidamente las 
oportunidades y dar forma al IMN de acuerdo con los objetivos generales de la empresa. 
El segundo estudio proporciona información importante para los gerentes sobre cómo lograr y 
mantener el alto crecimiento durante períodos prolongados de tiempo. Nuestros hallazgos 
sugieren que los líderes estratégicos dentro de las EAC deben tomar acciones deliberadas para 
identificar la lógica de crecimiento de sus organizaciones. Capturar la lógica de crecimiento es 
importante para los gerentes porque canaliza su atención hacia las actividades que mejoran aún 
más el crecimiento de sus organizaciones. 
Los directivos deben intervenir estrechamente en estas actividades porque les permite no solo 
alinear a la organización con la lógica de crecimiento, sino también aprender y desarrollar las 
capacidades organizacionales que permiten su operacionalización. Además, nuestros hallazgos 
muestran que los directivos de EAC deben reunir sus capacidades dinámicas de tal manera que 
haya complementariedades entre sus capacidades organizacionales. Es decir, reforzar los 
efectos entre capacidades que exceden el resultado de la suma de partes. Al desarrollar 
capacidades específicas de alto crecimiento y reunir complementariedades entre ellos, los 
directivos pueden estimular y mejorar aún más la lógica de crecimiento de la organización. 
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Como tal, los directivos de EAC pueden lograr y mantener un rápido crecimiento al hacer el 
énfasis en la lógica de alto crecimiento y alinear a sus organizaciones para estimular esta lógica. 
El tercer y último estudio de esta tesis proporciona información sobre cómo los directivos 
pueden diseñar sus modelos de negocio para garantizar la escalabilidad en el tiempo. Nuestros 
hallazgos sugieren que los gerentes deberían digitalizar y crear efectos de red entre las 
diferentes actividades en el modelo de negocio. Nuestros hallazgos también indican que los 
directivos deberían crear un control integrado fuerte sobre las actividades en el sistema y tomar 
una posición central dentro de él. Esto les permite supervisar el panorama general, tomar 
decisiones rápidas y tomar decisiones para estimular los efectos de la red. Al hacer esto, los 
directivos pueden tomar decisiones para garantizar la escalabilidad y beneficios a largo plazo 
en lugar de limitar las pérdidas a corto plazo. Además, nuestros hallazgos sugieren que cuando 
los directivos crean efectos de red entre sus actividades de creación de valor, deben tomar 
decisiones de inversión enfocándose en estimular esos efectos y priorizar esto sobre los 
beneficios a corto plazo en sucursales independientes y aisladas de sus compañías. 
LIMITACIONES Y FUTURAS LINEAS DE INVESTIGACIÓN 
Los estudios en esta tesis han abordado brechas importantes en la literatura, respondiendo a un 
creciente interés por estos temas en el área. Sin embargo, cada estudio tiene ciertas limitaciones 
que debemos tener en cuenta y que proporcionan interesantes futuras líneas de investigación. 
En mi primer estudio, una limitación es que construimos nuestras ideas sobre un estudio de 
caso único de una empresa familiar con un número relativamente limitado de entrevistas. 
Aunque hemos podido hablar con los altos directivos que son clave en el proceso de toma de 
decisiones y hemos podido formar una visión completa de la interacción del equipo directivo, 
futura investigación podría beneficiarse de la investigación longitudinal etnográfica para 
ampliar aún más el proceso en profundidad. También podría beneficiarse de un enfoque de 
estudio de caso múltiple para ver cómo evoluciona el proceso en otras organizaciones, también 
en empresas no familiares. 
En mi segundo estudio, se puede encontrar una limitación similar. Realizamos un estudio de 
caso único en profundidad en un caso especialmente revelador de alto crecimiento sostenido. 
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Las características específicas de la empresa, como la industria en la que operan, su naturaleza 
tecnológica y el hecho de que no estuvieron respaldadas por capital de riesgo en los primeros 
cinco años de su trayectoria de crecimiento, podrían influir los resultados. Aunque nuestro 
modelo proporciona una visión más conceptual, yendo más allá de las características específicas 
de la empresa, alentamos la investigación futura para explorar la replicación, la extensión y las 
condiciones que podrían limitar nuestro modelo (Smith & Besharov, 2019). Una línea de futura 
investigación interesante es explorar la aplicabilidad del modelo a otros entornos. ¿Podrían las 
empresas maduras y estables que no están creciendo, o las nuevas empresas con una tasa de 
crecimiento más modesta también beneficiarse del modelo? Estas son preguntas interesantes 
para futuras investigaciones. 
En el último estudio, estudiamos tres casos de EAC exitosos. Una buena práctica en el ‘Método 
de Eisenhardt’ es utilizar al menos cuatro casos e incluir casos ‘similares pero distintos’ para 
captar la variación entre ellos (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Aunque 
recogimos una gran cantidad de entrevistas, y otros estudios me precedieron en el uso de menos 
de cuatro casos (p.e.. Björkdahl, 2009; Lerch & Gotsch, 2015), el número limitado de casos es 
una limitación del estudio. La investigación futura se beneficiaría de estudios de casos múltiples 
incluyendo más casos. Otra limitación en nuestro estudio es que solo estudiamos casos 
altamente exitosos y no los comparamos con los menos exitosos. La comparación de las 
características escalables del modelo de negocio de las EAC exitosas y las empresas que no 
pudieron mantener su rápido crecimiento es una línea importante para futuras investigaciones. 
En general, creo que los estudios en esta tesis abordan fenómenos importantes de los cuales 
nuestra comprensión es limitada. Espero que las reflexiones teóricas y las ideas empíricas en 
esta tesis amplíen nuestra comprensión de estos fenómenos y contribuyan a los desafíos 
importantes, pero complejos, de sostener un alto crecimiento o protegerse de los competidores 
que lo consiguen. 
 
